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The central topic of this work is the relationship between critical knowledge and the counter-
hegemonic activist struggles in Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb. While looking at the “cognitive 
background” of activism, both non-theoretical and theoretical knowledge is taken into account. 
The accent is nonetheless on the theoretical knowledge. Critical ideas, on the other hand, have 
been inspiring social and political actions for centuries. The question of the nature of this 
relationship, including the mechanisms of diffusion, concrete sources and reasoning behind it, 
has thus far remained under - researched. Which type of knowledge is considered to be 
“movement relevant” today? Where does it come from, through which channels and which 
social, structural and organizational factors influence its consolidation and operationalization 
within social movement collectives? All these questions are addressed through a research 
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Before the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, social 
movement studies were mainly focused on Western Europe and North America. Unlike France 
or the United States where big social and political changes throughout their national histories 
were, to an extent, pushed forward by social movements from below – East-European states 
lagged behind with respect to the development of so called “movement society” (Mayer and 
Tarrow 1998). First sign of discontinuity, with respect to direction from which social change 
usually occurs in these societies appeared in the late 1980s, when socialist regimes were 
contested by social movements. Among the most researched and certainly paradigmatic case of 
East-European resistance against the socialist regimes was the Polish movement “Solidarnošd” 
(“Solidarity”).  
Until recently, stream of research of social movements in this part of the world did not go 
too far from the point of the collapse of socialism. In some cases such as Serbia, the most 
researched movement was “Otpor” (“Resistance”) against Slobodan Miloševid in the late 1990s. 
Anyway, the “anti-authoritarian” movements of Eastern Europe remained in the focus of social 
movement scholarship. Currently, we are once again witnessing authoritarian tendencies in 
countries like Hungary, Poland and Serbia. It turned out that the perspective of turning into a 
“movement society” did not materialize after the collapse of the socialist regimes. On the 
contrary, post-socialism was often legitimized as “painful but necessary transition” from real-
socialism to liberal capitalism.   
This is why the comprehensive contestation of so called “transitional” paradigm1  was, in 
most cases, missing in the post-socialist era. People would go out protesting against different 
government’s decisions, or against different rulers. Serbian “Resistance” from the second half 
of the 1990s was one of such movements which tended to confront the “leftovers” of 
authoritarianism in Serbia, as if the era of Slobodan Miloševid, the former president, 
represented continuation with socialism rather than the first stage of transition. All in all, no 
social movement or any other socially or politically relevant actor with a holistic critical 
approach towards transitional paradigm occurred in the period between the initiation of 
transition (in 1991) and the recent past.   
This reality changed in the last decade, especially in the region of former Yugoslavia. After 
approximately two decades of uncontested rule of transitional paradigm, with occasional 
                                                          
1
 Two main conceptual pillars of this paradigm, as will be elaborated in the first chapter, are “Europeanization” and 
“democratization”. Furthermore, this paradigm is composed of two dimensions: economic and political. The prior 
is uniform and by definition promotes free market economy, while the latter is somewhat bipolar and might be 
nationalistic or civic – or both at the same time.  
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particularistic remarks which may all fall under “give us real liberal democracy” or “give us real 
capitalism” type of complaints, some social movements in this region started questioning the 
very essence of the economic and social misconceptions of the post-socialist condition. Some 
ten years ago, different aspects of various “side-effects” of transition surfaced: lack of real 
political participation, powerful ethno-nationalism, corruption, commodification of education, 
high unemployment (due to privatization of factories and companies), violation of labor rights, 
and general social and economic deprivation. The appearance of social movements in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia (and Slovenia) opened the door for addressing all these issues 
as parts of a bigger whole, as compounding elements of the doctrine of transition and, thereby, 
articulating a systemic critique of the status quo. 
This raises a question – what allowed for the occurrence of such social actors? What 
changed so drastically in Serbia that public spaces once again became important, causing the 
emergence of the movement “Ne da(vi)mo Beograd” (“Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own”)? What 
changed in Croatia, causing the student movement from 2008/9 to be widely studied as one of 
the most radical and best organized student movements in the world? What changed, finally, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, enabling the rise of workers’ and popular movements of 2014? 
Looking at the structural conditions, there was no major change. The global economic crisis of 
2007/8 came when the economy had already been destroyed and workers had already been 
suffering from the side-effects of transition. Material and economic deprivation were nothing 
new for this region. A couple of events indeed shook the “dreamy” citizens, but these events 
told them nothing new about their societies – nothing they had not known before. Instead, I 
assume, it was the perception about the causes of such poor social and economic conditions 
that slowly started shifting away from the transitional discourse. It was suspicion that appeared 
– suspicion whether certain policies, privatization and modernization with so many “casualties” 
were indeed necessary or inevitable – or whether they were logical consequences of clear 
political choices that could have been avoided.  
The major premise coming out from here is that it was the maturation of consciousness 
rather than the opening of structural or other “windows of opportunity” that brought about 
potential and possibility for such radical actors to emerge. The following premise is that the 
maturation of consciousness during the last ten years or so resurged as a consequence of 
combination of several factors. On one hand, economic deprivation, as well as social and 
political degradation certainly represented the constant state of affairs since the dissolution of 
former Yugoslavia. Apart from these factors, the most intuitive one which could have affected 
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the maturation of consciousness was the inflow of critical ideas2 that prompted future activists 
to construct alternative, hence counter-hegemonic perception of reality.3  
These premises made the choice of studying the relationship between social movements 
and ideas/knowledge relevant. Nonetheless, ideas can be of different kind. Some are more 
abstract, others more practical; some are utopian, others realistic; some are perceived as 
dangerous, other as backing the status quo. The last dichotomy is the one that draws my 
attention. After almost two decades long rule of the post-socialist transitional paradigm, 
something changed and counter-hegemonic actors popped up in former Yugoslavia. Not only 
reformers of the status quo – but its radical critics appeared, actors who challenged the main 
pillars of transitional paradigm that dominated the former Yugoslav space during the last three 
decades. Therefore, my focus is on the corpus of counter-hegemonic knowledge and their 
relationship with the recent social movements in former Yugoslavia. One may refer to them 
also as critical ideas which had to a) come from somewhere; b) get diffused through some 
channels; and c) reach those people who are more likely to be responsive towards them.   
Ideas often get reshaped and rethought in accordance with a given context. Sometimes, 
they are brought back from the past and updated. They get diffused through stories of older 
generations, books that open space for new imageries and shift the angle from which we 
observe reality and our own experiences. Brokers such as friends or subcultural milieu may help 
out in this process. In case of former Yugoslavia, the road towards the establishment of the 
critical discourse was the road of contestation of the entire post-socialist paradigm. It is, hence, 
relevant to look at the corpus of knowledge which is addressing misconceptions and systemic 
contradictions in their entirety and wonder about the role of this knowledge in the 
abovementioned counter-hegemonic tendencies. This led me to pay specific attention to the 
role of cognitive processes on the more abstract level and assess the importance of theoretical 
knowledge in the formation of critical discourses of these movements. My work thus focuses on 
the role of (generic) critical knowledge in changing the perspective from which the above 
indicated social actors started perceiving and contesting the status quo.    
Certainly, the question of “what changed” and enabled the emergence of more radical 
actors cannot be answered solely through theoretical lenses. Firstly, the influence of theories, if 
present, has its non-theoretical background marked with worldviews, striking points in life or 
experience in general which led to the exposure to theory in the first place and, eventually, 
                                                          
2 Under “critical ideas” I refer to those ideas that “more or less comprehensively challenge the existing social 
order”. This definition is equivalent to the one of “critical theories” provided by Razmig Keucheyan (2013, 2). In the 
following text, I will interchangeably refer to (critical) ideas also as “critical knowledge”.   
3 Hegemony is here understood as the process of reproduction of the existing power relations, whereas counter-
hegemony stands for tendencies of contestation of the existing power relations. Further theoretical elaboration of 
these concepts is provided in the subchapter 2.1.      
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affected more specific theoretical choices. So, if one seeks to explore the relationship between 
theoretical knowledge and certain articulation of critique, one needs to take into account the 
whole process of cognitive “accumulation” and different stages that result in a given shape of 
“cognitive maps” (Jameson, 1990) of both individual activists and social movements.  
Secondly, theory is always interacting with various activist practices – from social to 
political. Structures, macro-politics, economic crises, all sorts of events or Events, doubtlessly 
influence thoughts and ideas, including theoretical knowledge. Theory cannot change the 
consciousness of activists or any other actor by itself. Moreover, some activists are not affected 
by theory at all. However, the analysis of dynamics of collectively produced critical discourses of 
the three movements in former Yugoslavia, showed that conceptual level of the critique is very 
noticeable and in some cases, very significant when it comes to “critical cognition”, both 
individual and collective.  
The most general premise of this work is hence that theory (and especially critical theory) 
matters with respect to activism, even though some activists are affected by it more than 
others. This premise is deduced from the general task of theoretical knowledge to illuminate 
phenomena, shed light on inconsistences or helps in finding linkages between phenomena 
which, at first, do not look connected or dependent on each other. Claiming that theory played 
a decisive role in the construction of the new imagery or in determining the shift of perspective 
and the broad scope of critique in former Yugoslavia, would have probably overemphasized its 
significance. Claiming that its presence was necessary but definitely not sufficient condition for 
expanding and deepening the scope of critique would have made much more sense.  
With the inflow of new ideas and maturation of awareness of causes of systemic 
misconceptions4, different national contexts gave birth to different types of action. Similar 
ideas could have resulted in various activist outcomes, depending on specific context within 
which they were applied. The context of the former Yugoslav post-socialism thus gave birth to 
new social movements that, as mentioned above, managed to break the absolute dominance of 
transitional paradigm by accommodating certain ideas and developing them further within a 
given context.  
Following that notion, the themes that this thesis seeks to address include: critical theory’s 
relevance for activism; channels through which critical knowledge (including critical theory) 
spreads across space and time; the sources and factors that shape individual interests in 
(critical) theory; collective dynamics bringing certain concepts to the forefront of epistemic 
                                                          
4
 See more about the misconceptions of the post-socialist transitional paradigm in the subchapter 1.1.  
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discourses; the relationship between worldview (non-theoretical) and theoretical knowledge in 
the construction of critical cognitive maps.5  
Through these themes, I am discussing the influence of both theoretical and non-theoretical 
(critical) knowledge on social movements. At the same time, I am bearing in mind that this is 
not a one-way street. In order to avoid the “chicken-egg” dilemma of discussing what comes 
first (practice or ideas), I am consciously choosing to focus on one of the two directions (ideas-
practice), while keeping in mind the importance of the opposite direction as well. Apart from 
making the focus of research clear, this remark is important also because it allows me to 
emphasize what is not essential to it. In a nutshell, I am not focusing on the political outcomes 
of ideas, or any other consequences of their intervention apart from the impact on individual 
and collective cognitive processes and discursive breakthroughs made by social movements. I 
am not wondering whether the time for certain ideas has come or not.6 Instead, I start from the 
initial assumption that certain (critical) ideas reached activists and movements, and helped out 
in the formulation of a critique which had been lacking in the post-socialist space of former 
Yugoslavia hitherto. Consequently, the role of ideas is assessed through a closer look at the 
individual and collective processes of cognitive accumulation and “maturation”, as well as by 
looking at how movements’ discourses relate to the dominant discourse (paradigm).   
In order to grasp the link between critical ideas and action, theory and activism, theory and 
non-theory, or in general, counter hegemonic thought and counter hegemonic action in the 
given context of post-socialism, this thesis is divided into seven chapters, where each chapter 
contains a number of subchapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the (post-socialist) 
context within which this research is being conducted. The same chapter includes a subchapter 
on the post-Yugoslavian context, which testifies about additional specificities and peculiarities 
of this region. Finally, the first chapter is concluded by the overview of concrete case studies as 
well as the logic behind the case selection. The second chapter is dealing with the theoretical 
framework. The main pillars of theoretical framework include sociology of knowledge, critical 
theory and specific branches of social movement studies such as cognition and social 
movements, collective identity, diffusion and frames. The third chapter tackles research 
questions and methodological choices, including (epistemic) discourse analysis and in-depth 
qualitative, semi-open interviews. The fourth chapter is based on the (epistemic) discourse 
analysis. It is supposed to reveal the type of conceptual apparatus employed by each of the 
three movements. By “mapping concepts” and tracing the conceptual “backbone” of each 
discourse (of the three social movements in question), I am initiating the empirical research 
that seeks to look at the “conceptual background” of activism in former Yugoslavia.   
                                                          
5
 These “themes” served me as the basis for formulation of the research questions (bellow).  
6
 This is a reference to an often used catchphrase from Viktor Hugo: “Nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time 
has come”.  
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The fifth chapter is designed to give a simple answer: where do the concepts detected 
through epistemic discourse analysis in the fourth chapter initially come from. The research 
thereby embarks on a “bumpy journey” and digs deep into the origins and social and structural 
factors which allowed for the breakthrough of critical knowledge. This chapter is, on one hand, 
essential for assessing the level of importance that theory (conceptual knowledge) played in the 
construction of “alternative visions” of reality through acts of individual activists. On the other, 
it should illuminate the non-theoretical cognitive edifice which had previously paved the way 
for the receptivity of critical theory by the activists. The second part of the fifth chapter 
proceeds with the discussion about channels of diffusion of critical knowledge whose origins 
had already been elaborated in the first part. It addresses both institutional and non-
institutional channels, as well as the issue of brokerage, subcultural and other factors which 
made diffusion possible.  
The sixth chapter is supposed to complete the research “circle” and explore the collective 
processes that allowed individual cognitive inputs to become constitutive elements of the 
collectively designed critical discourses. After every factor constitutive of collective dynamics 
within the three movements is detected and elaborated, the concluding, seventh chapter 
summarizes the achievements of the whole research. Considering that the linkage between 
ideas and action has a centuries’ long tradition, on the very end of this work I am offering 
appendix tackling the historical perspective of this research. Unlike the appendix in which I can 
only map the most tangible examples of linkage between ideas and social and political action, 











Chapter 1: Contextualizing the Research 
 
 
Discussion on the general context of post-socialism is important for assessing the wider 
historical context within which the in-depth research takes place. This is the task of the first 
subchapter within chapter one. Elaboration of the post-socialist condition is important due to 
better understanding of the object of the critique of the three social movements in question. 
Just like one needs to understand the main characteristics of feudalism in order to grasp the 
French Revolution and the ideas behind it; or like one should be familiar with capitalism in 
order to understand the Bolshevik Revolution and ideas that fueled it – so does one needs to 
understand the post-socialist transition in order to tackle the “cognitive background” of its 
critique. The second subchapter within chapter one, narrows down the wider context of post-
socialism and focuses on the specificity of the post-Yugoslav context. Finally, the third 
subchapter addresses the three case studies, its main characteristics and reasoning behind case 
selection.   
 
 
1.1. Post-Socialist Context 
 
In order to understand what kind of context we are dealing with here, I shall briefly 
elaborate the post-socialist “transitional” paradigm. I am thereby addressing the systemic 
features of post-socialism at the macro level, as well as the systemic misconceptions that 
became the object of the critique of social movements in Sarajevo, Belgrade and Zagreb.  The 
reason why I find this explication necessary is purely conceptual: in order to understand the 
nature of the counter-hegemonic critique that is going to be analyzed bellow, one first needs to 
understand the very nature of the hegemonic paradigm that prompted social actors to make it 
the main object of their critique.        
The problems with post-socialism already start at the stage of its label. Logically speaking, 
the so called “post” periods indicate that what is at stage is something that comes after a 
period with more clearly defined characteristics. In his book on “post-democracy”, Colin Crouch 
(2000) gave a quite solid explanation of the conceptualization of “post”. He suggested 
imagining three time periods: pre-X (time 1), X (time 2), and post-X (time 3). In the “pre-X” time, 
there is a clear lack of “X”. Time period two is “the high tide of “X”. In the “post-X” period, 
Crouch argues, “some things will look different from both time 1 and 2”. However, he 
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continues, “X” will still have left its mark: there will be strong traces of it still around; while 
some things start to look rather like they did in time 1 [pre-X] again” (Crouch 2004, 20).  
Generally speaking, there are several ways of understanding post-socialism: as a condition 
and as a paradigm, a narrative or even an ideology (see more in Balunovid 2013). When it 
comes to condition, post-socialism definitely inherited some fallacies from the socialist period, 
and “buried” most of the emancipatory potentials and heritage of the Yugoslav socialist 
experience. On the other hand, the narrative side tends to represent the post-socialist time and 
space as a historical stage whose main reference is supposed to be the negation of the stage 
that preceded it. Moreover, all fallacies within the post-socialist condition are narratively 
ascribed to the resilient “traces of socialism”. In this case, the “post-X” functions as a strong 
negation, discrediting the “X” which is perceived as the period of imprisonment.7 Post-socialism 
is ideologically represented as a sort of absolute beginning and should announce a radical 
discontinuity with respect to socialism. In other words, it seeks to authorize itself “on the basis 
of itself” (Badiou 2005, 210). At the same time, the “pre-socialist” period is revitalized and 
reintroduced as the only “valuable” tradition upon which the post-socialism can build itself. The 
pre-socialist period, or the “pre-X” in Crouch’s terms, becomes a constitutive element of the 
new tradition upon which the “post” period could lean every time it faces a conceptual 
deadlock and/or crisis of legitimation.    
“As every historical rupture, every advent of a new master-signifier8, changes retroactively 
the meaning of all tradition, restructures the narration of the past, makes it readable in 
another, new way” (Žižek 1989, 58), the post-socialist rupture, the turning point between 
socialism and post-socialism, reorganized the entire tradition of the former Yugoslav space. 
Certain segments of common, international heritage were given new (negative) meaning, while 
the national histories were pushed to the forefront. Thus, tradition is recreated by ascribing 
new meaning to the certain portions of heritage. This is, of course, the way in which tradition 
functions. It picks certain segments of (factual) historical heritage and sheds affirmative light on 
them, while discarding other segments and/or demonizing them. Moreover, tradition often 
purposefully “forgets” portions of heritage. “Invented” tradition (Hobsbawm 1983) in post-
socialism rests partially upon the internalization of external perception of the Balkans as 
“backward” (Todorova 2014) and partially upon pride caused by the pre-socialist national 
heritage which was supposed to reaffirm the feeling of (national) pride after the time spent in 
the “dungeon of nations” (as the socialist Yugoslavia was called by the nationalists).  
At first glance, these two pillars of the post-socialist tradition seem contradictory with each 
other. The two are, nonetheless, in a rather dialectical relationship. The internalization of the 
                                                          
7
 Yugoslavia is often described in the post-Yugoslav era as the “dungeon of nations”.  
8
 Master-signifier is Lacanian concept which does not have to refer to any other concept than itself.  
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perception of the Balkans as “oriental” and “backward” served to show the necessity of 
economic reforms. Pride, on the other hand, served for legitimizing political (ethnic) 
nationalism and insistence on national (and often religious) identity which went along with the 
global shift towards identity politics. In other words, transformation of the economy through 
primitive accumulation of capital, privatization of public and state owned companies and 
factories, as well as the overall liberalization of trade and the establishment of “free market” 
economy was, on one hand, justified as economic “modernization”.9 On the other hand, the 
political endeavor of creating nation states followed by wars and bloodshed served to heat up 
national sentiments and upgrade pre-socialist (ethno) nationalist and religious identities. The 
link between strengthening ethnic and national identification (and thereby fueling inter-ethnic 
hatred) on one hand, and economic transformation with all its side effects and “victims” (of 
transition) on the other, rests upon the following logic: every time the side effects of 
privatization and other economic processes threaten the stability of the rapidly impoverishing 
post-socialist edifice, it is “the nation” and “the enemy” of that nation that jump to the front 
and sideline much more tangible effects of economic deprivation. 
The concrete post-socialist paradigm (and the specific post-socialist transitology)10 should 
have encompassed the above described trends and translate them into clear and tangible 
conceptual terms. While having its origins in the general theory of modernization and its three 
main pillars (civil society, industrialism and capitalism), transitology in Eastern Europe, has 
developed a kind of romantic perception of the European Union. This is how Europeanization 
has become one of the two master-frames of post-socialism. The second one is 
democratization, which should have announced discontinuity with socialism, that is, again, 
presented as undemocratic, authoritarian or even totalitarian. The task of this pair of concepts 
was to provide a more general framework within which the post-socialist economic, political 
and social practice could be justified and legitimized.  
In this brief elaboration of the conceptual content of transitology, it is good to start from 
Europeanization. In literature, it consists of the following processes: a) construction, b) diffusion 
and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
“ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in 
the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) 
discourse, political structures and public policies (Radaelli 2004, 3). In the specific context, 
Europeanization also has its “anti-oriental”, hence more normative side. This dimension of the 
                                                          
9 As a matter of fact, industrialization (which is real modernization) already took place during socialism.     
10
 At the general level, transitology is “drawing its origins from the turbulence of the Latin American context of the 
1970s, (…) and has established itself as a specific scientific domain after 1989. It, further on, places the social 
sciences in direct service to neoliberal capitalism -- measuring the "adequacy" of the transformations towards 
market economy, as well as the adequacy of the introduction of forms of parliamentary democracy which support 
the former” (Pupovac 2010). 
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term might be understood as “de-Ottomanization” or simply, “Westernization” (Todorova 
2009, 180). In this normative sense Europeanization consists of the adoption and adaptation of 
forms of life and production which were first developed among the intellectual classes and the 
rising bourgeoisie in certain Western European countries. The new forms of thought, life and 
production, can be very roughly, summarized as rationalism, individualism and industrialism 
(Kohn 1937, 259). The more administrative and less normative approach refers to 
Europeanization as an equivalent to the process of EU integration. The key term at this less but 
still quite normative side of Europeanization, becomes “conditionality”. European Union 
becomes the “main protagonist of the Eastern European Transition; according to its 1993 
Copenhagen policy, it is supposed to educate, discipline and punish while offering EU 
membership as the prize at the end of the bumpy road of transition where awaits, so the story 
goes, the democratic and economic pay off” (Štiks and Horvat 2015, 8). According to some 
authors, the EU enlargement to the post-socialist Eastern Europe in practice appeared as a 
“prototype of imperial politics” (Zielonka 2007; in Vidmar Horvat 2020). Other authors argue 
that this imperial politics of the EU served for gradual introduction of neoliberal state through 
which the region was supposed to be subjected to the “entrepreneurial spirit” (Vidmar Horvat 
2020, 15). Thereby the EU sought to secure itself a peripheral territory for fulfilling its own 
interests (ibid.)     In addition, the strategy of “sticks and carrots” was often used for imposing 
discipline by the European Union. The relationship between the “role models” and the post-
socialist “catch-uppers” was thereby established as the one between teachers and pupils 
(Buden 2009). Subordination, with respect to the “center”, was willingly accepted by the 
“pupils” represented by their “comprador elites” which were, to a significant extent, members 
of the old socialist nomenclature. Unlike most of the impoverished working and middle class 
citizens, the former nomenclature managed to survive disintegration of socialism and, in 
addition, enrich their positions (Ray 1993, xix) by converting their political capital into economic 
capital (Lazid 2011). Apart from traditional economic misbalance between center and periphery, 
surplus and deficit countries of the world economic system, the space of post-socialism 
internalized externally imposed perception of cultural, ethical and moral backwardness and 
placed itself “in school” in Europeanization and modernization.       
The second conceptual side of the “transitional coin” is, as mentioned - democratization. 
The success of democratization in CEE11 (post-socialist) countries, as suggested in the 
mainstream literature, “is to a great extent a consequence of effective Europeanization” 
(Zolkina 2013, Introduction). Keeping in mind all possible approaches of democratic theory, 
from direct to representative, minimalist to deliberative, instrumentalist to value oriented – it is 
difficult to understand what exactly any of these approaches have to do with Europeanization. 
                                                          
11
 CEE stands for Central Eastern Europe. 
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Even the most modest minimalist approaches such as Schumpeter’s12 or Dahl’s13, have very 
little to do with “Westernization” in normative terms, or EU accession in less normative, 
administrative terms. However, the historical moment of dissolution of Yugoslavia and the 
collapse of the real-socialist regimes in Eastern Europe brought Europeanization and 
democratization together, as compatible and almost inseparable conceptual “partners”. Mutual 
dependence between these two conceptual carriers of transition was based on the intersection 
of their properties: from economic transformation and liberalization of the market to 
privatization process and abolishment of single-party political systems, and lastly, integration 
into the EU by catching up with the “developed” West. Overall, the two concepts served as a 
discursive backup to present transformation of “old” habits in social, economic and political life 
as necessary and a matter of confrontation between “civilization” and “barbarism”.  
The trouble with “democratization” of the post-socialist space is that it began in parallel 
with the “takeoff” of the worldwide neoliberal paradigm. Democratization was about to be 
launched at the same time when neoliberal governmentality started undermining “the relative 
autonomy of certain institutions - law, elections, the police, the public sphere—from one 
another and from the market, an independence that formerly sustained an interval and a 
tension between a capitalist political economy and a liberal democratic political system” 
(Brown 2013, 45). This is how democratization ended up as neoliberalization, which stood in a 
direct contradiction with (liberal) democracy due to “submission of political sphere to an 
economic rationality” (ibid., 40). Considering that neoliberalism hits the periphery much harder 
than the center, the former Yugoslav European periphery was hit accordingly.14  This region 
however, had its own specificities and peculiarities with respect to the rest of the post-socialist 
Eastern Europe.   
 
1.2. Post-Yugoslav Context 
 
Arguably, the Yugoslav transition is perceived as the most complex of all the Eastern 
European “post-socialisms” (Ritter, 2012/2013). On the one hand, former Yugoslavia shares 
general features with other Eastern European regions and states. Aspiration towards the so 
called “democratic transformation” is one of them. Capitalism, on the other hand, was not a 
‘grass-roots’ phenomenon but the end result of democratic transformation (Mujkid 2015, 626). 
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 “Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule 
them”. Schumpeter 2003, 284-285.  
13
 Dahl’s minimalist definition of democracy contains two key dimensions of democracy: contestation - or the 
ability of contenders to compete in a fair electoral contest in which the outcome is uncertain; and participation – 
the extent to which competition encompasses the entire adult population. See: Van Cott 2008, 11. 
14
 See more about the waves and social/economic consequences of privatization in Serbia in: Balunovid, 2014. 
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Narratively, it was democracy that was directly opposed to socialism. With the downfall of 
socialism, one could not hear much about “capitalism” replacing “socialism”. “Early 
revolutionary slogans of 1989 demanded ‘socialism with human face’, ‘human rights and 
freedoms’, ‘freedom of movement’ and not ‘capitalism’, or ‘the establishment of a sharply 
divided class society’ or a ‘trickle-down economy’ (ibid.). When reality turned out to be 
capitalist, with sharp class divisions, the national elites in Eastern Europe had to find an 
ideological solution for it. This ideological solution was supposed to serve as justification for 
sharp social and economic differences.  As mentioned above, justification is partially found in 
the narrative of modernization. However, this was not enough and could not secure smooth 
capitalist transformation without creating a mechanism for drawing attention away from social 
and economic problems. In Yugoslavia, the perfect solution had already been there, rooted 
among certain segments of population including intellectual elites and writers, already during 
socialism.15 This is ethno-nationalism that existed in the wider post-socialist space, but showed 
its most explicit face in former Yugoslavia.     
Ethno-nationalism thus represents a political side of the post-socialist medal. It is often 
defined as “cultural” or “Eastern”, as opposed to “civic” nationalism of the “Western” type 
(Kohn 1994). Other authors emphasize that such categorical differentiation between the two 
“nationalisms” contains a strong normative component. The former is often perceived as “bad” 
and the latter as “good” (Porter-Szücs 2009; 4 Jaskulowski 2009, 95-127; in Jaskulowski 2010, 
290). The dichotomy could be also posed around different periods (or centuries). The former is 
the product of the late 20th and the 21st century, and the latter as the 19th century 
phenomenon. Finally, the former is usually associated with the post-socialism heading towards 
“democratic transition” and the latter with “stable” democracies. Regardless of one’s academic 
positioning within this normative debate, ethnic nationalism is a dominant category through 
which post-socialist – and especially post-Yugoslav experience is to be addressed.   
The result of playing on the card of ethno-nationalism was ethnically driven conflict in 
Croatia, Bosnia and later Kosovo and Macedonia. Gagnon's claim that “ethnic conflicts are 
happening when the elites are making ethnic belonging to be the only politically relevant 
identity” (Gagnon 2002, 134), found its remarkable realization in the Yugoslav conflicts. With 
ethnic/national/religious identities becoming the most appropriate distractors from difficult 
social and economic condition in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the post-conflict former 
Yugoslavia became the region of constant ethnic tensions. Hostile relations between the newly 
independent states, as well as among ethnic majorities and minorities within single states 
colored social, political and cultural reproduction of the post-Yugoslav societies.  
                                                          
15
 See more about nationalism and literature in the socialist Serbia in: Zunic 1999; Wachtel 2003; Perovic 2014;   
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An interesting twist followed. In spite of the dominance of the ethno-nationalist narrative, 
the political side of the “transitional coin” was eventually split into two camps: civic (liberal) and 
(ethno) nationalist. Even though the nationalist stream has often been presented as 
incompatible with “Europeanization” in both economic and cultural (political) terms, civic and 
nationalist streams turned out as equally good executers of the neoliberal (economic) reforms. 
In the post-war period, “civic” political forces insisted on political “pacification” – but the 
relation of complementarity between nationalism and economic (neo)liberalization became 
sooner or later, clear in all former Yugoslav republics. In Croatia, for instance, it was the 
nationalist leadership of the 1990s (embodied in Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the first 
president of independent Croatia, Franjo Tuđman) that linked, both practically and narratively, 
neoliberal economic reforms to the far-right nationalism. In Serbia, this “tandem” was initially 
blurred under Milosevid16 but became clearer after his fall. In contemporary Serbia, the 
champion of economic liberalization is no other than President Aleksandar Vučid, the former 
secretary general of the ultra-right Serbian Radical Party (SRS).17 In Bosnia, a country that 
represents the most paradigmatic case of internal tension between different ethnic groups, a 
“non-ethnic” politics is nearly impossible due to the convocational model of state 
organization18. The three dominant (and most of time ruling) parties, SDA, HDZ (Bosnia) and 
SNSD (but also SDS)19, all have “pro-European” agendas. Moreover, they often accuse other 
parties for “anti-Europeanisms” in order to discredit them.          
Nearly two decades after dissolution of the common state in some parts of the former 
Yugoslavia this blurry signifier called “transitional post-socialism” was challenged. Both sides of 
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 See more about the blurry ideological condition in Serbia in the subchapter 5.4. “The role of religion and other 
peculiarities”.  
17
 Serbian Radical Party (SRS) has been established and led by the convicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj. After 
leaving SRS, Vučid and Tomislav Nikolid (president of Serbia 2012-2017) founded a new Serbian Progressive Party 
(SNS), which took a moderate turn, but never gave up on the nationalist rhetoric. Instead of open promotion of 
“Greater Serbia”, Vučid (and Nikolid) simply accepted a more modest or more realistic version of Serbian 
nationalism.     
18
 This is a consequence of the Dayton peace agreement. The annex four of that agreement, which represents 
Bosnian constitution, divided the country into two entities and one district. While the entity called “Republika 
Srpska” includes 49 percent of the territory, the second entity called Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
contains 51 percent of the territory. In addition, the later entity is divided into 10 cantons. See more in the 
document of Dayton peace agreement here: 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf 
19
 SDA is short from Party of Democratic Action. The founder was the first president of BiH and the war leader of 
Bosniaks, Alija Izetbegovid. Today, the president of this party is his son, Bakir Izetbegovid. HDZ BiH is short from 
Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This party is a major Croatian party in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The president Nebojša Čovid is the former member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
SNSD is short from the Union of Independent Social-Democrats, led by the curent member of the Presidency of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik. This is the major party in the entity of Republika Srpska. SDS is short from 
Serbian Democratic Party. It is currently opposition to SNSD in Republika Srpska. This was the major Serbian party 
during the war and it was led by the convicted war criminal Radovan Karadžid.      
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the transitional coin, nationalism and economic neoliberalism, its discursive apparatus and 
practical social and economic consequences were put into the same discursive basket as 
objects of the critique. And when it seemed like there was “no end to the beginning”20 of 
transition, the combination of some old and some new (radical) democratic ideas reemerged.  
 
1.3. Case Presentation 
 
The newly arisen social movements across the region of former Yugoslavia pushed 
contesting ideas forward and launched the struggle against neoliberal transition. Some authors 
labeled them as the “new left” in the post-Yugoslav space (Štiks 2015). Štiks places these 
movements in the post-socialist, post-conflict – but also the post-crisis context. The reason why 
he calls these new actors “new left”, is because he directly refers to the League of Communists 
of Yugoslavia as the “old left”. Even though similarities with the “new left” of the 1960s are 
admitted, the author nonetheless indicates more specific characteristics of the post-Yugoslav 
“new left”, including “the critique of electoral democracy (…) critique of the neoliberal capitalist 
transformation of the post-Yugoslav societies and the so called “transition”(…) critique of the 
conservative, religious, patriarchal, and nationalist ideological hegemony (…)defense of 
common and public goods (…) and an internationalist approach to the post-Yugoslav and wider 
Balkan region, often coupled with an anti-nationalist and antifascist attitude(…)” (ibid, 137). In 
different (national) contexts this struggle got different shapes which consequently pushed 
different issues to the forefront.  
In Croatia the leading role was taken by the student movement. While “catching the 
wave” of the global student resistance against neoliberal turn in the sphere of higher education 
(see more in Dolenec and Doolan 2013), this movement grew out of the student struggles at 
the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb. In Serbia, by the municipal initiative around the group 
“Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own sought to intervene through involvement in the local authorities’ 
urban policies (Domachowska 2019). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the uprising that was initiated 
by the workers in Tuzla resulted in the rise of the popular movement in Sarajevo and several 
other cities. Chiara Milan (2020) rightfully emphasizes that the major characteristic of this 
movement was “social mobilization beyond ethnicity”. In further presentation of the three case 
studies, I am going into more details.  
The three cases I am covering thus include three social movements which occurred within 
the same post-socialist space and time. The common feature of all three cases is that the main 
                                                          
20 This phrase is used by the Croatian philosopher Ozren Pupovac in order to point out one of the most often used 
justifications for damaging economic and social effects of transition: “We have just started…”  See: Pupovac 2010. 
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object of their critique was the above described paradigm of transitional post-socialism. This 
general common feature, however, brings up the question of potential variations in terms of 
discursive performances upon which the critique was set and potential explication for these 
variations. As will be shown below, the variations are detectable. There are two main reasons 
for this. Firstly, we are dealing with three different types of movements – one being student, 
the second being municipal and the third being “popular”. Secondly, in spite of the shared 
condition of post-socialism, specific national contexts still diverged and affected each of the 
three discourses.  
I shall briefly introduce the circumstances under which the three movements occurred. 
Thereby I am simultaneously presenting the three cases in a nutshell, and stressing out 
divergences of starting positions with respect to certain (predetermined) inclinations and 
possibilities of specific discursive consolidation. The three lines along which I am showing these 
initial divergences are:  
1. Structural divergences and divergences in national contexts which affected macro 
conceptual articulations within discursive performances  
2. The specific type of social movement   
3. The issue of external triggers and level of state repression 
These three lines, along which I am about to show divergences between the three social 
movements, are set up after I had already had a closer look at the final versions of all three 
discourses. In Sarajevo, for instance, it was clear that police repression significantly influenced 
discursive content. In Zagreb, hostility towards Yugoslav heritage (that is, the specific national 
context) prevented the straightforward usage of concepts related to Yugoslavia. In Belgrade, 
the specific type of social movement appeared as both the consequence of the national context 
and the reason for undertaking certain conceptual directions through discursive performance.  
Let me start a more substantial elaboration with the case of a student movement in Zagreb 
which has become famous for its “free education for all” struggle in 2009.21 The most important 
endeavor conducted by the movement was the occupation of the Faculty of Philosophy22, 
which started on the 20th of April at noon. Around 300 students gathered in front of the faculty 
and carried the “One world one struggle” and “Education is not for sale” banners with them. 
Soon they started interrupting lectures and exams and uttering the “Free education” rallying 
cry. The students never canceled the educational function of the faculty. Even though they 
prevented professors from teaching, they organized alternative lectures and activities. The 
unlucky circumstance for the faculty management was that the dean was not in Zagreb at the 
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 See more in: Popovid 2015, 105-106. 
22
 English translation of the Faculty of Philosophy is “Faculty of Humanities and Social Studies“. In this disertation 
however, I will use a direct translation from the local language.  
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time. He was in Brazil, spending time in Copacabana beach. This gave the students an 
advantage, because the management was neither complete nor ready and organized – whereas 
the movement was. Its activities, moreover, inspired others and the struggle diffused from 
Zagreb to 20 other faculties across Croatia.23  
Many external incentives appeared to be equally influential, but none of them represented 
sufficient cause for the rise of the movement. The global economic crisis of 2007/2008, alter- 
and anti-globalization movements across the world, the “Bologna” process of higher education 
reform24, negative practices of commodification of higher education (for instance, in Great 
Britain) or good practices in the same sphere (for instance, in Finland) – these were all 
moments indicated by my interviewees as “external factors” influencing the movement in one 
way or another. Its occurrence, however, did not have any direct external triggers. The 
blockade itself had some role models (for instance, the blockade of the Faculty of Philosophy in 
Belgrade in 2006). What appears as crucial, nonetheless, has to do with the counter-hegemonic 
cognitive construction of meanings and imagination, rather than any external or internal events 
per se.25  
On the other hand, the wave of protests and plenary meetings of citizens in the Bosnian 
capital were directly triggered by the workers’ struggle in the former Yugoslav industrial capital, 
the city of Tuzla. On Wednesday, February 5th 2014, Tuzla’s (mainly industrial) workers from 
privatized and destroyed factories took to the streets, as they had done many times before. 
Had the workers not been joined by the unemployed and other supporters from the town, that 
Wednesday would have probably looked like all of the previous ones, and would have had 
similar (zero) effects. But the workers’ voice claiming the right to social security, work, pension 
and healthcare payments got louder as the crowd got bigger. Sarajevo, along with other cities 
such as Mostar or Zenica, heard it as well. The images of police repression against the ever 
larger mass of people on the streets of Tuzla became viral. The gathering of the protestors in 
Sarajevo started on the 7th of February at around 1.00 p.m. in front of the Cantonal 
Government. Soon thereafter, they moved to the front of the Presidency building. Both 
buildings were secured by the police and the television camera recorded a remarkable 
statement from an elderly protester, who said: “Had you been safeguarding factories like this, 
we would have been importing the workforce today”. The protestor stressed, in other words, 
                                                          
23
 Apart from Zagreb, students from seven other cities launched blockades in their hometowns: Zadar, Rijeka, Split, 
Osijek, Pula, Varaždin and Slavonski Brod. Thereby Croatia was at the time the third most rebellious student 
country in Europe, just behind Greece and France.  
24
 See more about the conditions and aims of the “Bologna reform” of higher education in Garben 2011. 
25
 “(...) it wasn't like the tuition fees were sudenly introduced, for instance, and the students started rebelling. We 
literally constructed that struggle (for free education). Already in 2008 we fought agaist capitalism at the 
theoretical level and we found the niche within which we could fight (practically) in education. We created this 
space for mobilization consciously and this simply resonated with other students and citizens at the more general 
level.“ (Interviewee no. 8)   
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that the police should have taken care of factories and local production before these were 
destroyed by privatization, the same way they did with the institutions (and the political elite) 
on the day of protest.  
By the end of the day the protests escalated and the poorly organized crowd created an 
inflamed atmosphere – both metaphorically and literally, as institutional buildings were set on 
fire. This time, unlike in the 1990s, it was not an external aggressor who was responsible for it. 
The inhabitants of Sarajevo themselves did it, targeting the symbols of “self-colonial” domestic 
aggression of the ethno-nationalist political elites against their own people. Thus, Sarajevo’s 
Cantonal government and the Presidency building burst into flames. The state was ready, and 
reacted in Sarajevo in the same way as in Tuzla – with pure repression.26 
Soon, it was police brutality and a serious number of arrested protestors which affected the 
discourse of the movement. When one faces such a strong reaction from the state, it is the very 
repression that occupies much of the attention of the public. Automatically, it occupies the 
movement’s discourse as well, because the public is so focused on day-to-day events. This 
appears to be an influential structural factor, especially in comparison to the student movement 
in Zagreb. On the one hand, the student movement acted within University, which is immune to 
the intervention of the repressive state apparatus due to its autonomy. Such a structural 
advantage may, possibly, increase the likelihood of shaping day-to-day public discussions, rather 
than (predominantly) responding to them. Sarajevo’s popular movement, on the other hand, 
interacted with the unfavorable structural conditions which resulted in an ad-hoc reaction to 
the external trigger (Tuzla) and the police brutality in both Tuzla and Sarajevo. Consequently, 
the ability of critical discourse to get a more focused shape and thereby cover misconceptions 
of the hegemonic discourse more broadly became limited.     
 
The “Don’t let Belgrade D(r)own (NDB) movement, finally, sits in between the two previous 
cases with respect to triggers and repressive response by the state. It reached the peak of 
public support after an event which might be considered a direct trigger for mobilization. 
Namely, in the night between the 24th and the 25th of April 201627, a couple of buildings (over 
1,000 square meters) in Belgrade’s downtown were knocked down by heavy machinery. People 
who witnessed the event were kept in custody for a couple of hours. Their phones were taken 
and checked by unknown people with masks. Citizens who lived in the area called the police, 
but no one showed up. The whole endeavor was conducted in the part of Belgrade where an 
exclusive area called “Belgrade Waterfront”28 (BW), by the Sava River, was going to be built. 
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 See more about Bosnaian protests and plenums in: Arsenijevid 2014. 
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 See more about this case in: Bieber 2019, 51-52. 
28




Then prime minister and today’s president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučid, said that the highest 
officials of Belgrade’s administration stood behind this action and that each and every one of 
them would be prosecuted. Almost four years later, while I am writing these lines, no public 
official has been charged or prosecuted.  
Public visibility of NDB and the hype created by wide mobilization against BW were highly 
interrelated with this event. The night between the 24th and the 25th of April was the trigger for 
mass protests, but the terrain for it had been prepared in the previous years. The movement 
had worked on spotlighting the “Belgrade Waterfront” project in order to illuminate wider 
social, political and economic misconceptions within and behind it. This project became a 
matter of public debate mostly thanks to the activities of NDB. Therefore, here we may speak of 
a direct trigger for mass mobilization and popularization of the movement – but not of the 
direct trigger for the occurrence of the movement itself. On the side of the state’s response to 
the protests, the situation is likewise somewhere in between the other two case studies. There 
was no visible repression during and after the protests, but the repressive circumstances under 
which the demolition in Hercegovačka Street took place could be taken as triggering mass 
mobilization and wider public reaction. The possibility of discursive expression was hence half-
limited, or half-determined by the event that took place on the night between the 24th and the 
25th. Lawlessness, police repression, insecurity and the like did come to shape the discursive 
content of the protests organized by NDB after the 25th. Yet, there was still some space for 
using the hype, while at the same time not reducing the overall discursive performance to the 
scope determined by it. 
The fact that the student movement in Zagreb made its own cause, while being influenced 
but not directly responsive towards external events and/or direct repressive response from the 
state, placed it in a more advantageous position than the popular movement in Sarajevo and, 
partially, the municipal movement in Belgrade. Why? In terms of the ability to organize their 
struggle discursively, the Croatian students were not in a rush. There was no need for reacting 
immediately, and, on top of that, there was no need for referencing, accommodating and 
bridging the context of the “trigger” with the intended (general) discursive performance. This is 
why, in Zagreb, it was not only about expressing revolt, but about constructing a relatively 
autochthonous and new imagery, while contesting the hegemonic epistemological framework 
within which the mainstream knowledge is usually produced.  
On the other hand, NDB enjoyed the advantage of having bigger or wider (social) 
mobilization capacity than the student movement, precisely because of the event to which the 
mass protests were responding. This capacity would have, nonetheless, never been upgraded 
by a single event, had it not been for the activities undertaken by the movement beforehand. 
This means that the movement had already become well-known among the wider public, 
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before the demolition and the atmosphere of repression increased its mobilization capacity. In 
other words, the NDB movement could respond directly to the specific event (the demolition) 
and increase its mobilization capacity while not having to reduce its discursive performance to 
it. 
Finally, the popular movement in Sarajevo occurred as a direct consequence of the events 
in Tuzla. After the occurrence, it then kept on struggling with further discursive limitations 
which were imposed upon them by the brutal response of the police already on day one of the 
protests in the Bosnian capital. The police repression was however, just an additional 
aggravating circumstance which increased the heavy weight of the hostile national context of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina even more. National contexts in other two case studies were different, 
but not much “lighter” when it comes to the possibility of critical discursive breakthrough.  
In Croatia, references to socialism and Yugoslavia have always been more discredited than 
in Bosnia, while Serbia again finds itself somewhere in the middle. In Bosnia, structural 
obstacles embedded in ethnically and territorially divided post-war society, made the possibility 
of anti-hegemonic discourse more fragile and unstable, from the very beginning. While in 
Croatia one had to be more careful with respect to the socialist (Yugoslav) heritage, public 
discourse in Bosnia had to be adjusted to the constant danger that universal anti-nationalism 
could be interpreted as an attack on one or another ethnic group. This was the narrative in the 
Bosnian entity of the Republika Srpska (Serbian Republic), in which the protests in Sarajevo and 
other parts of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina29 were portrayed as being directed at 
destabilizing that entity. Serbia, on the other hand, has had ever since Miloševid’s rule and the 
1990s, a ready-made counter-attack from the state to any sort of serious social upheaval, 
whether it is reformist or revolutionary. “Foreign agents”, chiefly among them George Soros, 
are usually thought/suspected to stand behind those who seek to rebel and/or resist. This 
narrative is a typical feature of semi-authoritarian or authoritarian regimes. Unfortunately for 
NDB, one such regime has been established in Serbia (again after Miloševid)30 alongside with 
their occurrence.  
Table 1.1: Case studies  
Lines of divergence  Type of movement  Structure/Context Triggers/Repression  
Belgrade  Municipal Authoritarian 
tendencies 
Indirectly  
Sarajevo Popular  Structural Ethno- Directly  
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 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the second entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
30
 For the first time after the fall of Slobodan Miloševid, Serbia has been declared a semi-consolidated democracy 










When it comes to reasoning behind this case selection, one should stress that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia were not the only cases where social movements and protests 
happened in the past ten years. Apart from these three cases, protests of the deprived and 
dissatisfied occurred in other former Yugoslav republics, such as Slovenia and North 
Macedonia. Some protests were similar to those in Miloševid’s Serbia in the 1990s, hence they 
were anti-authoritarian (this was the case in North Macedonia). Elsewhere, the protests gave 
birth to an alternative political agenda and new (relevant) political parties. Such was the case in 
Slovenia after the protests in Maribor, Ljubljana and other cities across the country. My 
selection of case studies for this research yet fell on the remaining three countries Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Why? 
There are three main reasons for choosing these countries. Firstly, the three cases share the 
same linguistic space which is important due to: a) the fact that this is my mother tongue and 
this level of knowing the language is important especially if among the methods applied is 
discourse analysis; and b) because the politically driven barriers could not prevent 
communication among these societies completely – which is why the three activist scenes could 
have interacted with each other. This dimension (of interaction) may be significant for 
understanding where and how critically intonated discourse developed in all the three cases.31 
Secondly, the countries share similar consequences of the post-socialist transition: strong 
nationalism, involvement/exposure to warfare in the 1990s and the post-war consolidation 
through economic reforms.  
At the same time, the contexts are somewhat different. Each case is specific enough for 
combining their similarities and differences, thus inferring the reasons for divergences in the 
relationship between activism and counter-hegemonic knowledge. Thirdly, the three 
movements do not overlap due to their nature. One is a typical popular movement, the other 
typical student movement and the third typical municipal social movement. This implies an 
additional dimension of the research and an additional explanatory tool – in a sense that one 
may trace three different conceptual trajectories of developing critical discourses. The 
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 This does not mean that there was no interaction with other republics, in spite of the relative language barrier - 
especially between Croatia and Slovenia, for instance. However, Slovenian social and cultural space has somewhat 
been detached from the rest of the region which shares many similarities with respect to which Slovenia has 
remained external. Furthermore, the interaction between N. Macedonia and Slovenia was rather limited in 
comparison to the interaction among the other three cases.    
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movements in Slovenia and North Macedonia, one should mention, were both popular 
























Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I am defining concepts of critical theory and hegemony. 
After that I am introducing a more general theoretical pillar, the field of sociology of 
knowledge. Through elaborating the main sphere of interest of sociology of knowledge, I am 
suggesting an additional dimension that is supposed to be included in it. Finally, I am finishing 
this chapter with theoretical reflections from the domain of social movement studies. 
Considering the main research interest, I am firstly discussing the subfield of social movements 
and cognition and then move to the literature dealing with diffusion and master-frames within 
social movement studies. More specific theoretical reflections are kept for each empirical 
chapter/subchapter.      
 
2.1. Critical Theory and Hegemony 
 
The significance of theory building for any sort of social change - be it progressive or 
regressive, has been shown by example of the neoliberal turn.  Already since the 1950s, a small 
group of academics32 started developing the idea of liberalism mixed with neoclassical 
economy. It turned out that this mixture, called neoliberalism, has brought the world to the 
stage (or the edge) of “post-democracy”, which somewhat reversed the weal of historical 
progress. This means that it got it back to the stage of pre-democratic era33 in political terms, 
and the stage of 19th century inequalities in economic terms.34 Friedrich von Hayek, one of the 
masterminds behind the neoliberal turn and the author of the “key neoliberal texts such as The 
Constitution of Liberty, presciently argued that the battle for ideas was key, and that it would 
probably take at least a generation for that battle to be won, not only against Marxism but 
against socialism, state planning, and Keynesian interventionism” (Harvey 2005, 21). The 
moment when real policies based on Hayek’s and Friedman’s ideas have prevailed over both 
the orthodox and the “New Left” type of critical thought, drove critical theory to reshuffle its 
content and purpose. By saying “critical theory”, I actually accept the understanding of Razmig 
                                                          
32 “A small and exclusive group of passionate advocates - mainly academic economists, historians, and 
philosophers–had gathered together around the renowned Freedom’s Just Another Word... Austrian political 
philosopher Friedrich von Hayek to create the Mont Pelerin Society (named after the Swiss spa where they first 
met) in 1947 (the notables included Ludvig von Mises, the economist Milton Friedman, and even, for a time, the 
noted philosopher Karl Popper).” Harvey 2005, 19-20. 
33
 See more about this process in: Crouch 2004, 31-70. 
34
 See more about this process in: Piketty 2014, 84.   
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Keucheyan who argues that critical theory should be used in plural – at least nowadays. He of 
course acknowledges the significance of the Critical theory which is usually linked with the 
“Frankfurt School”, but comes up with a bit broader definition:  
“Critical theories are theories that more or less comprehensively challenge the existing 
social order. The criticisms they formulate do not concern particular aspects of this order, like 
the imposition of a tax on financial transactions (the “Tobin tax”) or some measure relating to 
pension reform. Whether radical or moderate, the ‘critical’ dimension of the new critical 
theories consists in the general character of their challenge to the contemporary social world.” 
(Keucheyan 2013, 2-3). 
Thereby Keucheyan provides a conceptual apparatus (of pluralized critical theory which 
does not reduce it to the Frankfurt School) that allows for a more comprehensive 
understanding of critical theory. Moreover, this definition gives us a chance to think broader in 
terms of the social role of critical theory. In this light he discusses the matter of emancipatory 
subjectivity and the absence of clearly identifiable, historically and materialistically rooted 
carrier of emancipatory social change in contemporary era. Unlike the Marxist orthodoxy which 
positioned proletariat in the center of historical process of emancipation from exploitation and 
alienation, today’s critical thought, Keucheyan argues, faces many obstacles and challenges 
while developing critical conceptual apparatus for tackling contemporary issues. The need for a 
reshuffling of critical thought on the other hand, went in parallel to the crisis of possibility for 
tangible social transformation.  
 The crisis of critical thought often goes hand in hand with the crisis of radical political 
subjectivity. When political action gets either divorced from or “disappointed” by political 
thought, furthermore, it usually undertakes the road of “great regression” or simply, deadlock.  
Keucheyan reminds us that the “failed revolution” in Germany in the 1920s, apart from giving 
way to fascism, announced the breakup between intellectual critical thought and 
(communist/socialist) party politics. The main consequence of this “divorce” was the 
production of a more abstract theory which, according to Keucheyen, signified the beginning of 
theoreticians’ deflection from the field of real politics. It was until the 1970’s that the critical 
thought had persisted as “rigid”, in a sense that Marxian thought and class struggle (with 
proletariat being the main emancipatory subject) were central to their theories in spite of 
changes in material, cultural and political conditions.  
The 1960’s and 1970’s brought some change, but still not too radical. Herbert Marcuse for 
instance, recognized the need for taking into account other struggles apart from the one of 
proletariat. In the twilight of the “crisis of radical subjectivity”, he saw emancipatory potential 
in struggles for national liberation or student struggles. The struggle of the deprived (mainly the 
working class), could have thus been supported by the struggle of the dissatisfied (students, 
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LGBT, anti-colonial struggles for national liberation) or both dissatisfied and deprived at the 
same time (African – Americans etc.), without losing the initial strength, whatsoever.35 
Nonetheless, Marcuse still thought of the proletariat as the backbone of revolutionary potential 
within society, and thought of other struggles as not being capable to carry the heavy burden of 
revolution by their own. The difference with respect to the past, in his view, was that this time 
the backbone of emancipation needed support from other social actors. The radical subject was 
nevertheless still seen as one, whereas other actors were perceived as desirable “catalysts for 
social change”.36 
The struggles in the 1960s and 1970s brought another change at the level of critical theory 
production. They accelerated the rise of the “new critical theory” which, again, corresponded to 
the rise of the “New Left”. In the light of “crisis of emancipatory subjectivity”, different authors 
sought to find a solution from this deadlock caused by the defeat of the 1968 movements as 
well as more traditional workers’ movements. It seemed inevitable that the new critical theory 
pluralized emancipatory subjectivity and diverged from the strict structuralism, economicism 
and historical determinism. Conceptually, as Laclau and Mouffe argue, the question was how to 
“characterize that plurality of antagonisms emerging on a mass terrain different from that of 
classes” (Mouffe and Laclau 1985, 62). Some authors thus focused on theorizing from identity 
and queer perspectives (like Judith Butler); others paid attention to recognition (Nancy Fraser 
or Axel Honneth); or Event (Badiou or partially Zizek). Hardt and Negri tried with the notion of 
“multitude”, whereas Laclau, Balibar, Habermas, Nern and Benedict Anderson questioned the 
notion of the “people” and its relationship to globalization. Others talked about the 
construction of the European (Habermas, Balibar); or the occurrence of antagonisms within 
nations (Laclau). Pluralization of critical thought hence “democratized” the notion of 
emancipatory subjectivity.  
Instead of categorizing streams of thought within the new critical theory, or mapping critical 
thinkers and issues tackled by them like it was done by some authors (Wark 2017; Keucheyan 
2017), the line of division I am suggesting is between orthodox (and homocentric) and 
contemporary (or polycentric) critical thought. While the prior undertakes a “materially – 
driven” path of defining the main carrier of radical subjectivity (which is proletariat), the later 
“allows” other actors to take over the epithet of a radical subject as well, usually through the 
process of articulation. One could thus wonder, which stream “talks” better to contemporary 
social dynamics and illuminates better the path for social struggle? Among the “new” authors 
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who seemingly managed to “speak” to the contemporary social and political actors were Laclau 
and Mouffe through their work on hegemony and populism. It was nonetheless, Laclau (and 
Mouffe) who always spoke about the importance of context. The absence of universal 
subject/carrier of social change, according to this approach, demands contextual 
accommodation of concepts and/or separate conceptual production for each context. For that 
purpose, scientific critical communities, both universally and each for its respective context 
should answer the following question posed by Robert Lynd eighty years ago:  
“What social science evidently needs is to seek to make explicit its tacit criteria of the 
“significant”. The most general criterion in current use is “a new contribution to knowledge” (…) 
But this vague reference of social science to the quantity of knowledge leaves unanswered the 
question of what it is to which knowledge is relevant” (Lynd ibid., 187-188).  
From discussion about the nature of critical theory, its orthodox and contemporary meaning 
and the meaning applied in this work, one should move on and provide a conceptual 
framework for dealing with the producers of critical knowledge. The heavy burden of tackling 
Lynd’s question is carried by the so called “critical communities”.  It is their responsibility to 
push critical theory “more clearly into engagement with political practices and to clarify the 
kinds of issues that a critical theory needs to resolve-both about itself and about the external 
world (…)” (Ray 1993, xx). The social relevance of knowledge and the role of “critical 
communities” as the producers of critical knowledge in (specifically) cultural change is precisely 
the topic of Thomas Rochon’s “Culture Moves” (1998). I took over this approach which links 
knowledge production and cultural change, and broadened it. Instead of cultural change I talk 
about actors who seek to accomplish a broader social change. In Rochon’s view, culture consists 
of the linked stock of ideas that define a set of commonsense beliefs about what is right, what 
is natural, what works (Rochon 1998, 9). As will be shown in the next subchapter dealing with 
sociology of knowledge, the whole edifice of society is, as a matter of fact, built upon the same 
stock of ideas that constitute dominant set of commonsense individual and collective 
perceptions of social reality – which again constitutes consent which legitimizes the status quo. 
In this light, while talking about conditions and forms (and cognitive origins) of cultural change, 
Rochon provides a solid theoretical apparatus for looking at conditions, forms and incentives 
for counter – hegemonic projection of social reality – or, better yet, development of counter-
hegemonic meaning systems. Patterns, in other words, remain the same regardless of whether 
we are talking about culture or broader social change. Importantly, the author looks at diffusion 
of new ideas, structural (societal, political, and institutional) constrains to the endeavors of 
actors to undertake the “original break from past ways of thinking about a subject” (ibid.).  
The role of political and social movements in spreading, adapting and “translating” ideas 
originating in critical communities, according to Rochon, is essential for widening the spectrum 
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of audience and increasing the number of recipients of innovation in thinking about a specific 
issue or issues. The role of social / political movements, he argues, is to bring contesting ideas 
to the attention of social and political institutions. The author comes up with three possible 
models of cultural change which, at the same time, illustrate three possible ways in which 
newly developed ideas in critical communities are communicated to the wider audience by 
movements: 
1. Value conversion 
2. Value creation 
3. Value connection 
Value conversion signifies struggle over meaning which takes place in a domain of “zero 
sum” game. Rochon gives the example of the Civil Rights Movement, and takes the issue of 
racial discrimination in order to explain value conversion. In a nutshell, if there are white people 
and there are black people and if the hegemonic meaning prescribed to this dichotomy 
between races is that white people are superior to black people, then there is a need for 
converting this meaning and establishing a new one: no one is superior to others because of 
their racial background. The second model of value creation includes cases of cultural change 
through introducing a new issue to the public – or in Rochon’s words, by “turning private issues 
into public ones” (ibid., 69). The mechanism is explained through the example of Movement 
against Sexual Harassment in the United States, where what used to belong to the private 
sphere (or being absent from discussions in the public sphere), now becomes a relevant (and 
unacceptable) by the standards of the public sphere. Finally, the third model of value 
connection (also called by the author the “applied philosophy”) represents the hybrid of the 
two previously indicated models. It “involves destroying old values and creating new ones by 
altering the context in which idea is evaluated” (ibid., 56). All three models of cultural change 
may, as emphasized before, also be applied to the widely understood process of striving 
towards social change.  
Importantly, I am not inclining towards critical communities over social movements with 
respect to (critical) knowledge production and conceptualization of reality. Instead, I am simply 
acknowledging that “social scientists are in a good position to contribute to the production of 
that [critical] theory, both by virtue of their training and by the research time available in the 
academy” (Bevington and Dixon 2005, 191). At the same time, I do acknowledge developments 
in social movement studies which took the direction of perceiving social movements as 
“laboratories of innovation” (see: Pavan and della Porta 2017, 2). Nonetheless, I see critical 
communities as contributors or sources  from which individual activists and social movements 
may draw initial incentives for constructing alternative meaning systems. Moreover, I see them 
as initial guideposts which may pave the way or trace the direction of the perception of reality, 
29 
 
as glue which may provide links and put various kinds of fragmented knowledge together. This 
practically means that critical communities may enable social movements to develop “a better 
understanding of the social mechanisms at work, so as to direct their efforts in order that their 
intentions might be more efficiently fulfilled.” (Nilsen and Cox 2013, 73-74) As the group of 
authors illustrated by referring to one of the most influential branches of social theory ever 
produced, Marxism – this stream of thought has managed to provide the link between 
seemingly non-connected social issues and become a holder of “particular strength as a 
movement theory”.37   
Finally, what needs to be elaborated in this subchapter is the concept of hegemony. 
Considering that I dichotomized hegemonic and anti-hegemonic discourses and claimed that I 
am about to study the development of counter-hegemonic ones - it is necessary to cover the 
essential transversal of my study by reflecting about my (theoretical) positioning with respect 
to hegemony. The closest to my understanding of development of counter-hegemonic 
tendencies is Gramsci’s conception of “war of position”. In his terms the hegemonic forces rely 
not only on coercive means, but also on the means of cultural hegemony. This “two-headed” 
hegemony stands for reproduction of power in the realm of institutional/political and also the 
realm of civil society. Struggle of counter-hegemonic forces against direct coercion is called the 
“war of maneuver” and implies a direct struggle between the ruling and the subjugated class. In 
the sphere of “civil society” where the means of power reproduction are more sophisticated, 
contestation is more indirect. Considering that in the sphere of culture and civil society the 
hegemonic power legitimizes itself through consent, this “war” labeled by Gramsci as the “war 
of position” consists of the struggle over meaning. In such a war, counter-hegemonic 
knowledge and ideas play a decisive role against hegemonic knowledge and ideas in order to 
displace political frontiers onto the sphere of social struggles. (See more in: Gramsci 1971; 
Laclau 2005, 153).        
At the same time, the concept of hegemony in my work is tightly connected to articulation 
and discourse. This means that the use of the concept is likewise reserved for the internal 
dynamics within the anti-hegemonic block. Here, I follow Laclau and Mouffe who argue that the 
main conceptual properties of hegemony are social demand and articulation. Firstly, they 
define articulation as “(…) any practice establishing a relation among elements such that the 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105). 
According to Laclau, the central object of articulation is social demand which needs to be 
emptied from meaning as much as possible. Its task is to - apart from its own, articulate all 
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 “Marxism (…) contributes an emphasis on the connection between apparently disparate campaigns and issues: 
struggles over oil and gas, for example, can connect ecological questions with local concerns over health and 
safety, economic ones about the ownership of natural resources, cultural conflicts over the meaning of place, and, 
indeed, the politics of policing.” Barker, Cox, Krinsky and Nilsen 2003, 15.  
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other (unrealized) demands (See more in Laclau 2005, 73). Hence, Laclau reaches the definition 
of hegemony: 
“(…) there is the possibility that one difference, without ceasing to be a particular 
difference, assumes the representation of an incommensurable totality. In that way, its body is 
split between the particularity which it still is and the more universal signification of which it is 
bearer. This operation of taking up, by a particularity of an incommensurable universal 
signification is what I have called hegemony.” (Laclau ibid., 70) 
Struggles over meaning and (thus) struggles for hegemony do not occur only between 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. These struggles (and this is especially clear from 
Laclau), also take place within the counter-hegemonic block itself. Due to the proliferation of 
social struggles, Laclau claims, no specific social demand (and hence no specific actor or 
struggle) may claim superiority over others before/outside the sphere of the political. In more 
philosophical terms, this means that no actor or social demand may claim ontological and/or 
epistemological superiority in the political sphere on grounds of its materially determined 
privilege inherited from the social/economic sphere. Hegemony must be the result of a process, 
where demands in the political sphere manage to articulate subjugation as oppression, for the 
opportunity to become “empty signifiers” within which all unfulfilled social demands may be 
compressed. In my work, this way of reasoning is replicated onto the field of conceptual 
articulation, whereby in each case study a different concept takes over the role of a “master-
frame” within each discourse. The centrality of one type of conceptual apparatus or even a 
single concept, in this sense, announces actually that one demand managed to hegemonize the 
space of articulation of discontent, by simultaneously representing itself and other unfulfilled 
demands.  
 
2.2. Sociology of Knowledge 
 
The formation of any sort of cognitive map whether it is hegemonic or counter-
hegemonic, theoretical or non-theoretical, has bothered theoreticians of science ever since 
Descartes onwards. How do we know what we know? Are the objects of cognition given and 
“objective”, or there is subjective intervention which may jeopardize our endeavors of 
“knowing the world objectively”?  
I assume that there are certain social factors which could make certain directions of 
cognitive development more likely to occur. There should be some external patterns or sets of 
experiences to which one may be exposed, which make certain types of knowledge more likely 
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to be appropriated by an individual. Unlike Karl Popper who separates the “inner” and the 
“external” world to the extent of claiming that these worlds are autonomous, my position is 
way more interactionist.38 This means that the two worlds, “inner” or “mental” and “external” 
or “material”, interact and mutually shape each other. It is the task of sociology of knowledge 
to investigate and assess this process of interaction which sets directions of cognitive 
development and acquisition of knowledge.  
Sociology of knowledge was not developed as a separate field of research until the 20th 
century. Before that, there were only Durkheim’s and Weber’s approaches. They represented a 
paradigmatic set of views that was used as a building platform for a specific branch of sociology 
of knowledge. On the one hand Durkheim’s answer to the question of what is precisely about 
society that is being studied by sociology is unequivocal: social facts. According to him, “social 
facts make sociology a focused discipline with an eye for empirical detail, far removed from the 
metaphysical lumber of social philosophy” (Baert 2005, 23). Weber, on the other hand, 
launched the tradition of sociological thought which, apart from “social facts”, likewise takes 
into account subjective meanings or subjective construction of everyday life. He believed that 
“the scientific constructs should include a reference to the subjective meaning an action has for 
the actor” (Schutz 1962, 62; in Schutz 1996, 47).  
Since Karl Mannheim onwards, a separate field of sociology of knowledge has sought to 
shed additional light on the specific matter of the relationship between subjective perceptions 
and objective social circumstances in which one acquires them. The sociology of knowledge, in 
Mannheim’s words, “has set itself the task of solving the problem of the social conditioning of 
knowledge and discovering workable criteria for determining the interrelations between 
thought and action” (Mannheim 1954, 237). The other two authors, who “popularized” the 
field of sociology of knowledge further, were Luckmann and Berger. They also thought of the 
“objective” and the “subjective” as compounding elements of a perfect dualistic image of 
reality. They argued the following:  
“Society does indeed possess objective facticity. And society is indeed built up by 
activity that expresses subjective meaning. And, incidentally, Durkheim knew the latter, just as 
Weber knew the former. It is precisely the dual character of society in terms of objective 
facticity and subjective meaning that makes its ‘reality sui generis' (…)” (Berger and Luckmann 
1966, 18).  
So far, my approach overlaps with Berger and Luckmann, as well as with Mannheim. The 
process of diverging, especially with the first-mentioned, starts when they proceed elaborating 
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 “Popper aims at defending the autonomous mind from materialism (being merely a product of the physical 
world).  At the same time he defends the world of ideas (world 3) from being merely a product of our deliberate 
construction or manipulation.” Garmann 2014, 33. 
32 
 
on what should be a more specific task of sociology of knowledge. The essential concern of this 
field of study, according to Berger and Luckmann is: “How is it possible that subjective 
meanings become objective facticities?” (ibid.). They argue, in other words, that sociology of 
knowledge should be about common-sense “knowledge”39 rather than “ideas”. It is precisely 
commonsensical knowledge, they argue, “that constitutes the fabric of meanings without which 
no society could exist” (ibid., 14-15). They further argue that “natural failing of theorizers” is to 
“exaggerate the importance of theoretical thought in society and history (…) and continue by 
arguing that the theoretical formulations of reality, whether they be scientific or philosophical 
or even mythological, do not exhaust what is “real” for the members of a society”. Since this is 
so, they claim, “the sociology of knowledge must first of all concern itself with what people 
'know' as 'reality' in their everyday, non- or pre-theoretical lives” (ibid.). For Mannheim, 
similarly, “philosophers have too long concentrated themselves with their own thinking” and 
the sociology of knowledge should instead, pay attention to the “non-exact modes of knowing”. 
As to the subjects of research, Berger and Luckmann talk about “common people”, while 
Mannheim talks about “acting men” who “proceeded to develop a variety of methods for the 
experimental and intellectual penetration of the world in which they live” (Mannheim 1954, 1). 
Here starts my disagreement with both approaches.  
Both works, of Mannheim on the one hand and Berger and Lukmann on the other 
distinguish between scientific (or theoretical) and non-scientific knowledge for which they 
believe it should be central to the sociology of knowledge. I argue that what people “know as 
reality” is not a uniform projection that may be predominantly prescribed to either scientific or 
non-scientific knowledge. My interest in theoretical influence upon the way in which individuals 
and groups perceive reality comes from another categorization which has to do with hegemonic 
and counter – hegemonic sides of the perception of reality. Unlike Berger and Luckmann who 
argue that sociology of knowledge should be dealing with hegemonic commonsensical 
knowledge, I set my research task around socially mediated construction of counter-hegemonic 
knowledge – which could be either theoretical or non-theoretical or often, both. This corpus of 
knowledge tends to deconstruct the ruling common sense and thereby disrupt, decompose and 
delegitimize the social fabric built upon a hegemonic paradigm. I am thus preoccupied with 
looking at the construction of what Mannheim calls “utopias”, understood as “complexes of 
ideas which tend to generate activities toward changes of the prevailing order” (Mannheim 
ibid., xxiii)40; and with what Berger and Luckmann call “other realities” - which “appear as finite 
provinces of meaning, enclaves within the paramount reality marked by circumscribed 
meanings and modes of experience” (Berger and Luckmann ibid., 25). These enclaves or 
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 Whereby “common sense” is defined as the knowledge I share with others in the normal, self-evident routines 
of everyday life. See: Berger and Luckmann 1966, 23.  
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 The opposite set of ideas Mannheim calls “ideologies”, referring to complexes of ideas which direct activity 
toward the maintenance of the existing order (ibid.).   
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“provinces of meaning” in their understanding exist in contrast to common sense and they are 
“perceived as superstitious, marginal, or deluded, on the one hand, or overly abstract, 
specialized, or dogmatic, on the other” (Rosenfeld 2010, 14). The argument against Berger and 
Luckmann who think that “other realities” should not be included in the field of research of 
sociology of knowledge is that, without these “other” realities, we can talk neither about reality 
in its totality nor about the role that knowledge plays in social change (which is always driven 
by counter-hegemonic thought). Only these, “parallel” realities, may show that knowledge is 
both “social product and a factor in social change (…) since no (hegemonic) common sense is 
really fully consensual even in its time” (Rosenfeld ibid., 87). The fundamental difference 
between Mannheim on the one hand, and Berger and Luckmann on the other, is that 
Mannheim includes “utopias” into the analysis, whereas Berger and Luckmann find “other 
realities” irrelevant for the field of sociology of knowledge. On this point, I therefore follow 
Mannheim.  
An important point of divergence of my approach with respect to Mannheim’s, is that I 
include theoretical influences and indeed – theoretical thinking into the analysis of what he 
calls “utopias” and I label “counter-hegemonic tendencies” or critical knowledge. Moreover, I 
find theory crucial in some instances of contestation of the status quo. As a factor of social 
change, knowledge tends to become more abstract in order to contest the general common 
sense. Critical knowledge seeks to bring about social change by scaling up the common sense in 
order to shake its entire edifice, rather than its particular “rooms”. To scale up the level of 
cognition and knowledge acquisition and communication of course, means including theoretical 
reflections which, as Berger and Luckmann rightly point out, “have their roots in pre-theoretical 
reifications established in this or that social situation” (ibid., 90).  
If theory plays a role in “cognitive development” or the construction of critical 
consciousness, this process has its vestibule. This vestibule is compound of non-theoretical 
inputs that lead towards theoretical upgrade under certain social conditions. From the 
standpoint of a dominant paradigm and its (ruling) common sense, critical knowledge is 
perceived as deviant and shares “an inferior cognitive status within the particular social world” 
(ibid., 66). This is however not enough reason for reducing the study of sociology of knowledge 
(as Berger and Luckmann do) only to the hegemonic set of (ruling) knowledge and meaning 
systems. Here I am suggesting that studying “the deviant side of the coin” might help us to 
understand the formation of contesting meaning systems, which seek to deconstruct and 
overthrow the one dominating in a given moment. The level of coherency of these contesting 
meaning systems is, at the same time, tightly linked to the ability of a subject (be it individual or 
collective) to develop both abstract and non-abstract levels of thinking and combine them. 
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Other authors also draw attention to the common research practice of looking at the 
hegemonic knowledge and its social role. This corpus of knowledge usually comes from a grand 
narrative which manages to become hegemonic and hence “deserve” to be strengthened and 
vividly reproduced with the help of the whole network of “small” narratives and every - day, 
common sense knowledge. Another quote from Robert Lynd’s book “Knowledge for What”, 
written ten years after the biggest economic crisis of the 20th century:  
“This over-ready acceptance of the main assumptions of the going system has been a 
source of confusion and embarrassment to the social sciences as that system has become 
highly unmanageable since the World War, and particularly since 1929” (Lynd 1939, 4).  
The moment of my writing, it has been more than ten years since the beginning of the 
biggest economic crisis of the 21st century, so far. The situation in social sciences today is 
seemingly different than 80 years ago when critical thought was not as widespread in 
established social sciences and readily available as in the 21st century.41 The amount of critical 
literature, theories and philosophical or scientific discussions on systemic fallacies of “predatory 
neoliberal capitalism” has skyrocketed due to the 2007/8 world economic crisis. This trend 
affected the former apologists, centrists who took a “lefty” or quite radical left turn after the 
crisis. The production of scientific pieces analyzing causes of the financial and economic 
collapse of 2007/8 and discussing (consequential) degradation of social and political affairs is 
probably at its historical peak at the moment. There is a clear reason for this and that is the 
need of the counter-hegemonic side of “reality” to get some conceptual and theoretical light. 
As Lynd argues, “(…) although empiricism is conducive to realism, it is also deceptively 
conducive to a kind of over-preoccupation with immediacies which may distract attention from 
critical larger questions” (ibid., 123).  
This is why theoretical, more abstract thought, especially philosophical insights, are 
constitutive of every (desired or conducted) social change. With this respect, Habermas makes 
a distinction between the social (subjective) and the cultural and institutional spheres. In each 
of these two, he argues, different types of knowledge matter. “For the cultural / institutional 
sphere, Habermas refers to the fact that society becomes increasingly complex, and related to 
that, argues that there is a growing need for expert knowledge. Theory and philosophical 
discourses can have a role as critical expert knowledge. In the social sphere philosophy will 
increasingly have a role as hermeneutics as trying to find meaning and to guide meaning” 
(Garmann and Johnsen 2016, 92). Finding or guiding meaning nonetheless became more 
difficult in the light of events and social/political/economic transformations which somewhat 
speeded up the course of history in the past decades. Thinkers found themselves in an uneasy 
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 The process of “globalization of critical theory” has significantly contributed to widening and spreading of critical 
theory beyond the limits of “Western world”. See more in: Keucheyan 2013, 3. 
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moment of “the end of determinism” which made holistic and plausible thought way more 
difficult to achieve. The crisis of emancipatory, critical thought somewhat overlapped with the 
crisis of the left. After 1989 and the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the new attempts of 
critical theory to reestablish balance with the dominant interpretation of 1989 as “the end of 
history” (Fukuyama) seemed to be failing. In parallel, the neoliberal stream of thought has 
become hegemonic and to a significant extent – commonsensical.  
 This is why, finally, I do not see common sense or counter-hegemonic contestations as 
something simply (and only) “given by ratio”, by humans’ ability to think or infer conclusions 
from certain premises. The crisis of critical thought and the dominance of neoliberalism are not 
understood here as the signs of inability to think and assess the misconceptions of the 
dominant paradigm. I do not see the crisis as being derived from human incapacity to think 
(see: Rosenfeld ibid., 142). Where I place both (hegemonic) common sense and counter-
hegemonic contesting tendencies - are social interactions and power relations.  This means that 
contesting sets of meaning usually develop into relevant ones when ruling common sense starts 
functioning as “a kind of structural or even constitutive censorship”. Their influence is more 
likely to increase when “common sense turns into an instrument of domination that works 
constantly and silently not only to keep individuals in line but also to exclude outlying voices as 
either criminal or crazy and to limit the parameters of public debate” (ibid., 14). With the help 
of other elements of the theoretical framework, I am seeking to illuminate structural, 
organizational and generally speaking – social conditions under which “utopias” in Mainnheim’s 
and “other realities” in Luckmann and Berger’s terms, may become relevant contesters of the 
hegemonic paradigm and establish a tangible counter-hegemonic “block” in order to reset 
existing power relations.     
 
2.3. General Theoretical Positioning Within Social Movement Studies 
 
The two main positions concerning the relationship between social movements and 
critical communities (and ideas) may be presented through the two important works of (earlier 
mentioned) Thomas Rochon (1991) and Eyerman and Jameson (1998). In Rochon’s “Culture 
Moves”, movements are somewhat objectified and presented as playing the role of 
practitioners, or conductors of previously developed theoretical insights. In Eyerman and 
Jameson, the authors emphasize that movements are “producers of knowledge” and see their 
activities as “cognitive practice”. They oppose the tendency of understanding movements as 
passive with respect to knowledge and cognition in general. The general compliant comes from 
another two authors who take Eyerman’s and Jameson’s side, arguing that “(…) the voices, 
ideas, perspectives and theories produced by those engaged in social struggles are often 
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ignored, rendered invisible, or overwritten with accounts by professionalized or academic 
experts” (Choudry and Kapoor 2010, 2).  
My approach is based on the analytical separation of levels of abstraction of knowledge 
precisely because it seeks to resolve this tension. I argue that movements are both receivers 
and creators of knowledge. Macro (conceptual) level is thus understood as taken over from 
critical communities, micro level as contextual intervention into macro conceptualization of 
reality, whereas meso level is understood as the one through which one can observe the 
combination of conceptual and presumed / contextual knowledge. It is at the meso level that 
we can see what applied theory looks like after being exposed to a given context. Knowledge 
occurring at this level represents the outcome of work done by what Jameson and Eyerman call 
“movement intellectuals”. Hence we may talk about the influence of critical communities at the 
level of generic knowledge and the work of “movement intellectuals” at the level of knowledge 
driven out from the combination of generic (macro) knowledge and given contextual 
characteristics.42 One approach in the above indicated discussion, therefore, does not exclude 
the other.  
 
Table 2.1: Epistemic discourses 
Level of abstraction  Micro Macro Meso 
Type of knowledge Presumed, contextual, 
common sense  
Generic knowledge  Applied concepts  
Source  Everyday events  Critical communities  Organic intellectuals  
 
Taken the research themes indicated above, which include a reference to the relationship 
between critical knowledge on the one hand and social movements on the other, I believe I 
should tackle the concepts in social movement studies. After elaborating theoretical 
understanding of critical theory, hegemony and general features of sociology of knowledge, I 
wonder how the relationship between social movements and critical theory look like from the 
social movement perspective. Conceptually speaking, social movements supposedly, “do center 
on sustained challenges to authorities in the names of populations otherwise lacking direct 
representation” (Tilly 2002, 53). On the other hand, critical communities do take the 
                                                          
42
 I’m hereby not referring to “know-hows”, but to the type of knowledge which composes discourses.   
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perspective of the “excluded” and theorize from the standpoint of the “weakest pillar of the 
bridge”.43 This makes the link between critical communities and critical knowledge on the one 
hand and social movements on the other – logically speaking, natural.  Lasse Lindekilde, 
however, claims that “from the perspective of discourse analysis (which is precisely one of the 
two methods I am using in the empirical research), social movements are engaged in innovative 
and creative forms of discursive practices, which pose a challenge to, or reproduce the existing 
order of discourse in a given institution of social domain” (Lindekilde 2014, 205)44. Social 
movements, in other words, may be more or less radical in their demands. The first scenario 
brought up by Lindekilde assumes that “movement activities are not only instrumentally 
adapting to contextual challenges and existing resources, but they are also emergent as they 
contribute to transform those resources. This means that discourses and actions in fact create 
relations, rather than just reflecting them” (ibid., 15). The later scenario implies acting within 
the already given limitations of a systemic framework. One could argue that the scenario in this 
context actually depends on the type of knowledge employed and applied through certain 
demands and actions.    
The interconnection and intersection between social movements and critical theory (and 
critical communities producing it) thus seems to be logical and self-evident, to the extent that 
cognition behind direct action strongly affects the type and “nature” of that action. Studying 
the relationship between ideas and social movements, yet, on first glance seems like falling 
under a typical cultural approach to social movements. Ideas, cognition, symbols – rather than 
structures and classes are supposed to be in the focus here. However, my position is neither 
placed within structural/traditional nor cultural approaches, but between the two. My 
approach thereby takes into account both structures and material conditions which shape (and 
are shaped by) non-structural and non-material factors such as cognition and ideas. Thus a brief 
clarification of my position is required here.  
In traditional approaches to social movement studies, “(…) social movement scholars 
attempt to explain the emergence and timing of social movements, the social and political 
context in which they develop recruitment efforts, the mobilization of resources, the way 
tactics and strategies change over time and outcomes and consequences of collective behavior” 
(Carty 2015, 20). Charles Tilly thinks that “it is better to stick to a definition of movements as 
                                                          
43
 “Just as the carrying power of a bridge is measured not by the average strength of its pillars but by the strength 
of the weakest pillar, and is built up from that strength, the confidence and resourcefulness of a society are 
measured by the security, resourcefulness and self-confidence of its weakest sections, and it grows as they grow.” 
Bauman 2008, 142.     
44
 Alberto Melluci addresses the issue of “alternative meaning systems” in the following way: “The analytical 
dimension of social movements (…) where conflictual forms of behavior are directed against the processes by 
which dominant cultural codes are formed. It is through action itself that the power of the languages and signs of 
technical rationality are challenged. By its sheer existence, such action challenges power, upsets its logic, and 
constructs alternative meanings.” Melucci 1996, 169. 
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consisting of sustained campaigns directed at authorities who use the social movement 
repertoire of tactics and create public displays of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment” 
(Staggenborg 2011, 8). According to such traditional understanding, much research on social 
movements does not take into account the “cognitive perspective”. Instead, its focus is on “the 
importance of mobilizing structures, the distribution of material resources, and political 
opportunities for the emergence of social movements” (Roggeband and Klandermans 2010, 4). 
In more recent studies, one could find, however, authors promoting the “cultural turn”. This 
turn should have shifted focus on “(…) content of movement ideology, the concerns motivating 
activists, and the arena in which collective action was focused – that is cultural understandings, 
norms, and identities rather than material interests and economic distribution” (Williams 2007, 
92). The “culturalists” in general terms (outside social movement studies) thereby broke up 
with the materialist understanding of society, and decreased importance of social classes and 
their “objective” interests. This shift took place at the level of social science (generally 
speaking), which then prompted social movement scholars to neglect class-driven 
understanding of social movements. As argued by Habermas even before the cultural turn was 
launched, “contemporary movements differ from earlier forms of collective action in that they 
address symbolic rather than instrumental needs (…) transition, he proceeds, from industrial to 
post-industrial society is marked by post-class movements” (Ray 1993, 59).  
Some versions of the cultural approach nonetheless allow us to stay between the 
materialist and idealist frameworks and argue that materialism needs idealism as much as 
idealism needs material grounding. This can happen if one “concentrates on questions about 
how individuals and groups perceive and interpret material conditions and focuses on the role 
of cognitive, affective, and ideational roots of contention” (Roggeband and Klandermans 2010, 
ibid.). Materialism may thus evolve and move away from previously rigid positions that 
recognize only objective material conditions and start taking into account contextual (spatial) 
and historical (time) variations (factors). My general approach regarding the perception of 
social reality therefore has two frontiers on each side: the one on the material side which 
divides rigid from the non-rigid materialism (my position is non-rigid); and on the side of 
idealism which prevents limitless / infinite possibilities of interpretations, typical for the 
postmodern relativist approaches.45 The same goes for my perception of social movements 
which is neither traditional/structural nor cultural. This means that my approach is essentially 
dialectical and assumes a contingent nature of social processes. I am seeking to build theory 
from scratch, through empirical research, while bearing in mind both general traditions in social 
movement studies, structural and cultural.    
                                                          
45
 See more about post-modernism in social movement studies in: Sotirakopoulos 2016, 72  
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In terms of specific literature and authors, my general theoretical position regarding social 
movements touches upon two authors: Colin Barker and James Jasper. Let me explain. In the 
end of his chapter on “cultural approaches in the sociology of social movements” Jasper 
stresses that what still remains to be researched are the “first stirrings of a social movement”: 
“Given the sensibilities, ideas, values, and allegiances mixed together in different population 
segments, how does necessarily limited attention come to be focused on one set of issues 
rather than others? “. (Jaspers 2010, 100) Taking Jaspers as a reference, the point of my 
theoretical departure corresponds to the point where the cultural approach “lands” – meaning 
that I am about to focus on what Jasper considers to be a yet non-answered question. By 
researching these “first stirrings of social movements”, I am not moving further away from 
materialism. Quite to the contrary, my path may easily be perceived as circular because it seeks 
to establish a mutually dependent trajectory of explanation, whereby material and cultural 
approaches do not negate but rather complement each other. On the one hand I shall keep an 
eye open for the material dimension, while on the other I will take into account the cultural 
approach with respect to social reality typical for scholars of “new social movements” which 
usually “look at the emergence of the new types of identities, based more on beliefs, than on 
structural positions” (della Porta 2015, 68). 
Apart from Jasper, my general theoretical positioning within social movement studies also 
takes Colin Barker as a reference point. He argues that human beings “necessarily enter into 
social relations that are the product of previous activity and independent of their will” (Barker 
2013, 47). From a pure materialist standpoint, this means that real life experience is shaped by 
materially rooted (class-determined) conditions of life which then dictate the type of social 
relations one is getting into. Barker proceeds and argues that people “regularly run up against 
features of these systems that impede them in the pursuit of their (self-developing) needs and 
goals” (ibid.). The twist, which actually makes a difference and places my understanding of 
social reality (and social movements) between material and culturalist approaches, is that these 
needs and goals might be material, cultural, spiritual, or (most probably) mixed – and not only 
material and “objective”.   
My theoretical positioning also needs to be synchronized with the specific context of the 
region I am studying. Material deprivation and massive pauperization in the region of former 
Yugoslavia have been, to a greater of lesser extent, present in the last three decades. The well-
organized social movements with somewhat innovative agendas, nevertheless, appeared only a 
decade ago.46 The aspect I am focusing on is hence the penetration of ideas and 
conceptualizations which could have illuminated contradictions, suggest non-hegemonic 
                                                          
46
 As indicated in the introduction, the exception is the Serbian “Otpor” which was a typical type of political 
movement described in the very introduction: anti-authoritarian, seeking to replace Miloševid in the name of 
“European values”, “modernization” and “democratization”.  
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conceptualization, and thereby make actors aware of material conditions and various 
possibilities to contest the status quo. The assumption is that accessibility to such conceptual 
and theoretical insights had preceded the occurrence of social movements in the region and 
significantly influenced or shaped the formation of their individual “cognitive maps” and 
collectively constructed (epistemic) discourses. I am interested in the types of the ideas, their 
origins, mechanisms and channels through which they found their way to the activists and 
movement organizations, as well as the way in which certain ideas, rather than others - came 
about to become constitutive of the collective identities and discourses communicated to the 
wider public.  
 
2.3.1. Cognition and Collective Identity in Social Movement Studies 
 
The subfield of social movement literature dealing with “cognition and social 
movements” plays a very important role in this study. Starting from the basic postulate of 
cognition, cognitive foundations of human understanding of the world and meanings inscribed 
to its processes and conditions, come either from discourse and communication, reasoning and 
inference or, from individual observation and experience. No matter if the source of a piece of 
knowledge comes directly (from experience or observation) or indirectly (in the form of a story 
conveyed by a reliable broker for instance), it should always get generalized or abstracted in 
order to get processed in accordance to the framework of generic knowledge. This generic 
knowledge serves thus for organization, management and coherence of our propositions, 
perceptions and claims. After abstraction, the newly received “information” comes back in a 
systematic top-down form and generates the foundation of a new (cognitive) experience model 
which may be considered more advanced (and organized) than what had been firstly 
experienced / communicated/ inferred. The compounding elements of this new cognitive form 
are now set up more coherently. Abstraction and generalization are hence a necessary 
precondition of the formation of any kind of common space of communication, since the 
variety of experiences at the level of the so called “modally grounded (individual) knowledge”47 
provides no possibility for constructing a shared discourse or collective identity. Even at the 
level of individual cognition, people as language and discourse users, “need generic knowledge 
of the world in order to be able to “summarize” large, possibly incomplete or incoherent, 
sequences of local propositions in terms of more general, and more abstract global meanings” 
(See more about this process in van Dijk 2014, 49; 89; 246; 315). Provision of instances where 
every day experiences are constantly processed is secured by the framework of generic 
                                                          
47
 “Knowledge is grounded in the neurological structure of the brain and its modal specialization derived from our 
repeated everyday experiences with our environment.” Gee and Handford (ed.) 2012,  588. 
41 
 
knowledge. In accordance to this framework we perceive lower levels of knowledge (ideas, 
information etc.), whereby its formation may be attributed to numerous social and political 
actors (from political parties to media).  As argued before, the actor whose prior task is to 
provide (specifically) social movements activists (and not only them) with generic knowledge 
systems through which direct experience and particular information is processed and 
organized, are critical communities.  
Now, when it comes to more specific theoretical guidelines with respect to cognition and 
social movements, the work of Doug McAdam is among the most relevant ones. Talking about 
one of the three central causal factors for the rise of social movements within his political 
process theory, McAdam spoke about “cognitive liberation”. “(…) While important, he is 
stressing, “expanding political opportunities and indigenous organizations do not, in any simple 
sense, produce a social movement (…) Together they only offer insurgents a certain objective 
“structural potential” for collective political action. Mediating between opportunity and action 
are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations.” (McAdam 1982, 48) My 
departing point, as previously mentioned, is the landing point of such cultural approach. I do 
share McAdam’s point on the importance of subjective meanings attached to given situations, 
but I am taking one step back. Instead of just acknowledging the importance of subjective 
meanings, I will go deeper into the very process of acquiring ideas that shape individual and/or 
collective perceptions of reality. Taking these perceptions for granted of course is not 
something I criticize per se. For instance, McAdam in his peace on meaning and movements 
assumes that “movements are animated by participants’ critical beliefs and alternative visions 
of the societies in which they live” (McAdam 2013). His research interest was building upon this 
highly intuitive assumption. He departs from it in order to explain other processes. Unlike 
McAdam, who departs from this point in order to “go forward”, I depart from the same point in 
order to go “backwards” and look at where these meanings, ideas and sets of beliefs come from 
in the first place. My aim is to get the research to the place of initiation of cognitive processes, 
which open up the possibility of alternative or contentious perception of reality and hence, 
alternative and contentious politics and social action. I seek to learn how ideas originating in 
critical communities diffuse, incentivize activists, get transformed, get to the forefront of 
movements’ discourses or get dismissed throughout the processes of construction of 
movements’ discourses.  
My focus is on the relevancy of, specifically, generic knowledge or sets of theory with 
respect to social movements. Most of these concerns are raised by Bevington and Dixon, who 
primarily stress that social movement theory itself, “is not seen as helpful by those persons who 
are directly involved in the very processes that this theory is supposed to illuminate” (Bevington 
and Dixon 2005, 189). What I aim at discovering is, nonetheless, not limited to the relevance of 
social movement theory for activists and movements. I shall rather look for those theories and 
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concepts in the fields of social science and humanities more generally, which were recognized 
by the activists as those able to produce a “cognitive click” (Gerring 1999, 370). This search is 
applied both at the level of individual activists, and social movements and their discourses.  
Generally speaking, I am in search for theory relevant for activism today.  
Even though my research does not tackle collective identity formation in a specific way, the 
literature dealing with collective identity formation within social movement studies should be 
addressed when discussing social movements and cognition. My research namely, deals with 
collectively constructed epistemic discourses, which represent a segment of collective identity 
formation. Collective identity building is hence not reducible to the collectively set epistemic 
discourses, but the effects inherent to collective identity formation likewise affect construction 
of epistemic discourses. 
The iterature on collective identity building thus dig deeper into the processes that shape 
collective identities, which go beyond a simple summary of individual contributions to it. This 
means that collective identities, same as epistemic discourses, cannot be reduced to the sum of 
individual “cognitive maps” but, in addition - come as a consequence of various factors such as 
power relations, deliberations, inner organizational factors, as well as structural and other 
obstacles. In order to tackle this issue I rely on Alberto Melucci’s understanding of collective 
identity on the one hand, and the concept of “cognitive praxis” coming from Eyerman and 
Jamison (1991) on the other. Firstly, Melucci defines collective identity as “a process (which) 
involves cognitive definitions concerning the ends, means and the field of action (which are) 
incorporated in a given set of rituals, practices, cultural artifacts (and) framed between means 
and ends, investments and rewords” (Melucci 1996, 70). More broadly defined, collective 
identity is the main precondition for “making sense” of both reality and a given collective action 
by which a collective actor aims to change or challenge a certain aspect or totality of that 
reality. Even though internally conflicting, collective identity still requires a minimum of 
commonality at the very beginning of the dynamic process of its construction. As Melucci 
argues, “if unity cannot be conceptualized right from the beginning, it will never be forthcoming 
at the end, either” (ibid., 64).  
Collective identity also involves a sort of struggle typical for the process which Eyerman and 
Jamison labeled as “cognitive praxis” defined as “a process of integrating different sources of 
cognitive influences into a movement identity” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, 70). Furthermore, 
Charles Tilly reminds us that “some (political) identities lend themselves to mobilization and 
collective action, whereas others do not” (Tilly 2002, 49). This means that collective identities 
get shaped by following some and dismissing other particular (cognitive) influences and inputs. 
Certain ideas and concepts may, on the one hand, appear as suitable and resonate with a given 
context better than others and, as such, prove to be more suitable for mobilization than others. 
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Cases thus vary not only with respect to different “political opportunity structures”, but also the 
type of “object of communication”. This means that collective identity appears in different 
shapes and forms depending on who the target “audience” is. Such logic however, may be 
applied only partly, as certain conceptual features become master-frames and get to the 
forefront of movements’ discourses (rather than others) as well due to reasons independent of 
pragmatics and tactics. These reasons are to be found within collective deliberations, 
persuasions, and internal group dynamics that affect the final outcome of the collective identity 
formation process, including epistemic discursive set up. In addition, identities of social 
movements also “depend on their connections with other political actors” (ibid., 55), as well as 
hitherto established forms and units of social and political organization within a given context.  
One should also bear in mind that, as Jasper rightly stresses, collective identity “requires 
continual reinforcement” (Jasper ibid., 95). Looking at the factors typical for the process of 
collective identity formation, means looking at the dynamics happening between “social 
imagination and social interaction” (Ibid., 77) - whereby the prior shapes the former and vice 
versa. Interpersonal interaction, finally, brings people and their ideas together. Interaction 
between ideas and concepts end up constitutive of discursive formations after being affected 
by factors typical for collective identity formation. After being diffused from various sources 
through various channels, ideas start “competing” for becoming master-frames of epistemic 
discourses. The last theoretical reflection should cover up these aspects.  
 
2.3.2. Diffusion and Master Frames 
  
Even though I am not dealing with classical diffusion of tactics, frames, and repertoires 
from one social movement to another, the literature on social movements and diffusion 
represents an important pillar of my theoretical framework. Instead of repertoires, tactics or 
frames, I am concerned with diffusion of worldviews and concepts from critical communities or 
other sources, to activists and social movements. The literature on diffusion in social movement 
studies may be very helpful since diffusion of frames, for instance, includes diffusion of ideas 
that is central to my research. Similarly to diffusion from one movement to another, ideas 
travel from critical communities to movements through interpersonal contacts, organizational 
linkages, or associational networks (Tarrow 2005). Brokers might be involved in diffusion of 
ideas from critical communities to activists, in a similar manner as repertoires and tactics 
diffuse between movements. Both types of diffusion are multidimensional and represent a 
mixture of formal and informal institutional arrangements and actors.  
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Generally speaking, the process of diffusion is not reducible to the process of “contagion” 
and simple imitation. Similarly to the process of diffusion of repertoires, tactics and frames, 
adaptation, contextualization and learning play an important role in diffusion of knowledge and 
“cognitive inputs”, as well. This means that social movements engage in a “dynamic and 
interactive struggle over production of ideas and meanings” (Snow and Benford 1992, 136) and 
do not only operate as simple “receivers” of conceptual inputs from critical communities. Yet, 
this does not mean that inputs from critical communities (which later are additionally shaped, 
accommodated, and contextualized) are not crucial for initiating the cognitive processes 
oriented to counter hegemonic thinking, both individually and collectively. The process of 
diffusion in this work is therefore understood as a process of diffusion of ideas from critical 
communities to activists and social movements. There are two important remarks that should 
be emphasized with respect to this theoretical pillar. 
Firstly, one should make some theoretical clarifications regarding the role of intellectuals 
(who are usually main “elements” of critical communities). The “social function of intellectuals”, 
is emphasized by numerous empirical and theoretical studies, whereby the cornerstone of 
discussions taking place in the previous decades, has been set by Antonio Gramsci. His work on 
what he labeled as “organic intellectuals” whose role lies in “articulating principle capable of 
absorbing ideologically, economically, and politically other classes in the hegemonic system” 
(Ramos 1982), is among the most remarkable in this field. Organic intellectuals are nonetheless, 
at least in Gramsci’s understanding, supposed to be found within every social group. According 
to this author, a social group is “coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential 
function in the world of economic production”, and create together with itself, organically, one 
or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function 
not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields (Gramsci 1999, 134-135). In 
the shift from the class “in itself” to the class “for itself”, the role of “organic intellectuals” is 
crucial, considering that the awareness of one’s class position and consequently – class interest, 
is to be developed and systematized precisely by organic intellectuals within a given class. In 
order to dig deeper into the process of diffusion of knowledge from “critical communities” to 
social movements and their activists, I am reshaping Gramsci’s understanding of the connection 
between the producers and/or “systematizers” of knowledge on the one hand, and social 
actors (movements in this case), on the other. I do not therefore, focus on intellectual 
production within social movements (which is indisputably often very rich) – but on cognitive 
inputs coming from critical communities to “organic intellectuals” who apply it both practically 
and theoretically afterwards. This means that the focus of this work is what incentivizes the 
very (cognitive) activities of “organic intellectuals”. Again, the pillar of theoretical framework 
dealing with diffusion, to an extent, complies with the culturalist trend of shifting attention 
towards the way in which activists make sense of their own actions, as well as about the world 
around them (Jasper and Polletta 2001; Strang and Soule 1998).   
45 
 
Secondly, an important role in every process of diffusion is played by the so called 
“brokers”. At the most general level brokerage “describes the linkages of two or more 
previously disparate sites” (Russo 2014, 35). Having that in mind, the role of brokers may be 
played by personal contacts, alternative subcultural centers or entire subcultural scenes, media 
and alike. All these types of brokerage are to be taken into account while assessing the 
channels of diffusion of (critical) knowledge from its source to its “users” who, again, may 
reshape and accommodate it, depending on a given (political/cultural/economic) context and a 
given historical moment. 
Once when (critical) knowledge gets diffused, social movements step into the next phase of 
accommodation (or contextualization) and discursive consolidation of that knowledge. In social 
movement studies this process is called “framing”. The concept of frame “refers to 
interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” (Benford and 
Snow 1992, 137). “In Goffman’s words, frames allow individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, 
and label” events within their life space or the world at large” (ibid.). There are different forms 
of frames recognized in the literature. The most common for is the so called “collective action 
frame”, which “serve as accenting devices that either underscore and embellish the seriousness 
and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen 
as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable” (ibid.). Collective action frames are important also 
because they make diagnostic and prognostic attributions (ibid.), which is something they share 
with master frames, another type of frames - central to this work. Unlike collective action 
frames, master frames function at the more universal level, they include frames such as 
“justice” or “rights”. In Benford and Snow’s words, “master frames are to movement – specific 
collective action frames, as paradigms are to finely tuned theories.” (ibid., 138). Master frames 
therefore include a wide range of ideas and operate at the higher level of abstraction. The so 
called “elaborative” master frames are especially to be focused on in this work, since they are 
defined as “flexible forms of interpretation, and as a consequence, they are more inclusive 
systems that allow for extensive ideational amplification and extension” (Benford and Snow, 
ibid., 140)48.   
Master frames are, furthermore, often linked to the issue of resonance, so the authors 
emphasize that master frames are usually comprised of “ideas of age”, such as “freedom” or 
“self-determination” (Sanbridge 2002, 530). One should nonetheless wonder whether master 
frames may launch the initiation of “a new age” by themselves and thereby create new reality, 
instead of reacting to what had already been the dominant perception of reality beforehand. 
                                                          
48
 Elaborative master frames, according to Bernstein’s classification, come from elaborative linguistic code. On the 
opposite side is the so called “restricted code” which is highly particularistic with respect to meaning and social 
structure (…) Benford and Snow ibid., 139. 
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The issue of proactivity vs. reactivity is certainly among the relevant ones tackled in the 
empirical analysis in the chapter four.  























Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Questions 
 
In this chapter I am introducing three research questions, addressing the issues of: mapping 
counter-hegemonic knowledge; origins and channels of diffusion of counter-hegemonic 
knowledge (constitutive of epistemic discourses); and structural, social and organizational 
factors that shaped conceptual content of final discursive outputs. Methodologically speaking 
the research uses discourse analysis (with an emphasis on epistemic discourse analysis) and in-
depth qualitative interviews.  
 
 
3.1. Research Questions  
 
 
My research is, generally speaking, exploratory. This implies that hypotheses emerge 
during the process of the research. I seek to explore the phenomenon of the rise of counter-
hegemonic discourses in the post-socialist context, rather than to draw any causal correlation 
between dependent and independent variables. The research undertakes a “cognitive 
approach” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991) within social movement studies. Its design is set up in 
order to follow the genesis of development of the counter-hegemonic discourses among the 
newly arising social movements in the former Yugoslavia. This does not mean however, that the 
research is conducted without initial premises. They were necessary in order to set direction of 
the research. The first premise is that social movements in former Yugoslavia made a radically 
critical discursive breakthrough. The second premise is that this breakthrough is tightly 
interlinked to the “comeback” of counter-hegemonic knowledge which has diffused from 
various sources, reaching individual activists and social movements.  
By setting the research task around these two premises, I aim at exploring the whole edifice 
of ideas which had affected the occurrence and the final shape of such counter-hegemonic 
discourses. Thereby I am actually looking at the structure of knowledge providing “cognitive 
bricks” for the counter-hegemonic discursive edifice. My initial classification of knowledge 
introduces a binary opposition between theoretical and non-theoretical knowledge. While the 
prior includes conceptual, more abstract (generic) knowledge, the later includes worldviews or 
value systems acquired in the early phase of (political) socialization. I am nonetheless, as stated 
in the introduction, focusing on the way in which critical concepts (so critical theoretical 
knowledge) interacts with activism, meaning individual activists and movements. This 
dimension of the research includes mapping concepts present in discourses of social 
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movements (in the chapter four) and digging into their origins at the level of individual activists 
(in the third part). Non-theoretical “camps” of knowledge are of the same importance, but I 
shall rather treat them as referent bodies for conceptual/theoretical knowledge. In other 
words, I am looking at non-theoretical knowledge as a “corridor” for a theoretical “upgrade”. 
Non-theoretical knowledge always represents a compounding element of “cognitive maps” 
(individual or collective) which may, or may not be eventually affected by (critical) ideas from 
the domains of both theory and non-theory. In order to accomplish these tasks, I am 
undertaking the following three research steps: 
 
1. Mapping the presence of critical, counter-hegemonic concepts and ideas in 
discourses of the new social movements in the former Yugoslav region (traceable in 
the documents issued by the three movements) – and assessing macro level 
(structural) factors affecting divergences in discursive performance of the three 
cases.  
2. Looking at the origins and channels of diffusion of counter-hegemonic 
knowledge/ideas at the micro level of individual activists (from the early worldview 
level and value system to their theoretical upgrades). 
3. Exploring which structural, social and organizational factors shaped conceptual 
content of movements’ discourses (meso level).   
 
As is evident from these three steps, there are, in more general terms, two levels of 
analysis: one being collective and the other individual. With the first research question, I start 
from the collective level in order to trace the presence of concepts in discourses of collectively 
issued documents which may testify to the objective (conceptual) content of collective 
identities. The second step and the second research question is directed towards digging 
deeper into the origins and channels of diffusion through which certain value systems and 
conceptual (generic) knowledge found its way to the individual activists. Thereby I am seeking 
to learn about the “cradles” of critical, counter-hegemonic perception of reality, or, initial 
“cognitive inputs” for developing critical “cognitive maps” at the individual level. The third and 
final step, serves for answering the third research question and addressing social, 
organizational, and (specific) contextual aspects affecting the process of consolidation of 
(epistemic) discourses. I am, more concretely, looking for mechanisms that shape the 
interaction between individual cognitive contributions and are bringing about the collectively 
“designed” discourses as observed in the first step of the research. These two levels of analysis, 
individual and collective, represent by the same token two different phases in the process of 
learning and the socio – cognitive process of climbing up the “activist ladder”: from the level 
where fragmented sources of non-theoretical and (eventually) theoretical knowledge get to 
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shape individual cognitive maps; to the level where collective identity formation is triggered 
and itself triggers different social processes that (additionally) collectivize previous (more 
individual) cognition and affect the final “version” of epistemic discourses. 
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The exploratory character of this research implies methodology which can meet the 
requirement of flexibility with respect to its hypotheses. The methodological choice should also 
respond to the necessity of conducting a multilevel research and thereby leave enough leeway 
for maneuver and formulation of hypotheses along the way. At the same time, the 
methodology seeks to respond to the emerging concern within social movement studies, that is 
to “convincingly explain why some topics, grievances, and demands came to the fore as the 
focus of political protests rather than others” (Lindekilde 2014, 195; in della Porta 2014). These 
requirements could be fulfilled by applying discourse analysis on the one hand and in-depth 
qualitative interviews, on the other. The prior is essential when it comes to mapping concepts 
present in discourses, as well as their inner organization. The latter is important due to 
possibility to trace the origins and channels of diffusion, as well as the collective dynamics 
through which these concepts found their way to collectively constructed (epistemic) 
discourses of social movements. 
Regarding (epistemic) discourse analysis, I follow the tradition set by the social 
movement studies which “mainly use discourse analysis to study how movement texts 
(understood broadly as press releases, communiqués, websites, flyers, slogans, media 
statements, interviews with movement representatives, and so on) are composed and draw on 
existing discourses in order to communicate particular meanings, and how reception of texts is 
therefore co-shaped by their discursive context.” (della Porta 2014, 230; in della Porta 2014, 
198). Accordingly, I am looking at written documents, pamphlets, public appearances of 
activists (interviews, oral speeches at the protest events by both activists and “guest 
speakers”), press releases and other publications such as books or collection of articles (if any). 
Considering that my focus is on the conceptual side of discourse, the documents selected for 
the analysis include therefore, texts that can reveal epistemic content of discourse.  
In the Croatian case, the accent is put on the brochures such as the “Blockade Cookbook” 
which includes discussion on the conceptual background of their demand “free education for 
all”. Documents that are not covered by the analysis include press releases, which represented 
a significant channel of communication between the movement and the public – but usually 
dealt with day-to-day themes rather than conceptual discussions. The municipal movement 
from Belgrade had more protest events than their colleagues in Zagreb. This is why the analysis 
of epistemic discourse, apart from the text found on the official page of the movement or 
newspaper articles written by the activists, also covered the most representative speech from 
the most massive protest event. When I say “the most representative”, I mean the one through 
which the movement’s conceptual positioning was most clearly detectable. In the case of 
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Sarajevo’s popular movement, the choice was much narrower, since the movement issued very 
few documents in written form. This is why I had to focus on the calls for plenums and the 
accompanying text of the lists of demands. The demands themselves, at least in the Sarajevo’s 
case, served well for conceptual discourse analysis since their content varied, depending on the 
stage of development of the movement and the level of consolidation of the (epistemic) 
discourse.  
Concerning the second method applied in this research, the in-depth semi-open qualitative 
interviews, it is worth mentioning that this method is “peculiarly well suited to the analysis of 
highly relevant aspects of phenomenological reflection: the sense actors have of their 
environment” (ibid., 230). The purpose of this method is to illuminate the genesis of interaction 
between concepts, theories and in general terms – “cognitive inputs” on the one hand, and 
activists/movements who use these inputs to “make sense of their environment”, on the other. 
Diffusion of non-theoretical knowledge (value systems/ worldviews); and diffusion of 
theoretical knowledge from critical communities to activists and movements - as well as the 
insights on the dynamics of discursive consolidation – are central tasks to be accomplished 
through this method. Qualitative in-depth interviews, in other words, serve for learning about 
individual social and cognitive “becoming” on the one hand, and collective social and cognitive 
“becoming” on the other.  
When it comes to sampling, I decided to choose the “core members” as my interviewees. 
The fact that I am familiar with the three activist networks in the three selected countries, 
made the sampling easier. However, I left some space for the snow-ball strategy and learning 
from those already sampled about other possible interviewees who could possibly deepen my 
understanding of the processes of my interest. The first round of interviews was conducted in 
Zagreb, with 14 activists of the core group. The next round was conducted in Sarajevo with 11 
core group members and the final round in Belgrade with 12 most relevant respondents from 
the “Ne Da(vi)mo Beograd”. The number of interviews varied because the decision to stop or 
proceed interviewing was based on the tendency of repetition of similar answers – or the 
feeling that certain aspects of the research may be further enriched. The following two sections 
talk in more detail about methodological choices.  
  
3.2.1. Discourse analysis 
 
Discourses of course, do not bring about social change by themselves. It is the 
(epistemic) analysis of discourse nonetheless, that can help us in highlighting the conceptual 
(cognitive) background behind social/political action aiming at some sort of social change. 
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Through such analysis one may investigate the conceptual apparatus used, the complex set of 
imageries and their connection to the material/structural conditions standing behind as reasons 
and incentives for seeking social change (through action).  
As to the general understanding of discourse, I take the widely accepted view about it being 
generated by the combination of cognition and interaction. On the one hand, cognition involves 
processes of meaning attribution, knowledge production, and opinion and belief formation. On 
the other, it is a compound of interaction mostly expressed through language (but not only), or 
the so called “talk in interaction” (Van Dijk 2007, xxiv). It is therefore a part of “social practice” 
(Fairclough and Wodak; in Van Dijk 1997, 258). Discourse is here, furthermore, understood as 
“the structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105). 
My specific theoretical focus is on the epistemic discourse which tackles the “ways in which 
knowledge is presupposed, expressed, formulated, organized and managed in language use, 
communication and interaction” (van Dijk 2014, 9). I am looking at discourses from the 
perspective of knowledge management which represents management of complex schemata of 
social interrelations through which conceptual knowledge (ideas, categories, concepts, 
prototypes, domains, and scripts) become constitutive of movements’ discourses and hence – 
form the dominant conceptual stream within those discourses.49 Conceptual knowledge should 
be seen through the lenses of interaction between the exposure to theoretical influences and 
direct experience or, better said - between knowledge based on experience and generic 
knowledge.  
I combine epistemic discourse (analysis) with Fairclough’s critical discourse (analysis), which 
aims at revealing “the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of the social world, 
including those social relations that involve unequal relations of power” (della Porta 2014, 63). 
This combination is useful at the macro-level in dealing with the interaction (or specific 
relationship) between (critical) ideas and systemic and/or specific social contexts. Fairclough’s 
approach also refers to the way in which the “new knowledge” is managed with respect to the 
“old knowledge”. I shall interpret this feature as feasible for looking at how counter-hegemonic 
knowledge is managed with respect to hegemonic knowledge. This approach may also be useful 
for assessing those discourses that challenge existing power relations (or the ruling order of 
discourse in Fairclough’s terms), structures and specific institutions and thereby compete with 
other discourses seeking to reproduce the status quo. Hence, the role of discursive practices 
may be, overall, significant both “in the maintenance of social order and in social change” (ibid., 
70) and my focus is on the later.  
The selection of documents is made in accordance to the main research interest. As stated 
above, the focus was on documents in which the conceptual positioning was detectable. 
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 More on “conceptual knowledge” see in van Dijk 2014, 86. 
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Document selection had been done before starting the next phase of the empirical research, 
based on the qualitative in-depth interviews. Apart from having been a source of data and an 
object of analysis, the insights from the documents served me well as a preparatory tool for 
conducting interviews.    
 
3.2.2. In-Depth Qualitative Interviews 
 
The in-depth interviews have two main purposes: to address individual and collective 
“cognitive becoming”. Tthe first group of questions (at the individual level) digs deep into the 
origins of worldviews and particular concepts, theories and, more generally– cognitive inputs, 
that entered along with the activists into the process of discursive consolidation. Tracing such 
cognitive inputs is important for understanding both individual and collective construction of 
(counter - hegemonic) “packages of meanings” (Jasper 2010, 77; in Klandermans and 
Roggeband 2010.) which, when attributed to certain social and political issues, politicize 
hitherto non-controversial and/or non - politicized issues. This implies the meaningfulness of 
human action, which “has a certain intentional content that indicates the kind of action it is as 
well as the action that can be grasped only in terms of the system of meanings to which it 
belongs” (Schwandt 2003, 296; in: della Porta 2014, 230).  
My questions are inspired by the stream in social movement studies which emphasizes the 
need for “useful” theorization and knowledge production – meaning, useful for social 
movements and their activists. The already mentioned article by Bevington and Dixon, stresses 
the need for developing the “movement – relevant theory” (Bevington and Dixon2005, 186), 
which is understood as theory seeking to provide “useable knowledge for those seeking social 
change” (Flacks, 2004, 138). If the level of analysis is individual activists, one may alternatively 
call this theory “activist relevant theory”. Learning about non-theoretical “bricks” of 
individual/collective cognitive edifices of activists and movements is, on the other hand, crucial 
for understanding what and/or who “opened the door” for counter-hegemonic reasoning 
within a given context; and what/or who “opened the door” for possible theoretical upgrade of 
non-theoretical counter-hegemonic reasoning. The question is hence which value systems, 
which channels of diffusion, which worldviews - shaped the counter-hegemonic mindsets of the 
activists, and which elements brought the activists closer to certain theoretical influences. Out 
of the two above indicated steps of the process of “social becoming” (individual and collective), 




-Can you think of the sources of your worldview, understood as set of values which prompted 
you to perceive social/political reality in a given way?  
-Can you refer to any author or branch of literature which decisively shaped your theoretical 
interest? Was there any specific “cognitive click”?       
-Which branch of theory and which concepts you perceive as relevant for you or “movement-
relevant”?  
-What are the channels through which you have gotten in touch with these sources? Friends, 
media, international conferences, university or high school professors, parents…? 
This methodological choice partially overlaps to what is defined in the literature as “life 
history interviews”. There are nonetheless two important remarks to be added. Firstly, the 
more general “life history method” would include questions regarding stories of activists’ lives, 
“how they came to participate in the movement, the nature of participation and how it 
influences who s/he is” (Meyer and Lupo 2002, 104; in: Klandermans and Staggenborg (ed.) 
2002).50 My approach does not reach the level “reasoning behind mobilization”, but deals more 
with (and stops there) the origins and channels of diffusion of cognitive inputs detected 
through epistemic discourse analysis. Logically, the first step of such search is to wonder about 
the origins and channels of diffusion of knowledge at the level of individual activists who later 
happened to become constitutive elements of social movements’ discourses. This leads us to 
the second remark. Even though “life histories allow for understandings of different questions 
linked to cognitive mechanisms for making sense of external reality and acting on it” (della 
Porta 2014, 264.), life histories nonetheless “refer implicitly to the totality of a person's 
experience” (Bertaux and Kohli 1984, 217.). In this case, the in-depth qualitative interviews 
were semi-structured and had a clear research goal, including some previously defined 
assumptions and categories. This means that totality of one’s life could become significant but 
not necessarily. Instead, the focus here is sometimes put on family relations, sometimes on 
subcultural influences and sometimes with specific situations in life related to various feelings 
such as the feeling of “otherness”, discrimination or alike. The focus is clearly on segments of 
activists’ life which may open up the space for assessing one’s (counter-hegemonic) cognitive 
development.  
Through such questions, one can collect inductively a number of sources and types of 
cognitive inputs - including worldviews, particular theorizations and conceptualizations of social 
reality. By grasping concepts at the level of initiation and inspiration of the activists, prior to the 
formation of collective identity and consolidation of epistemic discourses, it is possible to get to 
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 “According to McCracken (1988, 19), life stories are accounts given by an individual about his/her life; they 
become life histories when they are validated by other sources.” (della Porta 2014, 262.) 
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the very sources of counter-hegemonic waves in the region of the former Yugoslavia. By posing 
these questions one is also able to learn how critical communities matter with respect to the 
development of activists’ social and political beings. 
The second group of questions addresses the collective level of analysis. It is concerned with 
the process of consolidation of epistemic discourses. Concerning this process, one should 
wonder about the filtration of ideas, meaning acceptance of some of them and dismissal of 
others from movements’ discourses. The second group of questions hence, seeks to investigate 
the internal dynamics through which processes of discourse consolidation take place. The set of 
questions, among others, include the following ones: 
-How conflicting were the differences within the movement and what has led to the prevalence 
of one stream of conceptual apparatus over others? 
-Whether and how were the differences overcome?  
 -What theory turned out to be “movement relevant”? 
The analysis of collected data is done thematically, through coding. As mentioned above in 
the context of differentiation between life stories and my qualitative interviews, the process of 
coding was both “open” and “a priori”. Some of them I created before launching data collection 
(also with a help of data acquired through discourse analysis) and some came up during and 
after it. For instance, the code “cognitive clique” was designed before, whereby I specifically 
asked the interviewees whether they can detect a “window opener”, an author or a piece of 
literature which has traced their further (theoretical) development and decisively shaped their 
“cognitive maps”. Concerning the acquisition of “non-theoretical” cognitive inputs, coding was 
mostly done during and after the process of interviewing. Some codes related to belonging to 
the working class, or (ethnically) mixed family background were to an extent anticipated – but 
were not pushed forward before the interviewees would start talking about these issues 
themselves. A similar scenario took place when it comes to the collective level of analysis. Some 
codes such as “trust” were anticipated because I had a chance to witness some phases of 
collective identity formation (especially in the case of Belgrade and Sarajevo). Most of other 
codes from the part on consolidation of discourses were created during the analysis of the 





Chapter 4: Mapping Concepts through Discourse Analysis 
 
In the first chapter I outlined the conceptual features of the post-socialist paradigm. 
Here, I am starting the empirical analysis in order to reveal the way in which this paradigm is 
contested discursively by the three social movements in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia. In order to comprehend (epistemic) discourses and assess their organization along the 
“ladder of abstraction”, I made an analytical division between micro, meso, and macro levels of 
discourse. As indicated in the subchapter on “General theoretical positioning within social 
movements” (see the table 2.1.), macro level stands for the highest level of abstraction at which 
the content of discourses’ “rooftop” can be traced. Micro level deals with knowledge based on 
commonsense and day-to-day events which serve as a direct link to the context within which a 
given discourse has been developed. Meso level, finally, links the macro and micro levels and 
puts micro level (everyday) knowledge and day-to-day events into the framework set by the 
conceptual (macro) pillars of discourse. Meso level appears as a sort of “organic” knowledge, 
produced by social movements or by the “organic intellectuals” in Gramscian terms. Knowledge 
produced at the meso level appears as a set of supportive conceptualizations which bridges 
over macro and micro levels of abstraction.  
The novelty of this approach does not lie simply in an analytical separation of the three 
levels of abstraction. Primarily, aim is to unpack the three critical discourses in order to provide 
a detailed explication of the way in which counter-hegemonic voices have been organized and 
set discursively. Secondly, the analytical differentiation between levels of abstraction in 
discourses has to do with the specific position of movements vis-à-vis critical communities and, 
more generally, (critical) knowledge. Let me elaborate on the later point.  
As indicated in the theoretical chapter, I am primarily stressing out the importance of 
variations with respect to theoretical/conceptual content of discourses. In this part, I am 
conducting the analysis of discourse, aiming at mapping the epistemic content and divergences 
with respect to concepts used by the three movements. In accordance with the commonly used 
terminology within social movement studies, I use the concept of master-frame for assessing 
macro level discursive contents. Subsequently, it should be clearly stated which concepts were 
used as master-frames and in addition – which among the them played a role of “front-
runners” and which fell under the category I define as “supportive” master-frames. By using the 
term “front-running master-frames” I am referring to “carriers” of the whole epistemic 
discourse. When I use the term “supportive frames”, I refer to macro conceptualizations that 
play a more specific role and cover at least one specific dimension of the epistemic discourse. 
Thereby I can make this exploratory endeavor more precise. Such analytical separation allows 
me to dig deeper into the reasons for divergences in epistemic discourses, along the lines of 
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(initial) differences51 presented above in table 1.1. Before that, it is important to outline those 
differences.  
As stated above, the central discursive trajectory of the student movement in Zagreb was 
formed around the notion of “free education for all” and an attempt to deconstruct systemic 
problems behind the issue of commoditized education. Other important discursive features 
were inclusivity and inclination towards representing student struggle as the focal (nodal) point 
for a wider social struggle. The way in which the students from Zagreb challenged the post-
socialist paradigm discursively consisted of three conceptual lines: 
1. Imposing the new perspectives of social and political reality by introducing a critical 
conceptual apparatus and conducting (mainly) value conversion and value connection 
2. “Frontal” attack on the economic pillar of transition  
3. Recalling chosen segments of socialism without explicit reference to its (total) revival 
The entire discourse of Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own, on the other hand,  was set around a 
simple message: municipal politics is the essence or the starting point of any plausible counter-
hegemonic discourse. The main pillars of their discursive performance were therefore: 
1. Shifting attention from “grand narratives” to more tangible instances of injustice 
2. Building up conceptual apparatus that could justify and back-support such (new) 
approach (in Serbia) 
3. Enhancing popular democratic participation in the process of recomposing power 
relations in the society        
The “small struggles” are, as claimed by the activists, the ones tackling issues which make 
lives of regular people more difficult on a daily basis. The departure from small-scale everyday 
activism to macro levels of discursive performance serves for reminding the public about the 
connection between concrete and systemic features of the system. Thereby, they make,  both 
symbolically and practically, a complete and coherent field of contestation.    
Finally, the discursive performance of Sarajevo’s popular movement was determined by two 
highly unfavorable components: structural and material. Structurally, the Bosnian society has 
suffered ever since the dissolution of Yugoslavia due to a highly complex political system. 
Among the many material consequences of that complexity, apart from a rapid and cruel 
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 The three lines of differentiation, to remind the readers, included “type of movement”, “structural context” and 
the issues of “triggers” and “level of repression”.  
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economic deprivation, the absence of a clear socially rooted (potential) carrier of resistance 
turned out to be the biggest problem for conducting a more radical activist/political endeavor. 
Highly unfavorable social and political conditions were also emphasized by the activists 
themselves, who tried to build up something “on the spot”, both discursively and 
organizationally. Consequences had the following discursive characteristics:  
1. Aggregate of particular demands coming from the people which should have justified 
democratic orientation of the people’s assembly (plenum)    
 
2. Usage of concepts at the highest level of abstraction which should have consolidated 
narrow and particular demands coming from the people 
 
3. Occasional tension between micro and macro levels of discourse 
 
Following these basic features of the three epistemic discourses, I am starting the empirical 
analysis with the student movement in Zagreb. Then I proceed with the popular movement in 















4.1. Zagreb’s Vanguard: Free Education for All 
 
Before I proceed with the analysis of particular documents produced by the movement, 
I shall briefly refer to the documentary film called “The Land of Knowledge” (Bezinovid 2011) 
which followed the meetings and protest events organized by the movement throughout the 
35-day blockade of the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb. This movie represents the most credible 
testimony of what happened during the blockade, and served as a good preparation before 
conducting interviews. For the readers, it could serve a similar preparatory purpose.  
As we know already, the occupation had a single official demand: “free education for all”. 
As one of the students declared already in the early days of the blockade:  
“They demand from us to provide the list of demands in the official form. As a matter of 
fact, we’re not talking about demands, there is no plural here. The demand is only one and it 
has been set in a very clear way: free education for all!”  
The movement decided to impose its own rules of the game, rather than to play by the 
already established set of rules. In spite of accusations from both the public and the 
government for not being clear enough in expressing its demands and not “official” enough in 
terms of communication, the protesters refused, for instance, to direct an official invitation to 
the minister to come and address the plenum (which was the central “legislative” body of the 
movement):  
“The “genre” we can potentially fall into if we invite the minister is the one of “his 
majesty coming down to the plebs” – which may potentially imply his willingness to listen to 
the people and show some kind of generosity. This may falsify the image of reality in which he 
is ready to communicate with us. The way in which he should in fact communicate with us is 
responding to the request directly – and not via “theatre style” performances.”   
The two above indicated quotes implicitly convey the message of autonomy. Practices such 
as making lists of concrete demands, or communication as prescribed by the authorities, were 
abandoned. Instead, the approach followed the tradition of University as an independent, 
autonomous institution. Furthermore, the metaphor in the second quote (“his majesty” and 
“the plebs”) illustrates the uneven power relations between the minister and the students. The 
single issue upon which they built their agenda (free education for all) was seen by the activists 
as: a) an issue which belongs to the wider specter of social and political problems; and b) an 
issue which could have triggered other social and political struggles. As one of the activists 
stressed in the above mentioned documentary movie, “education is the point of focalization 
and the effects of our struggle should get widespread to other spheres and issues of public 
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interests – healthcare, social benefits, workers’ rights etc.” Another activist conveyed a similar 
message: “This is the oasis of rebellion. The whole state expects from us to keep it that way. It 
is important for us to be the symbol (of resistance) for the sake of the regular workers, textile 
workers and others who work for 1500 kuna (per month)”.52  
Finally, among the central claims was the notion of democracy and, more explicitly, direct 
democracy. The institution of plenum to which a significant attention was paid in the 
documents issued by the movement was considered a counterbalance to, or a consequence of, 
the unfulfilled promises of representative democracy. The failure of MPs (members of 
parliament) to meet the needs of their constituency spilled over into an increasing mistrust in 
University rectors, deans, and other people occupying high positions at the University. This is 
why one of the activists addressed the dean who came to support the student struggle in the 
following way: “You said “Long live the Faculty of Philosophy”. What are you going to do 
concretely? Are you going to follow the example of the French University professors and get 
into strike yourselves?”  
It turned out that this sort of suspicion was justified. The whole endeavor of the occupation 
and the perspective from which the movement was about to confront the status quo were 
simply more radical than the “softer” wing of the establishment could have expected. Thus, the 
initial (declarative) support of the dean was soon to be withdrawn.  
Now that the most general discursive characteristics are outlined, it is time to proceed with 
an in-depth analysis of the conceptual content of documents issued by the student movement. 
The first is “Occupation Cookbook” (its most appropriate segments) and the second is “The 
Educational Brochure”.   
 
4.1.1. “The Occupation Cookbook” 
 
“The Occupation Cookbook”53 is a handbook which came out as a result of the 
occupation54. The group of authors covered organizational and other aspects of the occupation 
and provided their readers with insightful knowledge on how to organize a rebellion at 
university. This is a 70-page-long manual and I have no space to reflect on every aspect of it. I 
will instead focus on the last section, which deals with “The Social Context of the Protest for 
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 1500 Croatian kuna is approximately 215 euros. The exchange rate is roughly seven kuna for one euro. 
53
 The title of the handbook is similar to the worldwide famous “Anarchist Cookbook” (Powell 1971).  
54
 There were two occupations of the Faculty of Philosophy in 2009. The first one lasted for 35 days, whereas the 
second one lasted for only two weeks and attracted much less attention from the public. This is why my focus is on 
the first occupation.  
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Free Education in Croatia & The Motivation behind the Action”. This section will be fully 
analyzed, whereas I shall stress that the rest of the “cookbook” mostly contains what I labeled 
before as meso-level knowledge, produced (inferred) and conveyed by the “movement 
intellectuals” themselves. This includes knowledge on how to: organize an occupation of a 
university; organize and manage plenums; create and organize working groups and teams 
during an occupation; design a media strategy; manage security and general logistics; organize 
alternative educational programs during an occupation etc.  
The key concepts at the beginning of the above-mentioned section of the “Cookbook” 
include: modernization, socialist legacy, European Union / European standards and the 
transition process. Deconstruction starts with the discursive trick according to which the 
meaning of concepts is considered to be automatically disputed when put between quotation 
marks. The master-frames within the post-socialist hegemonic discourse, such as 
modernization, Europeanization and transition, are portrayed as pure legitimizing means which 
serve for suppressing critical thinking in general. The hegemonic narrative thus constitutes and 
legitimizes itself on the basis of a newly established dichotomy between “the modern” and the 
“European” on the one hand, and the “socialist” and (hence) “backward”, on the other. In light 
of this dichotomy, the introduction of tuition fees for higher education is conceived as being on 
the “modern” side. From the hegemonic paradigm’s perspective, feeless higher education 
becomes a synonym for backward logic typical of socialism, whereas the introduction of fees 
becomes automatically progressive.  
The European Union, as a concept under which “interventions in the social structure” are 
“easily justifiable”, appears as the most tangible symbol of progressiveness and modernity in 
the hegemonic discourse. The symbolic meaning of “European Union” is hereof further 
deconstructed. The movement thus engaged in the endeavor of “value conversion” (Rochon 
1998, 54).55 The “value/meaning conversion” starts with the indication of what is considered to 
be the common sense. To paraphrase, EU membership is presented as a guarantee of welfare, 
so that all the sacrifices made in that name are automatically justified. The European Union 
thus comes to play the role of “object of desire”.56 This is why it is argued that the Western 
European welfare model, towards which Croatia is supposedly heading, had already been 
dismissed. Joining the EU thus means joining a union of states that has nothing to do with 
welfare anymore. While stressing the absence of this kind of critical reflections in the Croatian 
public, the authors assume another type of common sense: the desire of Croatian people to live 
in a welfare state. It comes without saying, in other words, that welfare is something everyone 
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 For the purposes of this work a more appropriate term would probably be “meaning conversion”, but I’m 
nonetheless using Rochon’s terms due to clarity and compatibility between the theoretical framework and the 
empirical analysis.  
56
 Here I refer to the Lacanian concept which signifies an “unattainable” object of desire.     
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would go for. The activists use this chance to communicate their interpretation of the Lisbon 
Treaty which is perceived by them as “the basic document of the new and neoliberal European 
Union”. From there, they are engaging in converting the commonly accepted meaning of the 
European Union (EU) in the public. By deconstructing the meaning of the EU through 
illuminating what the Lisbon Treaty really is about, they illuminated the contradiction between 
people’s expectations driven by the hegemonic discourse (the story about welfare and the 
European Union), and the “real”, “welfare-free” neoliberal structure of the EU. Thereby, the 
ground was set for proclaiming that “the elite still uncritically supports the myth of the 
European Union as a zone of general welfare.” 
From this meso level of discourse, in the following section titled “The Attack on the 
Acquired Social Rights”, the activists get back to the macro level of communication and 
deconstruct the structural framework under which their struggle for free education takes place.  
The concept of “capital” is introduced for the first time. It is argued that the interests of capital 
stand behind the “ideological justification” of the degradation of social rights. The abstract 
concept of capital and its “interests” is illustrated through mentioning its social and economic 
effects (such as layoffs, manufacturing consent for decreasing social rights etc.). Activists here 
translate “flexibilization” of labor as the process of enabling employers to lay off workers more 
easily. This remark highlights the interconnectivity of the student struggle with other socio-
economic issues and shows a degree of solidarity with other struggles (such as labor struggle), 
which reflects the same logic applied in the case of tuition fees in higher education. In Rochon’s 
terms, here we may see the application of “value connection”.  
The transitional narrative is likewise addressed through its negative affiliation to the 
“socialist legacy”. The group of authors does not express a direct sympathy for socialism, but 
instead illuminates a logical fallacy on the side of the hegemonic narrative. They argue that “all 
criticism against the attacking of the social rights is silenced by symbolic intimidation and the 
threat of labels such as “Yugo-nostalgia”, “backwardness” or “parasitism”. Two out of three 
concepts indicated here are typical of the wider space of post-socialism, whereas the negative 
connotation given to “Yugo-nostalgia” is especially conspicuous in the Croatian case. By 
unmasking the logic that frames “Yugo-nostalgia” negatively, the movement seeks to shed light 
onto the socio-economic, rather than identity-based reasons behind accusations for being 
“Yugo-nostalgic”.57 This type of discursive twist may again be interpreted as “value/meaning 
conversion”. Labels such as “Yugo-nostalgic”, the activists claim, primarily serve the purpose of 
legitimizing the degradation of social and economic rights that were guaranteed in the Yugoslav 
period. Instead of a “demander of basic rights” (including the right to free education), everyone 
who calls for these rights thus becomes “Yugo-nostalgic”, “Serbo-Communist”, “Serbo-
                                                          
57
 The Yugoslav experience has been demonized in different ex-YU republics by a different degree. Undoubtedly, 
Croatia is on top of this gradation scale.  
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Yugoslav” or alike. Thereby, one gets automatically discredited due to the high level of public 
hostility towards the Yugoslav heritage (which is often equalized with the “Serbian hegemony”).  
From there, the activists proceed with deconstructing and delegitimizing the narrative 
behind measures such as tuition fees in higher education and, more generally, 
suspension/reduction of social rights. Concepts such as “budget deficit” or “fiscal limitations” 
are questioned through a discussion about “rights of the majority”. This discussion, for instance, 
falls under democratic discourse and Roshon’s “value connection” again takes place. The 
hegemonic public discourse and its main concepts are thus “divorced” from the context of 
“opposition to the irrationality of socialist privileges”. The “necessity of reducing social rights 
due to fiscal deficit” is put instead, into the context of lack of taking care for the interest of 
majority”. The economistic discourse, detached from any ties with politics and society (as 
present in the hegemonic discourse), is replaced by the one of political economy, which 
emphasizes the political character of economic policies. By referring to “the majority” as 
“working majority”, which stands in opposition to a “tacit consensus among the political elites 
in favor of capital”, the critique becomes more radical and, furthermore, labor-oriented. From 
there, the group suggests a more progressive tax policy which would “tax profits of banks or 
telecommunication companies”. Thereby, the movement sums up this discussion on macro 
(conceptual) and micro (contextual) level by communicating its own policy suggestion at the 
meso level.  
 
4.1.2. The Meaning of Democracy 
 
 The last chapter in the “Occupation Cookbook” is reserved for a discussion on 
democracy or, rather, lack thereof. The special emphasis was on the shortcomings of 
representative democracy. Once again, the authors highlight the way in which “political elites 
work against the interest of the majority”. In their view, representatives of the general interest 
are only nominal representatives, and hence get easily corrupted by the power of capital. The 
rule of the people consequentially appears as “alleged” and democracy becomes its own 
opposite. The mistrust in representative democracy comes from its practical failure to meet 
real needs of the people. Direct democracy is therefore presented as a consequence and/or 
reaction to the “unfulfilled promise of representative democracy”. It appears, in the authors’ 
words, as a “security measure”, as a “specter that does not stop to haunt”.58 The very way in 
which direct democracy is defined (as a “security measure”) assists in legitimizing it and, 
thereby, legitimizing the plenum as its main institutional body. We may likewise detect the way 
                                                          
58
 This is a clear reference to the famous Marxian notion of the “specter of communism haunting Europe”. 
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in which the student movement seeks to position itself with respect to other social struggles 
that suffer from the same anti-democratic tendencies within the Croatian society. Their 
struggle for free education is put into the wider context of social struggles, and presented as 
another “dam” for defending the interests of the majority, not (only) the narrow interests of 
students.  
This message is obviously leaning towards radically democratic anti-capitalism, but the 
overall (epistemic) discursive content is, by the same token, keeping the classical model of 
welfare state alive by using the discourse of “rights” and by criticizing the “neoliberal attack” on 
them. This balancing between a radically democratic discourse and a “softer” one rooted in 
human rights (and welfare), tells us something about the way in which the movement sought to 
bridge over the gap between micro (contextual) and macro (conceptual) levels of discursive 
performance. On the one hand, namely, they acknowledge the factual condition of the 
disappearance of social rights and point the finger at “neoliberalism” as the main “offender” in 
this case. On the other, it is clear from the more radically articulated paragraphs (which, among 
other concepts, include “the power of capital”), that the remedy for such condition is not to be 
found within the “softer” discourse of rights. To the contrary, the remedy for the disappearance 
of social rights under the attack of neoliberalism must be, in their view, much more radical than 
a simple (social democratic) demand of “bringing the social rights back”. By calling for a 
radically democratic method of decision making, the movement actually calls for going beyond 
representative democracy, as we know it.        
 
4.1.3. Educational Brochure 
 
The Educational Brochure addressed several issues, among which are: frequently asked 
questions; aims of the struggle and organization of the movement; specific demands; and 
statements of support from domestic and international intellectuals. The brochure also 
included financial data from the national budget and the list of EU countries where education is 
free, as well as the list of universities in Croatia which have joined the struggle alongside their 
colleagues from Zagreb. Last but not least, the brochure included a couple of lines quoted from 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights concerning the right to education. I shall start from 
the section on intellectuals’ statements of support. Among those who supported the 
movement were Boris Buden, Noam Chomsky, Slavoj Žižek and Judith Butler. For the sake of 
clarity, I will quote the statements and then address them all together:  
1. The question today of whether free education is realistic or not isn’t a question of the objective 
perception, but the political position with respect to reality. In other words, this is the question of 
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solidarity with those who have illuminated the antagonist character of reality and took a clear stand 
on it. It is too late for neutrality now. (Boris Buden)  
2. I have learned of the struggle of Croatian students to ensure that free education will be available to 
all. It is a worthy goal for every society – including my own, where such rights are not honored – and I 
would like to wish them success in their efforts. (Noam Chomsky)  
3. Those who are old enough among us remember the “directed education” as a last attempt of the 
communist regime in the old Yugoslavia to subordinate education to the “social utility” and narrow 
down the space for alternative thinking. Western Europe is discovering again the “directed education” 
– and its name is the “bologna reform of higher education”, which is a new attempt to subordinate 
education to the needs of social control and regulation. We need hence a cultural revolution in order 
to be able to participate in civil disobedience with all available means and fight against this dangerous 
tendency. You, the students, who occupy faculties, are not only doing the right thing, but also the 
necessary thing. Go ‘till the end and persist, without any compromises. (Slavoj Žižek)    
4. This is an important moment to oppose the decimation of the social welfare state, especially its 
impact on educational institutions, as well as the rise of neo-liberal circulations in relation to 
university life. Students are threatened with becoming an actually “precarious” population, exposed to 
poverty, debt, and lack of educational opportunities. Please accept my strong support for your brave 
and just actions. (Judith Butler)  
The supporting statement given by Boris Buden reveals a similar conceptual trajectory to 
the one seen in the “Occupation Cookbook”. Deflection from the narrative which makes 
economy all about numbers, at the same time, means making economy less “mathematical” 
and more political. Boris Buden, whose name provokes a great (and almost undisputable) 
respect on the post-Yugoslav intellectual and activist (progressive) scene, finishes his statement 
with a strong message in which he declares: “It is too late for neutrality now”. This is a call for 
taking sides, because his theoretical and political writings have always been about taking sides. 
Buden’s statement reveals a clear “theoretical framework” from which he talks. It is not, 
according to him, about an objectively and convincingly articulated perception of reality, but 
about power relations and a clear political stance. Marx, in other words, has beaten Kant. By 
including his statement of support into the brochure, the movement gave us a hint about one 
of the theoretical incentives for the side taken by the activist group. 
Both Judith Butler and Noam Chomsky are widely read on the activist scene as well. Their 
supporting statements touched upon the two discursive points concerning more general 
proclamations about the issues of rights and precariousness. Chomsky, obviously aware of the 
context of former Yugoslavia, accommodated a radical demand to the sensitivity of the post-
socialist era. The epistemic/conceptual content of the supporting statement given by Butler, on 
the other hand, applies the notion of “monstrous neoliberalism”, which affects every single 
dimension of society, including education and students’ lives. Certainly, this narrative fits the 
overall collective identity built up by the movement, but also reflects the historical moment of 
the immediate aftermath of the 2007/8 economic crisis and resistance popping up worldwide.  
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Finally, Žižek’s statement of support has a direct message. Similar to Buden’s “no 
neutrality”, the Slovenian philosopher declares, “no compromises”. He touches upon the 
Bologna higher education reform and, interestingly, makes a parallel with the attempt of the 
bureaucratized socialist state to subordinate education to the so-called “social utility”. “No 
compromises” is a line consistent with what we already learned about the struggle and 
demands from the section on “Overall Discursive Performance”, when an activist said: “We’re 
not talking about demands, there is no plural here. The demand is only one and it has been set 
in a very clear way: free education for all!” No wonder, hence, that Žižek’s line found its place in 
the brochure.  
Before I proceed to the section called “questions and answers”, I shall briefly analyze the 
pair of quotations used in the brochure: the first from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the second from the Croatian constitution. The prior quote is article 26 of the 
Declaration of Human Rights, which is concerned with the right to education: 
“Everyone has the right to education (…) Technical and professional education shall be 
made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible on the basis of merit 
(…) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 
The later quote is article 66 of the Croatian constitution:  
“In the Republic of Croatia, everyone shall have access to education under equal 
conditions and in accordance with his/her aptitudes.” 
Both articles reveal the presence of legal discourse. Referring to declarations and legal 
documents conveys knowledge that communicates the following: “What we demand is nothing 
more than respect of valid legal documents.”59 This sort of twist appears both as a supportive 
master-frame within the overall discourse and a sort of preemptive defense from the expected 
counter-attack. Such discursive maneuver60 is conducted in order to emphasize the fact that the 
government acts against its own rules (embodied in its own laws and constitution) and 
principles of the very hegemonic narrative itself (human rights as opposed to “socialist 
authoritarianism”, for instance). The movement thus managed to strike a balance between 
                                                          
59 Spanish Podemos or, better said, its Secretary General Pablo Iglesias, also became famous for his use of the 
Spanish Constitution in TV electoral debates. Interestingly enough, he has gone from demonizing the “regimen del 
78” (the year the Constitution was approved) to actually bringing a physical copy of the Constitution to TV and 
reading excerpts from it – on the right to housing, for instance. (I owe this remark to Oscar Fernandez Fernandez).  
60
 The presence of legalistic discourse was likewise explained to me by my interviewees. Apart from its strategic 
role (similar to the case of human rights discourse) it had another source, the so called “Bologna section” within 
the Faculty. This section organized protests before the blockade, and dealt with the legal perspective of addressing 
student issues. Later on, this section converged with more radical fractions of the movement, but knowledge they 
had gained before could serve to the cause of “free education for all” as well.  
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different concepts, hence keeping clear and visible the difference between the conceptual 
“front running” master-frames and the supportive master-frames.  
The discourse of “rights” pops up again in the section “frequently asked questions” (FAQ).  
These lines are telling us that free education is morally and ethically just, but at the same time 
useful for the wellbeing of community. Thereby we got a little bit of pragmatism. The modernist 
paradigm, through which policies such as study fees are legitimized, is challenged through 
informing their readers the paying for studies is not considered “modern” in fifteen EU states. 
One of the remarks indicates that “sixty percent of students in Croatia are already paying for 
their studies.” The activists emphasize that the fees in Croatia are among the highest in Europe. 
If this trend continues, they proceed, “only the rich and those from the middle class who are 
willing to step into debt slavery will be able to study.” Hereby they are using the discourse of 
human rights in order to confront the system, which favors the rich minority and pushes the 
non-rich majority into “debt slavery”.  From there, a simple calculation came out. Through basic 
algebra, the amount of money which would be enough for free education and the ratio 
between this amount and the overall annual budget suddenly made free education not so 
difficult to achieve.  
“Around 300 million of kuna per year would cover the expenses of all fees (while only the 
Zagreb Arena costs 650 million). This amount equals only 0.25 percent of Croatian yearly 
budget which amounts 120 billion of kuna.”     
In the following text within the same FAQ section of the Educational brochure, novelties are 
concentrated around two concepts: that of “knowledge society” and that of “commodity”. The 
latter is typical of contemporary social movements and its usage, especially in student 
movements, does not come as a surprise.61 What the movement tried to communicate by using 
this concept is that people themselves are reduced to commodities if their knowledge is 
commoditized. Their function within society is not determined by what is defined in the text as 
“public interest” but, rather, by their ability to sell knowledge in a commoditized form which, 
again, reduces them to sellers of labor force. This condition is linked with the concept/master-
frame of “knowledge society”, which plays a supportive role. Similarly to discourses of legality 
and rights, the one organized around the concept of “knowledge society” announces the 
presence of a contradiction between the hegemonic narrative on the one hand and policies 
implemented by the authorities, on the other. This is an interesting discursive twist. If one 
should choose among the different definitions of “knowledge society”, the Croatian context 
most probably corresponds to the following one:  
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“Economic success which is now determined by the ability of individuals and firms to 
accumulate and transform information in such a way as to produce and market goods 
efficiently and flexibly”. (Smith 2002, 39-40)62  
Wider debate on the concept of “knowledge society” was left aside and it seems like the 
movement declaratively accepted its validity. The way in which they operate discursively is by 
pointing at the contradiction between the desire to create a knowledge society and the 
practical application of the concept in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries such as Croatia. 
The very concept of “knowledge society” promotes the commodification of knowledge, which is 
of course in direct opposition to the agenda of the student movement. What they wanted to 
show, nonetheless, is that even such concepts serve for justifying the worst practices (namely, 
the introduction of tuition fees), which not only negate the right to education but also the 
endeavor of establishing a “knowledge society”. They simply faced the system with all of its 
rottenness, by holding up a mirror to it and exposing its contradictions.  
It is worth mentioning that activists use an academic/scientific reference in order to 
emphasize the absence of correlation between studying successfully and paying fees. They go 
against the dominant narrative of merit-based society, which has been established in the past 
couple of decades. This has, of course, nothing to do with being against the notion and practice 
of making an effort or disputing merit as such. Rather, it illuminates misconceptions of the 
narrative which often interprets final results of competitive processes as effort-driven, without 
taking into account different positions from which “competitors” start running the race. Apart 
from this point, they draw attention to the catastrophic policies both locally and globally which 
make societies less just, in general terms. Obviously, they are quite hostile towards the “market 
laws” which they find not only unstable, but also unsustainable. The context within which they 
make an argument is the sphere of education. The way they put it (and, often, repeat it) in 
different contexts reveals a more general hostility towards the market-driven logic. Again, they 
talk about rights which cannot be “just an offer on the market” and thereby, one more time, 
                                                          
62 “As far as we can determine, this literature [“futuristic business literature”] has conflated at least four different 
sets of a “knowledge society”. Definition 1 claims that a ‘knowledge society is (…) a society organized around the 
production of knowledge in the same sense that an agrarian society is organized abound agricultural production 
and the industrial society is organized around manufacture’. Definition 2 claims that advanced countries are 
“knowledge societies” in that technological change is much more important for economic growth than before. 
Definition 3 argues that advanced countries are ‘knowledge societies’ in the sense that economic success is now 
determined by the ability of individuals and firms to accumulate and transform information in such a way as to 
produce and market goods efficiently and flexibly, something which has never before been the case. Definition 4 is 
that advanced countries are ‘knowledge societies’ in the sense that without the ability to understand and 
transform knowledge (in other words, without high levels of education) it is hard for individuals to find decent jobs 
in such societies.” Smith (ed.) 2002, 39-40 
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argue that no rights are to be guaranteed within the free market liberal systems. Due to the 
whole post-socialist context, they do not go further than this in arguing in favor of socialism or 
alike. However, it is quite clear that the critique is stemming from the radical, rather than the 
reformist left.   
Finally, the micro level of epistemic discourse is not underrepresented either. It is traceable 
in the “Open letter to the Croatian public”. Since the blockade was receiving significant media 
coverage, the first couple of lines of this open letter refer to the presumed, common 
knowledge. The duration of the blockade, the lack of responsiveness by the ministry of 
education and the government as a whole, as well as the occupation of other universities across 
the country, was supposed to make the Croatian public familiar with the day-to-day 
development of events. Apart from reusing elements of legal and rights-based discourses, 
activists used the micro level of their general discourse for pointing the finger of responsibility 
for a given situation at the authorities. This discursive feature, along with all the other “front 
running” master-frames analyzed above, unequivocally testifies about the readiness of the 
















4.2. Sarajevo’s (Almost) Impossible Struggle 
 
    
The only town in Bosnia and Herzegovina that somewhat diverged from the highly 
unfavorable structural and material reality (regarding the absence of solid social/political 
subjectivity) was Tuzla, which had a solidly organized industrial labor force. Their discourse and 
the overall collective identity were highly determined by its proletarian basis and there was no 
need for so much hard discursive work. The deprivation of workers spilled over, in terms of 
discourse and narrative, into the wider perspective of social deprivation of the majority of 
citizens of Tuzla. That was clear. The uprising in Sarajevo, undoubtedly, represented a different 
case. 
As in Tuzla, its factories and companies had already been destroyed in the process of 
privatization at the moment when the uprising took place. But had it not been for Tuzla’s 
workers, Sarajevo would have never happened, at least not in that moment and, most probably, 
not in that shape. The workers in Sarajevo were not as organized as in Tuzla. The necessity for 
prescribing meaning retroactively, to both protests and plenums, was much more evident in 
Sarajevo. The process of articulation of “the people” had been weighed down by the lack of a 
clear material base, in the sense of lacking the dominant social subject which could have taken 
the leading role in the articulation. Under such circumstances, the popular movement in 
Sarajevo had to balance between proliferation of particular (and very concrete) demands 
coming from the fragmented and heterogeneous “people” on the one hand, and the necessity 
of finding a common denominator, on the other. The analysis of documents departs from the 
one issued before the plenum was established. This document is the first attempt to formulate 
some demands and thereby initiate more tangible confrontation with the status quo.  
 
 
4.2.1. In the Name of Citizens 
  
On February the 9th, two days after the first protest was held on the streets of Sarajevo, 
the informal group of citizens who later stood behind organization of the people’s assembly, 
issued a statement “in the name of citizens on the streets of Sarajevo”, declaring: 
“We, the people who went out onto the streets of Sarajevo yesterday, also regret the 
injuries and damage to properties, but our regret also extends to the factories, public spaces, 
cultural and scientific institutions, and human lives, all of which were destroyed as a direct 
result of actions by those (ALL THOSE) in power for, now, over 20 years. We ask our fellow 
71 
 
citizens and fellow sufferers not to allow these unpleasant scenes to cloud the fact that this 
kind of government and those in power have cost us immeasurably more.” 
The first paragraph of the statement contains several concepts, among which property, 
public space, culture, science, “human life”, people and power. The introducing sentence refers 
to the most recent events during which the two buildings of the Cantonal government and the 
Presidency got inflamed, while dozens of citizens and police officers got injured. This section 
refers to the context and a very micro-level, common-ground knowledge about the recent past.  
The first sentence contains an epistemic discursive trick. It discredits the accusations of 
hooliganism, coming from the political elite and the media, by putting an emphasis on “damage 
to property” that was inflicted by the “hooligans”. By introducing the concept of property, the 
informal group of activists immediately puts the damage made into a subordinated position in 
comparison to the damage made by the process of systemic and systematic damaging of 
factories, public spaces, cultural and scientific institutions, and human lives throughout the last 
20 years (of transition). By introducing the concept of property, in other words, they opened up 
the space for counterweighting this concept with other concepts at the same level of 
abstraction such as human life or public spaces. In terms of Thomas Rochon, this might be 
interpreted as an example of value connection. At the meso level of knowledge production, 
they simply apply the logic of Brecht’s famous statement “What is the robbing of a bank 
compared to the founding of a bank?”63 The conveyed message is thus the following: “what is 
(the “sin” of) burning the buildings of the Cantonal government and the Presidency, compared 
to (the “sin” of) not burning them, after 20 years of suffering”. Thereby, the activists change the 
context, or connotation within which the idea is evaluated and devaluate the issue of damage 
to property by connecting (or comparing) it to the issue of damage done to human lives, 
factories, public spaces etc.  
The activists, further on, demanded “unconditional and immediate resignations of both the 
Sarajevo Canton and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina governments and the formation 
of non-party governments. Secondly, they demanded that “no measures, of any kind, are to be 
undertaken that would limit peaceful citizen protests”. Finally, they demanded the “immediate 
release of demonstrators, no criminal case filings against them, and an end to the witch hunt of 
people”. These demands reveal the contextual limitation of discourse, which had to be initially 
kept at the micro level of abstraction due to the above-described circumstances (repression 
and external triggers). The last two demands address issues related to the most recent protest 
events and demand allowance of peaceful protest activities as well as release of the arrested 
protesters. By calling for the formation of non-party governments in the first demand, the 
informal group who organized the plenum established a binary opposition between politicians, 
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 See: Žižek 2014, pp, 4;151. 
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on the one hand, and “non-politicians”, on the other. Given the context, the politicians were 
supposed to be perceived as corrupt, unskillful and unworthy of holding positions in public 
offices; while the non-politicians, or the “non-party” personnel, were supposed to represent 
the opposite from politicians and political parties. The reason is that the level of trust in 
politicians and political parties had significantly decreased by that moment. Before the protests, 
the level of trust in politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina was probably reaching a historical 
minimum: 62.3 percent of the citizens did not have trust in political parties and politicians at all, 
while 14.9 did not have too much trust.64 In practical terms, some kind of a non-party 
government was seen as the only possible remedy for the corrupt political system.  
What is nonetheless more important is that, in the remaining text, the activists constructed 
through demands for what happens “after the non-party government is established”. They are 
pointing at the social and economic deprivation, the violation of human dignity, and the need 
to (re)introduce welfare and social justice for all strata in society. All these problems were 
supposed to be addressed after the passage from “party” to “non-party” government. Hereby 
we may trace the pair of front running master-frames, consisting of human dignity and social 
justice.  
The usage of human dignity as a concept is exceptionally sensitive in the Bosnian post-war 
context. Similarly to the post-WWII period in Europe, the relevance of this concept comes from 
the essentialist value of the human being, which obliges others to treat him/her as a value in 
itself. The main context in which this concept’s relevance has reoccurred is the 1990s war and 
the atrocities committed against civilians, including the genocide in Srebrenica. This is 
symptomatic, because the concept likewise covers the period of “transitional theft, corruption, 
nepotism, privatization of public resources, and the implementation of an economic model that 
favors the rich and financial arrangements that have destroyed any hope for a society based on 
social justice and welfare.” This means that the violation of human dignity through war crimes 
and atrocities during the war has been prolonged in the post-war era by using different means. 
The main causes of the violation of human dignity in the post-war Bosnia are thus found in the 
economic model and political practice established after the Dayton Peace Agreement. At the 
same time, the concept of human dignity reveals the need for discursive coverage of a wide 
spectrum of causes affecting the violation of each and every aspect of human existence in 
Bosnia.65  
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 The results came out of the research conducted in the period between 2013 and 2015 by the Bosnian center for 
social research “Analitika”. 
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As for the second front running master frame, demanding social justice was (also according 
to my interviewees) the only concept which could simultaneously be progressive and wide 
enough so that many could identify with it. Considering the absence of a clear social base66 and 
the (popular) nature of the movement, this sort of “signifiers” were the only ones that could 
leave enough maneuvering room for a future (more solid) articulation and construction of the 
“carrier” of social change. On the other hand, the trouble lied – as with many widely set 
conceptual features and formations – in losing depth in favor of width. Other (supportive) 
concepts/master-frames mentioned, such as transitional theft, nepotism and the like, were 
expected to help out in setting the list of problems to be addressed – ranging from violations of 
human dignity to the absence of social justice.  
 
 
4.2.2. Plenums, not Political Parties! 
 
In the first statement released by the informal group of activists, one may notice how 
politics is blamed for cloaking the larceny of society. This “(party) politics / society” cleavage 
may be understood in classical populist terms as a division between the elite and the people. 
Considering the absence of a potential “radical” subject, this is to be understood as the first 
step towards a possible occurrence of such subject. The call for participation at the first 
Sarajevo plenum goes into the same direction. In this text, we learn that “us” stands for “the 
citizens”, which gives a civic tone to the discourse. “No political brokering” represents an 
exclusivist standpoint whereby the activists pose an ultimate line of demarcation between 
them and the political elite, which is blamed for the distorted social image of Sarajevo and the 
whole Bosnian society. Behind this demarcation line posed through the statement “there is no 
party or organization behind us whatsoever” one may notice the presence of a sort of 
disclaimer which should have represented a sort of sine qua non of any progressive social 
change. Unlike politicians who have gotten richer in the past decades, behind the activists there 
are “years of humiliation, hunger, helplessness and hopelessness”. These four features delved 
deeper into the “violated human dignity”, thus concretizing its meaning. So hunger stands for 
economic deprivation; helplessness for disempowerment of those who have been economically 
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 The issue of social base becomes even more relevant in the chapter six, where it becomes one of the main 
categories through which I am assessing the process of “discursive consolidation”. This is why it is important to 
stress here already, that by clear or “solid” social base I mean a well – structured, organized and self-aware group 
of people who could be mobilized for a given cause. Usually, the term “social base” is used in studies dealing with 
political parties who always seek to establish a solid base of its activists, supporters and voters. However, as 
argued by Agh, “(…) it is not only parties that are looking at a solid social base but also the newly emerging social 




deprived; humiliation for the violated self-esteem due to the previous two features; and 
hopelessness for the vicious circle of the political, institutional and general systemic framework 
which prevents any sort of intervention of the deprived into mechanisms which determine the 
conditions of their own lives. The concept of human dignity thus gets its further conceptual 
elaboration.    
It is not by chance that this sort of conceptual apparatus was used in the call for 
participation at the first Sarajevo plenum. Its aim was to raise awareness of common feelings 
among the citizens, as well as shared emotions among potential participants in the plenum. The 
reasoning behind stressing all these feelings was to widen the common basis for future plenum 
participants. The “Initiating Committee for Organizing the Plenum”67 tried to communicate, 
presumably, the common sentiment of the majority of Sarajevo’s population. The binary 
distinction between the majority who shares the feeling of “violated human dignity” on one 
side and those who enjoy privileges on the other, is made even clearer by refusing any 
possibility of making deals or arrangements behind closed doors. This instance of discourse tells 
us that privileges in Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been earned, and very rarely even 
inherited (the exception might be the Izetbegovic family).68 Instead, privileges have been 
mostly allocated to those who kept sustaining the very political and economic system that 
perpetuates and widens the scope of benefits for the holders of political and economic power. 
Demands coming out of this argument were similar to those which appeared in the first 
public statement. An additional ingredient had to do with the newly emerging political actor, 
the plenum. The phrase, “let us keep on working for the good of us all”, reveals the necessity 
for building trust outside the institutional system, which had shown a lack of sensitivity for 
common interest. The cause behind founding a new civic body (plenum) is again presented as a 
sign of mistrust towards the institutions and all those who had been shaping the real of Bosnian 
society in the previous two and a half decades. Demands are pointed to the irresponsibility and 
inability of the political class to meet the needs of the protestors, who are conceived as the 
voice of the deprived and dissatisfied majority. This is why the second demand emphasizes that 
after the resignation of the cantonal government, the new administration must be constituted 
on the basis of “future conclusions of the Sarajevo Citizens’ Plenum”.  
The organizing committee is (still) careful and plays strategically, because it calls specifically 
for the resignations of the cantonal government and the government of the Federation of 
                                                          
67
 This was a temporary informal group which was supposed to cease its activities when the first plenum took 
place. After that, the plenum became the only official body of decision-making, including communication with 
media and the public.  
68
 Alija Izetbegovid was the first president of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which since the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia has been most of the time the main representative of the Bosniak ethnic group in Bosnia. His son, Bakir, 
is presently the president of the party, as well as a former member of the presidency, just like his father.  
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Bosnia and Herzegovina. The question is why only these two governments, why not the whole 
political/bureaucratic apparatus? The answer lies in the complexity of the Bosnian political 
system. The other entity, which is the Republika Srpska (RS), is not mentioned by the activists in 
Sarajevo because the political elite from there kept on claiming that the protests in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the other entity) were oriented towards destabilizing 
the RS (through spreading “false discontent” from the Federation to the Republika Srpska). The 
discursive performance from Sarajevo, hence, could not cross certain structurally imposed 
limitations. Instead, it started with macro concepts, while sticking to the context of Sarajevo 
and the Federation on the micro and meso level of discourse. Thereby, they tried to prevent 
further attacks from the Republika Srpska and to create the conditions for a bottom-up reaction 
from the citizens of that entity.69 
Finally, a demand reflecting upon the police brutality against the protestors which escalated 
on the very day when the protests started is portraying demonstrations as peaceful. This is, of 
course, what most movements in general, and protest movements in particular, tend to do. 
However, the Bosnian context had an additional ingredient, which made this micro level even 
more important to be kept under (discursive) control. Namely, after the events from February 
the 7th (the ignition of institutional buildings), many people were ambivalent with respect to the 
protests. While supporting the outburst of discontent on the streets, many did not like the idea 
of setting the buildings on fire because it reminded them on war. Here one could see the 
example of accommodation of discourse to the context (between the first public statement and 
the first call for a plenum).  
Going back to the first document, it should be recalled how the activists remember the 
“factories, public spaces, cultural and scientific institutions, and human lives, all of which were 
destroyed as a direct result of actions by those (ALL THOSE) in power for, now, over 20 years”. 
The capital letters in “ALL THOSE in power” imply a critique of the entire political elite, 
regardless of the level of governance, entity or canton in question. In the second document, 
they had to be more careful and specifically direct their critique at “their own yard”, meaning 





                                                          
69
 During the 2014 uprising in Bosnia, no serious rebellious group popped up in the Republika Srpska. 
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4.2.3. Plenum Takes Over 
 
The first plenum in Sarajevo was held on the 12th of February 2014. This gathering did 
not bring any list of demands. The second plenum held on the 14th of February was more 
successful with that respect. The list contained four “urgent demands” and the plenum kept 
sticking to them more or less until the end. The first demand urges for the establishment of a 
government of experts, without political affiliations, in consultation with the Citizens’ plenum. 
The second is concerned with the audit of the salaries and benefits of public officials. The third 
calls for the audit of privatization, and the fourth for the establishment of an independent 
commission of experts for verifying the facts of the events of 7th of February.   
One must notice that three out of the four demands are in line with the set of claims 
indicated in the two previous documents issued before the plenum was established. Firstly, the 
persistence of the dichotomy between the politicians and non-politicians is traceable here as 
well. What changes is that the non-party government from the first document now becomes 
the “expert government”. It is worth mentioning at this point that there is a certain tension 
between this demand and both of the front running master-frames (human dignity and social 
justice) from the previous two documents, as well as their supportive master-frames. This 
tension, furthermore, exists also within this list of demands, between the establishment of a 
government of experts (though in consultation with the Citizens’ Plenum) on the one hand, and 
the establishment of a more socially just order for all social strata - for all those whose human 
dignity and material basic needs have been endangered or destroyed by the transitional theft, 
corruption, nepotism, privatization of public resources, on the other. The twist is that the simple 
binary opposition between corrupt politicians and their political parties on one side, and 
independent experts whose professional affiliation is a guarantee for the absence of all side 
effects of “party politics” on the other, had already been discredited in the context of the 
European Union and elsewhere. Several countries, namely, such as Greece or Italy, had already 
had these types of governments in the past and their rule meant everything but the rule in 
favor of all social strata. While calling for the abandonment of the “economic model that favors 
the rich and financial arrangements that have destroyed any hope for a society based on social 
justice and welfare”, the Bosnian plenum at the same time called for the establishment of a 
government of experts whose prime role has proven to be satisfying, primarily, the macro-
economic indicators. There would have been nothing wrong with this per se, had it not been 
proven many times that taking care of macro-economic parameters practically means (further) 
violations of human dignity and further attacks on social justice and welfare (mainly through 
austerity measures).  
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This tension may be induced from two sources. First, those who stood behind the first 
statement were people who tried to avoid the term “expert government” due to well-known 
experiences of other European countries in the recent past. At the same time, they were fully 
aware that no other formulation apart from stressing this binary opposition may resonate with 
the wider public. Obviously, theoretical and worldview influences of the core group hit the wall 
of social reality once the plenums started. This reality was not simply opposed to certain 
conceptions and value systems, on the contrary. But there was no space for more abstract, 
systematic and, most importantly, long-term visionary thinking. Considering the “years of 
humiliation, hunger, helplessness and hopelessness”, this sort of endower was (almost) 
“mission impossible”. Secondly, regardless of the context, one indeed tends to hit a conceptual 
“wall” when one starts thinking beyond political representation, due to its fallacies. If there 
must be some government, and political parties are discredited, who should take over? Do we 
need leadership at all? Is there any political system in the world without leadership? What the 
plenum did manage, nonetheless, is to emphasize the need for setting up a controlling civic 
body (plenum). This means that the core group still succeeded in pushing forward the idea of 
“popular democracy” as a controlling mechanism.  
Similarly, the third demand, dealing with auditing the privatization process of public 
enterprises in Sarajevo Canton, is only partially in line with the previous two documents. 
Privatization is, of course, often taken in critical discourses in the region as euphemism for 
transitional robbery. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that it is targeted in such a direct 
manner. Here, the demand got its concrete articulation and the argument is pushed further by 
listing the firms and factories (by name) which must stay out of reach of the economic logic 
which had already destroyed thousands of firms and factories, including those enumerated. 
However, this is not communicated through demanding abolishment, but rather “auditing” of 
privatization of strategically important firms and factories. Privatization is thus addressed 
through the most “suspicious” cases, rather than through a wider scope of economic logic 
behind it. The discursive performance is here less radical than in the first statement. This shift, 
of course, has to do primarily with “massification” of the decision-making body (the plenum), 
which led the initial group of activists to face the constraints of having to operate within a 
popular and hence poorly organized “social base”. In the first document, violations of human 
dignity and transitional theft were discursively connected with an economic model that favors 
the rich. From there on, the core group tried to pave the path of the future discourse. But the 
plenum was a different story.   
Finally, the second and the fourth demands operate at the micro level of discourse. The 
second makes it evident that people wanted things to happen immediately. They wanted 
immediate satisfaction, if not by improving their own social and economic position in absolute 
terms, then at least by witnessing the downfall of those whom they found responsible for their 
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own deprivation. This is where demands like “audit of the salaries and benefits of public 
officials” come from. Other points from the second demand reflect a strong urge for tackling 
the unjustified privileges of the political elite. The call for limiting the maximum wages of public 
officials is aimed at narrowing the gap between the citizens and their public servants. The 
fourth demand addresses, again, the events from February the 7th, when the police used 
excessive force against the demonstrators and the arrested. The following days and weeks were 
marked by more subtle means of intimidation of activists. Many of them were followed, some 
even intercepted on the street, intimidated by criminal charges, etc. The state’s reaction 
revealed panic at the beginning but soon, repression became a (successful) means for limiting 



















4.3. The Fresh Air of Municipalism in Belgrade 
 
The case of the “Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own” movement shows, similarly to the student 
movement in Zagreb, how a seemingly single-issue-oriented discourse may use a given (single) 
issue as a paradigm for a much larger-scale (systemic) critique. As previously indicated, the 
“Belgrade Waterfront” project, with its damaging consequences, served both as the focal point 
of intersection of many dimensions of the post-socialist condition and the point upon which the 
movement built its mobilization capacity.70  
The “methodology” of activism was thus inductive and the direction of struggle could be 
perceived as bottom-up. The activists often stressed the importance of everyday life and 
everyday actions. While putting an emphasis on struggles at the local level, the movement 
nonetheless sought to establish a network with other local initiatives (both in Serbia and the 
rest of Europe)71 and thereby build a strategy and agenda for national engagement of a 
network of local initiatives.72 The emphasis on “everyday life” was supplemented by the macro-
level conceptualizations which, in turn, were again combined with the specific context. On the 
one hand, concrete struggles were not followed by big ideological narratives. Discourses, on the 
other hand (as expressed usually in written form in documents, articles and interviews), were 
both micro and macro, so that concrete struggles could have been connected to other struggles 
via conceptual apparatus. Thereby, the bottom-up strategy actually reached its full potential, 
which includes both “bottom” and “upper” levels of discourse. As one of the activists explained, 
the key was to try to change things at the local level and thereby show that it’s possible to make 
people’s lives better by everyday action. Only then, he argues, when concrete things change, 
one can go to higher levels.    
          
 
 
                                                          
70
 In a statement given for the only documentary made about the NDB, one of the activists explains: “From the 
beginning the issue of Belgrade Waterfront was the topic from which other topics should unroll. This is to show 
what democracy means for us and how to get there. We have to start from the small things. See: “Inicijativa”, 
video file 23:35,  Vice Production, 2016,  https://video.vice.com/rs/video/inicijativa/58ef418b572f8bfc021989a6  
71
 The movement cooperates with other local initiatives in Belgrade and throughout Serbia, but also with other 
movements in Europe, such as Barcelona en Comu. In 2019, NDB created the “Civic Front” together with other 
local initiatives from all around the country. 
72
 As a matter of fact, this has already happened officially. The NDB, namely, formed the “Civic Front” together 
with the Local Front from Kraljevo, and the United Movement of Free Tenants from the city of Niš.  
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4.3.1. About us: NDB’s Manifesto 
 
“Don’t let Belgrade d(r)own” is a movement which, according to its manifesto, gathers 
activists, individuals and organizations interested in issues related to cultural and urban 
policies, as well as sustainable city development, fair use of resources and the involvement of 
citizens in the urban development of their environment. If one analyzes the conceptual content 
of these general lines of the manifesto, it is evident that the group is preoccupied with issues 
that had never played a major role in public discourses of neither Yugoslav nor post-Yugoslav 
societies. The NDB chose the road of introducing new issues and presenting them as publically 
relevant. This is evident from looking at the section "About us” on their website. 
The initial set of concepts, through which this movement communicates its agenda with the 
public, include urban planning, culture, sustainable development (above all urban 
development), and the commons (common resources). The importance of the “involvement of 
citizens” is made clear from the beginning, more as a means for tackling these issues than as an 
end. It is democratic participation, in other words, that sheds light on the political character of 
these issues. By linking democratic participation or “involvement of citizens” with urban 
planning and “fair use of common resources”, the movement states its commitment to the 
politicization of topics which had been left out of political debates up until then. Thereby they 
launched the process of what Rochon calls “value creation”.   
The proceeding part of the “About us” section is concerned with the project proclaimed to 
be a symbol of systemic fallacies. The “Belgrade Waterfront” has been spotlighted as a 
paradigm through which the “degradation” and “robbery” of Belgrade are clearly detectable. 
The activists describe themselves as a “group of people of different profiles, occupations and 
beliefs, gathered around the common aim”, which is “stopping degradation and robbery”. The 
way they express this endeavor, in the following paragraph, is Rochon’s “value connection”. 
One can, namely, notice that certain concerns (about common resources, lack of participation 
and hence democratic practices, etc.) are connected to the “private interests of non-
transparent actors” and “shady deals between investors and politicians”. The former is 
connected to the “appropriation of the city”, the latter with making “collateral damage” out of 
public goods and funds.  
It is known from linguistics that  metaphors serve for linking more abstract concepts to 
more concrete ones, to everyday experiences (see: van Dijk 2014, 294). “Collateral damage” 
here plays a role of indicating the waste of public goods (and public funds) for the sake of 
fulfilling private interests. It follows that the “appropriation of the city” is a consequence of the 
fact that public affairs are driven by private interests. Another metaphor appears by the end of 
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the text, where the authors stress the following: “This city is our home. We are responsible for 
each of its parts, processes, and problems, both for the present and for the future.” A metaphor 
which describes Belgrade as “our home” brings up the general concepts behind which the 
collective body of this movement is formed (common resources, common space, and 
sustainable development) and “translates” them into something that might easily be 
understood. Responsibility for “parts of our home” leads to the need for democratic 
participation. That is to say, the authors do not content themselves with praising the principle 
for its own sake.   
 
4.3.2. The Speech from the Protest Event 
 
As stated above, on the night between the 25th and the 26th of April 2016, a couple of 
buildings in the city center of Belgrade were knocked down by the bulldozers. This event, as 
previously mentioned, was tightly related to the Belgrade Waterfront project, since it took 
place in the area where the project was supposed to be realized. This is why it triggered mass 
mobilization, initiated by the NDB group. The speech I am hereby analyzing took place in 2017, 
at the protest event labeled “Following the Footsteps of the Phantoms”, exactly one year after 
the demolition in “Savamala”. One of the core group members of NDB started his speech with 
the set of knowledge claims that is presumably shared by both the movement activists and the 
protesters. The speech starts from the micro discursive level, from the demolition in 
“Savamala” that specifically triggered the mass mobilization. Wreckers are called “phantoms”, 
which clearly refers to the fact that the people who knocked the buildings down wore masks. 
The speaker proceeds with normative claims (about the criminals and their accomplices, 
masterminds and ideologists), based on common sense about the series of unlawful elements 
of the event in “Savamala”, including the already published interview with the former wife of 
the Belgrade Mayor who publically confirmed that he knew about the demolition in “Savamala” 
in advance.  
From the level of discourse which reveals the content of the common sense and the 
presumed (shared) knowledge, the speaker moves into the abstract (macro) level of discourse, 
while still keeping an eye on the contextual (micro) level. He proclaims:  “We lost our state. The 
institutions are privatized and instrumentalized.” The state is occupied, its institutions are 
coopted by the ruling structures and their purpose is to fulfill private interests of individuals. 
The state as a concept and its concrete institutions should serve the interests of its 
constituency, its people. Instead, the activists claim, the state serves for fulfilling personal 
interests and interests of the small group of privileged people.  
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Secondly, the meaning inscribed here tackles the issue of democratic subjectivity and 
provides an answer to the question: “Who is the liberator of the state?” The answer is: “Us”! 
The answer to the question what is “us” comes right after, it is “us” - education workers, 
scientific workers, police officers, solders, unemployed, pensioners, the youth, the elderly etc.73 
In this case “us” does not imply any particular social class, but “the people”. With this respect, it 
is a classical populist subject that is being searched for. This is even more evident from the 
closing sentences of the speech, where the activist declares that “the top of a small group [of 
politicians] has been changing, but most of them belong to the top since the beginning”. Even 
though the term “establishment”, typical of populist discourses is not used, we may anticipate 
without any concept-stretching that “the top of the small group being against society and the 
state” is euphemism for “the establishment.  
The last relevant observation from this segment of the speech comes from the part in which 
the speaker stresses: “The accomplices and the profiteers came first and they divided the 
country among themselves. Then they started competing in who’s going to privatize more state 
and social enterprises. Once they had sold out all that, they started selling out the land itself 
piece by piece, public goods, communal enterprises, public space – all that under the excuse of 
investments.” In the first sentence, the activist refers to the early stage of post-socialism, the 
stage of primitive accumulation of capital in Serbia. Due to the lack of capital and absence of a 
capitalist class (which was supposed to be the carrier of economic transformation from real 
socialism to capitalism), the new ruling class had to be created from scratch. The solution was 
found in the practice of conversion of political power into economically privileged status. The 
old political nomenclature, hence former high officials of the Communist party, thereby became 
the main protagonist of the new economic logic. So when the speaker talks about the profiteers 
who came first and divided the country among themselves, he explicitly refers to the class 
which profited the most from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.  
Apart from the former nomenclature, which secured a better “starting position” for itself 
through the privatization of public enterprises (mainly in the 1990s and early 2000s), the new 
ruling economic class was also made up of the so-called “war profiteers”. Those were the 
people who got rich during the war through robbery and illegal businesses, such as smuggling 
(cigarettes, for instance). In the post-war period, until nowadays, those people came to be 
labeled as tycoons. The activist refers to privatization as the central process of transition, on the 
one hand, and the most powerful means for converting political influence into economic 
                                                          
73
 This segment of the speech concretely, is related to the protests which took place after the victory of Aleksandar 
Vučid in the presidential elections in April 2017. The protests which were organized via Facebook did not have any 
official organizer and were labeled “Protests against dictatorship”. The NDB movement supported these protests, 
but never took a leading or more proactive role in them. People were protesting against the means by which the 
newly elected president secured his victory in the first round (by winning more than 50 percent of votes).    
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benefit, on the other.74 ”They sold out everything” the activist stresses, and thereby deprived 
people of common goods, pauperized the ever-greater majority and brought it to the edge of 
existence. Even though power was moving from one clique to another, he continues, most of 
those who have been among the usurpers of public goods “still belong to the top”. They are, in 
his words, a group of “veterans of a dirty battle of power against the state and against society 
itself.” The battle on the side of power, he further emphasizes, takes place under “the excuse of 
investments”, which have become sufficient reason, at least narratively, for every further step 
in the process of transformation of social, political and economic reality. 
The speaker then proceeds with communicating some contextual, micro-level knowledge 
which represents the “running start” for continuing the speech where he again shifts to more 
abstract conceptualizations. “We have the power” and “The citizens of this country are its 
authority” are statements by which the gathered people are reminded that their democratic 
rights are at the same time an obligation to take the power back into their hands. Terms such as 
“usurpers” or “occupiers” tackle the meso level of discourse. Namely, the speaker brings 
together the presumed knowledge on the one hand, and the macro level illustrated through 
“the power of the people”, on the other. From there, he implies that those who “trick people”, 
cut legally acquired pensions, resort to blackmails do not represent the people who transferred 
their sovereignty to them. Instead, they aim at fulfilling their personal interests. The 
“occupiers” and “usurpers”, both metaphorically and directly, serve as labels for the people 
who are marked as those “doing private business” while holding public offices (an example is 
the Mayor of Belgrade, Siniša Mali).    
The speaker soon points out that the struggle takes place in every place where injustice 
stays.75 This seemingly abstract claim gets contextualized immediately in the following sentence 
where all the “places of injustice” are listed (flea markets, forced evictions etc.). He engages in 
an interplay between the common sense (expressed through metaphors such as “we’ve been 
watching the same movie”) and the abstract level (“a different distribution of power is 
inevitable”) and consequently, adds up the meso level at which he implies that caring about 
issues concerning the city we’re living, studying and working in indeed means “doing politics”.  
In Rochon’s terms, what discursively happens here is a classic example of value conversion, 
whereby “doing politics” becomes liberated from the negative connotation acquired in the past 
decades. Strangely enough, all social actors who have been seeking to change the rules of the 
political game (in the entire former Yugoslav region, generally speaking) have been accused by 
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 For more on the process of the post-socialist economic transformation see: Lazid 2011; for the overview of the 
phenomena related to the process of privatization specifically, see: Balunovid 2015. 
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the very same mainstream political parties that degraded politics of harboring “political 
intentions”. The aim of such accusation is no other than the degradation of their endeavors. In 
other words, what they (the political elites) say is that doing politics is bad, as long as someone 
else, apart from them, wants to do politics. The answer by the movement is clear: doing politics 
is not reserved only for those who have been doing it for decades in order to fulfill personal 
interests. To the contrary, the message is that politics we have is not the kind of politics we 
want. That is why “we want different politics”. The added knowledge here deconstructs the 
narrative coming from the “political class” and its insistence on the professionalization of 
politics. Instead, the speaker argues that “doing politics” means caring for the city and the 
conditions we are living, studying and working in.  
In the concluding words the activist uses metaphors. The one of “darkness and light” which 
stands for “us” and “them”, gets concretized and contextualized and appears as a call for 
struggling “against the darkness of the unavailable health care and education”; “against the 
darkness of the sale of PKB”76, etc. The strongest message comes in the end, in the form of a 
slogan with which most of NDB’s public talks finish. When a speaker asks: “Whose city”; the 
answer that comes from the protestors is: “Our city”. It is the “crowd” itself that closes the 
circle of communication and it is the people who shout the motto. It is the people who sum up 
what had previously been communicated to them by the speakers. It is the people themselves, 
in other words, who are reclaiming sovereignty.  
 
4.3.3. Local Community: Local, or Community? 
 
Clearly, the front running master frames of NDB rely upon two pillars: one is concerned 
with the concept of “public” and the other with the concept of “participation”. “Public spaces” 
are in their focus, but “public resources” or “public services” follow up. “Participation” is in a 
close alliance with “democracy” and hence composes the overall emphasis on “participatory 
democracy”. Supportive master-frames serve for widening the conceptual scope of the 
frontrunners. I have already gone through some of them (power, state etc.). Hereby, we are 
coming across another supportive master-frame which is closely attached to the socialist 
period. The column written by one of the core activists, published on the 28th of April 2014 in 
the daily newspapers “Danas” (“Today”), sheds light on the way in which the movement refers 
to the entire socialist heritage (more in conceptual than in political/ideological terms). The 
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article addresses the concept of self-management, in the context of self-managing local 
communities, which was among the main pillars of Yugoslav socialism.  
The writer starts with the reflection on the presidential elections and initially opens up the 
Pandora’s Box of the relationship between voting and democracy. Voting is here perceived as 
an act of consent, a pure legitimizer of the already set political agenda. Imposition from above, 
rather than participation from below, appears as crucial in politics. Such practice is the main 
object of criticism in the article. Embracing a (conceptual) perspective of thinking of our 
everyday problems, the author claims, might lead us towards accepting an “inductive instead of 
deductive method of politics”. In this case, the inductive method represents euphemism for the 
democratic participation that precedes elections, which means that voting should not be the 
only, or maybe not even the most important act of democratic participation. “Deciding about 
our destiny for the next five years in thirty seconds” (of voting) thus becomes a unique paradox 
of democracy, which reduces itself to elections. 
From the macro perspective, the author shifts to the meso level of discourse. On the basis 
of the conceptual discussion analyzed above, he suggests a possible solution to the indicated 
paradox of “electoral democracy”. The suggested direction of thinking goes straight to the 
socialist (Yugoslav) past, and includes the reinvention of the concept of self-managing local 
community (Serbian: mesna zajednica). The writer assumes that some people are familiar with 
this concept, but at the same time assumes that not so many, especially among youngsters, are 
familiar with its essence. This is why he engages in a further explanation in which he reminds 
the readers that “local communities represent the specific mode of self-management”, typical 
of the time of self-managing socialism. The call for the reinvention of such an important 
concept from the storage of the socialist heritage, tells us about the relationship between this 
heritage and the counter-hegemonic tendencies in Belgrade. The way in which the concept is 
recalled and discursively used, nonetheless, points to the degree of carefulness. By picking a 
concept rather than the entire ideology of Yugoslav socialism, the movement leaves the space 
open for attaching different meanings to the usage of self-management. This concept is not 
recalled (only) because of its socialist connotation, but (also) because it is complementary with 
the overall discursive performance of the movement. All the paradoxes of (electoral) post-
socialist democracy, including discontents with the lack of inclusion and participation in social 
and (especially) political processes (of decision-making), are indeed likely to be remedied by a 
solution that encourages participation. This comes as a logical common sense, rather than as an 
open claim about the superiority of socialism over post-socialism. The revival of self-
management from the past does not play the role of a call for going back to the past. Rather, it 
calls for looking into the future while remembering and taking from the past what seems to be 
plausible for resolving current social and political problems and tensions.   
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The article also contains a section reserved for scientific discourse, in which the author 
communicates the results of the research conducted by the Center for Free Elections and 
Democracy. Its purpose is precisely to show the validity of the old socialist concept in present 
times, since the results show the “low level of trust and inclusion of the citizens” at the local 
level. From here, the activist further argues in favor of a top-down approach which is supposed 
to bring change at the “level of the desirability of shifting the delegation of responsibility to the 
lower levels of decision-making.” Already in the following sentence, it is stressed that an even 
bigger change may come from the bottom up, in the form of change of the consciousness of 
citizens and taking over the sense of real responsibility for their own lives. Thereby he “admits” 
that, initially, incentives for a real change may come from the top, but emphasizes that a much 
more essential dimension of the desirable change must be set from the bottom up.  
This is pretty much in accordance with the overall discourse of the movement. The article 
further on, emphasizes the necessity of a wider transformation of the relationship among the 
people themselves, as well as the power relations in general. Considering that these issues 
cannot be easily resolved, what is necessary is a wide social consensus about potential solutions 
suggested in this article. Clearly, the author is calling for consensus with respect to the 
suggested conceptual and practical solutions, mostly embodied in the concept of self-
management of local communities. Before that, nonetheless, consensus is supposed to be 
reached at the level of diagnosis, hence at the macro (conceptual) level. 
The concluding words, again, link the three pillars of knowledge conveyed by this article: 
presidential elections and their banality with respect to resolving the everyday (deeply rooted) 
problems (the micro level of discursive communication); change in the approach towards 
governance and transformation of the relationship between the citizens and the state (the 
macro level of discursive communication); and the emphasis on issues concerning local 
communities, the critique of the professionalization of politics, the call for self-management 









   
It is time to conclude on the basis of the in-depth analysis of discursive divergences 
between the three movements along the three lines of contextual and structural differences 
presented in the table 1.1. Firstly, the focus was clearly on how discourses were organized at 
the macro (conceptual) level and on how a progressive critique of the post-socialist condition 
was built in the three similar but at the same time different national contexts. Within 
conceptual apparatuses, I spotted the difference between the front-running master-frames and 
supportive master-frames. From there, I was able to see how generic knowledge gets combined 
with a given micro context and how the meso level of discourse appears as a product of 
movements’ “cognitive praxis”. Divergences on both the macro and the meso levels of 
abstraction, at least partially, have something to do with the differences in type of social 
movement, specific national context and direct circumstances related to the occurrence of these 
movements and their actions.  
In all the three cases certain master-frames came to the forefront of discourses, whereas 
others served as a backup. Starting from Belgrade, the front running master-frames were 
“commons”, “public good”, “participation” or “democracy” at the level of local communities. 
Municipal concepts could have ended up at the forefront of NDB’s macro discourse due to both 
the specific type of movement and the specific national context. As to the movement’s 
affiliation, NDB managed to catch the wave of municipal ideas and municipal social movements 
which had been spreading across Europe. The movement started its endeavors as a collective of 
several enthusiasts whose professional affiliation or personal (activist) interest relied on issues 
related to the “commons” and the like. No wonder that the macro level of discursive 
performance reflected this type of specific affiliation of the movements’ activists. On the other 
hand, the occurrence of such a movement in Belgrade owed something to the national 
ideological context, as well. Serbia had gone through a sort of proliferation of ideological 
confusions in the 1990s, where the nationalist leader Slobodan Miloševid was (self-) portrayed 
as an embodiment of the “(dark) communist rule”.77 The left-leaning ideas were usually 
demonized by equalizing former President Miloševid with socialism. This is why the context of 
post-Miloševid’s Serbia was highly hostile towards any discourse which would directly refer or 
reproduce the socialist discourse. Moreover, municipalism could have represented a way out of 
the contextually driven division of society along the lines of binary opposition – pro or against 
the present “ruler”, who has developed clear authoritarian tendencies in the past seven years.  
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 I call this situation a “Serbian ideological paradox”. This phenomenon will be further elaborated in the next 
empirical chapter.  
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On the other hand, the front running master-frames of Zagreb’s student movement 
reflected the influence of a different national context, as well as the difference in the type of 
social movement. Even though the specific accent was on “free education for all”, concepts 
such as (the rule of) capital and neoliberalism were set as the dominant conceptual “satellites” 
placed around the main demand. Starting from a different context, one should firstly emphasize 
that the period of 2008/9, when the student movement occurred, were years when the 
concepts of capital or neoliberalism hit a peak in public attention due to the global economic 
crisis. This is why such master-frames could “land” more safely even in countries of post-
socialism, despite their hostility towards any left-leaning (critical) ideas. Croatia, unlike Serbia, 
had not had a proliferation of ideological confusions, whatsoever. It was quite clear from the 
beginning that the right wing had taken over after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The only 
obstacle to the revival of critical discourses and ideas was the (dominantly) negative perception 
of the Yugoslav period, whereby the accent has primarily been on its political (identity) 
dimension (Yugoslavia has been perceived as “Serbo-Yugoslavia”, hence dominated by the 
Serbs). Within such a context, master-frames like neoliberalism or capital could have possibly 
resonated with certain segments of society, under the condition that Yugoslavia stayed 
somewhat “out” as an explicit point of reference.   
Secondly, the fact that it is a student movement that we are talking about, allowed for such 
(critical) ideas to be brought up much “easier” than for the majority of other social (and 
political) actors. The reasoning behind this claim is twofold. Firstly, student movements have 
had the tradition of operating with and within critical discourses, not only in Croatia but 
worldwide. They are usually more immune to attacks from the political mainstream. Publics are 
usually less likely to “buy” arguments such as “someone is paying them” and the like. Primarily, 
students are seen as voices of the youth, so that political messages coming from them are in a 
sort of privileged position. They cannot be so easily dismissed, in spite of their radical content. 
Secondly, student movements are more likely to develop such radical discourses due to their 
internal dynamics and the specific habitus of university (especially a Faculty of Philosophy and 
especially in Zagreb).              
Finally, the discursive performance of the popular movement in Sarajevo rested upon the 
two front-running master-frames: social justice and human dignity. In this case, the most 
decisive factors were the limitations imposed by the national context, on the one hand, and the 
absence of a clear social base, on the other. Context-wise, Bosnia suffers from a dysfunctional 
state character. Its constitutional configuration (which divided the country into two entities, ten 
cantons, and one district with a special status), as well as the permanent perpetuation of ethnic 
tensions (primarily by the elites), have created enormous rigidity. This rigidity has mostly been 
reflected through a high level of structural resilience with respect to any sort of progressive 
change. Under such circumstances, every statement and every social or political action has to 
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be carefully communicated. Any move outside the ethno-national “box” in which Bosnia was 
put by its own constitution has proven to be nearly impossible.  
The social and economic degradation that has followed from these structural shortcomings 
has, nonetheless, created a bit of a maneuvering space for critical discourses. The attempt was 
precisely to overcome, or circumvent the above-indicated structural obstacles and get out of 
the ethno-nationalist “cage”. Alongside these front-running master-frames, one could also 
trace concepts such as transition (specifically transitional theft), corruption or nepotism which 
represent supportive master-frames. The intention was again clear: it is not about Serbs, Croats 
and Bosniaks, but about the “winners and losers” of transition, about the human beings whose 
dignity has been violated by those who enjoy undeserved privileges.  
When it comes to the concept of social justice, its discursive role could be assessed by 
referring to the specific type of social movement. The popular character of a movement usually 
carries both opportunities and dangers. Opportunities concern greater mobilization capacity 
which may overcome barriers typical for more narrowly set activist collectives. Dangers, on the 
other hand, come from the overly general character of such movements, which usually cannot 
fully benefit from the greater mobilization capacity, due to lack of a stable and clear social 
basis. Popular movements thus often suffer from overgeneralizations of discourse, which come 
from the vagueness of their social base. Concepts such as social justice may indeed resonate 
with a large portion of society. The trouble is that often one should take a step further if one 
wants to make both the social base and the discourse more solid and politically potent. In the 
case of Sarajevo, this was indeed tried. Structural obstacles however, turned out to be too 
strong. 
Another way to look at the supportive master-frames is through the perspective of meso 
level of discourse. This means that, sometimes, the supportive conceptual apparatus could 
have been used as a bridge from the main pillars of macro discourse to the micro (contextual) 
features of a given society and the very “nature” of the movement. In that sense, the three 
cases showed three possible scenarios, depending on contextual and other abovementioned 
specificities. Starting from Sarajevo, the activists had to supplement the main discursive focus 
(expressed in the front-running master frames of social justice and human dignity) with 
demands such as “expert government”. This was a direct response to the popular “anti-
political” sentiment coming from a huge disappointment, which made citizens highly mistrustful 
towards the entire political elite. The combination of these two factors, the absence of a clear 
social base and the “anti-political” sentiment, brought the overall discourse to a certain 
contradiction between the supporting and front-running master-frames. This contradiction was 
embodied in the groundlessness of the relationship between dignity and social justice, on the 
90 
 
one hand, and the historically and recently proven inability of “expert governments” to inherit 
these kinds of values, on the other.     
The supporting master-frames of NDB were more compatible with the front-running 
master-frames. Self-management, power, (occupied) state and the like indeed supplemented 
the conceptual essence of NDB’s discourse. The front-running master-frames were, on the one 
hand, clearly chosen in accordance with the type of social movement. NDB’s orientation 
towards municipalism and the emphasis on empowering local communities and the struggle for 
public space is clear. Yet, the reasoning behind the choice of supplementary concepts (such as 
self-management) has only partially to do with the type of movement and partially with the 
specific context of Serbia and its relationship with the socialist past. Even though the Yugoslav 
legacy has been demonized and to a large extent delegitimized, some of its (conceptual) 
elements have nonetheless remained unsoiled. In Yugoslav times, self-management was 
introduced as a conceptual response to the growing tendency of bureaucratization and 
divergence from the ideal of democratic socialism. As the “father” of the concept claimed, “the 
working masses which had once gained their right to decide for themselves through the 
national liberation struggle, were not ready to give up that right so easily and leave it to some 
new state bureaucracy” (Kardelj 1978, 17). Considering that Serbia has not become as hostile 
towards Yugoslav heritage as, for instance Croatia, such concepts which glorify participation 
and democracy (in both politics and economy) were suitable for the new municipalist 
tendencies. On the other hand, such concepts could resonate with the public if applied without 
a direct reference to the entire Yugoslav context. Self-management is undoubtedly “safer” as a 
supportive, than as front-running master-frame.  
Zagreb’s student movement incorporated legal and human rights’ discourse within the set 
of supportive master-frames. At first sight, the legal discourse embodied in referring to the 
(Croatian) constitutional principles or the human rights discourse (which recalled the UN 
charter on human rights from 1948) do not fit the more radical and clearly anti-capitalist 
essence of the epistemic discourse. However, the supporting corpus of these concepts served 
for contextualizing the main conceptual pillars (of neoliberalism, capital and the like). It was a 
way of saying, “we also beat you on your own discursive field”. Conceptual inconsistences of 
the dominant transitional paradigm are thereby illuminated not only from the standpoint of the 
opposite discursive camp, but also from within the very dominant paradigm. A similar trend 
may be detected in the case of the use of concepts such as learning society. Playing the card of 
winning at “the enemy’s” field served for showing that the front-running master-frames were 
not out of touch with reality and that counter-hegemony should not be equalized with utopia. 
Through such a discursive maneuver, in the light of the misconceptions of the hegemonic 




Here we come to the question of divergences with respect to the degree of state/police 
repression and the question of triggers. Apart from structural and contextual features, as well 
as the ones concerning the specific type of social movement, the presence or absence of direct 
triggers and the degree of repression could possibly turn out to be important for assessing 
differences in discursive performances. Why is this relevant? Micro, macro and meso levels of 
discourse revealed the extent to which movements had to react to concrete (micro) events, 
direct triggers for mobilization, or state/police repression before, during or after the protest 
events. These questions are important for assessing the proportion or balance between 
different levels of abstraction at which discourses were set. This assessment, on the other 
hand, should lead us towards a conclusion about the role of concepts (macro level of 
knowledge) in the overall discursive performance.  
In the concrete case of Sarajevo, the factor of state/police repression evidently influenced 
the inner organization of the popular movement’s discourse. The movement had to deal with 
arrests and police brutality after material damage had been done by the protestors. The 
discourse was hence full of immediate reactions and attempts to reframe the way in which the 
protestors’ violence was portrayed by the state and the mainstream media. The case of 
Zagreb’s student movement was somewhat different in this respect. The main activities took 
place at the university. Due to its autonomy, this is the last place where one should or could 
expect police repression. The discursive organization of messages communicated to the public 
was balanced, and it contained all the three levels of abstraction. Media releases were 
dedicated to the micro level (reactions to everyday accusations coming from numerous sides), 
whereas other documents (analyzed above) were clearly dominated by the macro and meso 
levels of discourse. The concepts were not, in other words, loaded with day-to-day issues but 
rather empowered and, in some cases, revived through references to commonsensical 
knowledge. They could thereby be set and used discursively without carrying too heavy a 
burden of micro-level “directives”.  
Belgrade’s NDB, finally, fell somewhere in between Sarajevo and Zagreb in this regard. The 
peak of their protest activities followed the act of violence by the unknown group of people 
who secured the demolition of buildings in Belgrade’s city center. The demolition was the 
trigger for mass mobilization, but also shaped, to an extent, the discourse of NDB afterwards. 
Unlike Sarajevo, nonetheless, there was more space for closer tying-up of the macro and micro 
levels of discourse. As for the violence, it had to be addressed through different discursive 
means than in Sarajevo. The crucial difference was that the violence committed in Belgrade was 
not carried out by the official police forces, but by the unknown masked civilians. This is why 
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the supportive set of master-frames in Belgrade included some less explicit78 references to the 
rule of law. 
 
Table 4.1: Master Frames  
Social Movement Zagreb Sarajevo  Belgrade 
Front-running Master 
Frames 
(Rule of) capital; 
neoliberalism 





Supportive Master – 
Frames  






















                                                          
78 Rule of law had already been degraded as a concept typical of the transitologist paradigm and had already 




Chapter 5: Activists and Critical Knowledge  
 
Critical discursive “worlds” were not created by a “big bang”. As we could see in the 
previous chapter, they surfaced under specific circumstances and sought to conduct a 
dialectical endeavor, both to resonate with given contexts and to launch a more tangible social 
change and transform these contexts. Except for various social and structural factors which 
shaped discourses, their content was also determined by direct inputs of those who happened 
to participate in the activist struggles.  
The three contexts share the common Yugoslav heritage and the common post-socialist 
structural, social and economic condition. At the same time, they differ in many ways. Both 
similarities and differences shaped the newly awaken critical voices. Most of these voices were 
socialized in war and after-war conditions, surrounded and exposed to the dominant post-
socialist narrative which created somewhat uniform image (in each of the national contexts) of 
the past, present and future. The anti-hegemonic critical perception of reality was developed 
along these three time references, which all interact and complement each other.    
Firstly, whole post-socialist edifice was built on the established hegemony over meaning of 
the past. This comes as no surprise. Famous novelist Milan Kundera argued that “the only 
reason people want to be masters of the future is to change the past. They are fighting - he 
proceeds, for access to the laboratories where photographs are retouched and biographies and 
histories rewritten” (Kundera 1979, 22; In: Berardi 2015, 125). The one who “conquers” the 
past thereby comes to the position to legitimize its rule in the present, as well as its plans for 
the future. This is why counter-hegemonic reasoning has to deal with new tendencies 
embodied in historical revisionism. Secondly, the present is, as we could see in the subchapter 
on the post-socialist condition, usually legitimized as “transitory” and hence “necessarily 
painful” period. Present suffering, thus the narrative goes, should change the course taken by 
the socialist past, and lead towards a brighter future on the wings of free market economy and 
newly established nation states. The resistance, again, must follow the path of deconstruction 
of the narrative of necessity or inevitability of the present condition. Finally, the future is, 
according to the post-socialist paradigm, foreseen as “European”, democratic and “modern”. 
The critique thus, must also deconstruct the narrative of the “brighter future”.  
Now, the question is who the carrier of such critique became. One may rightfully wonder 
who is an activist79 in the counter-hegemonic movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia 
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 “Who is an Activist” was the name of the conference organized by the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb in 
2017. I owe this exact formulation of the question to the organizers of that conference, where I presented my 
(ongoing) work.  
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and Croatia and what are the sources and channels through which critical knowledge reaches 
them. In addition, it is very important to trace the social, cultural and structural factors that 
mediate and affect the process of the acquisition of critical knowledge at the level of individual 
activists. Along this research trajectory, it is important to discover what type of knowledge 
influences “cognitive maps” of activists and whether theory (still) plays an important role in 
challenging the status quo. In order to get to the essence of the relationship between ideas and 
activism, one should wonder if there is such theory that could be considered activist relevant 
and, consequently - “movement relevant” in the contemporary era.  
Here, I am hence continuing the research journey by tracing the initial origins of the 
epistemic discursive content detected in the previous chapter. Digging into the origins of 
activists’ “critical cognition” implies both the search for non-theoretical and theoretical 
knowledge that became essential in their cognitive maps. I wonder about the production of 
alternative visions of reality, along the three time frames, and, simultaneously, wonder about 
social factors that bring activists to the opposite side of what has been established as seemingly 
uncontested hegemony of “transitology”. In the subchapter 5.1, I am dealing with the role of 
non-theoretical knowledge in cognitive development of the activists and wonder about the 
factors that had an effect on the development of counter-hegemonic worldviews and early-life 
value systems. In the subchapter 5.2, I am proceeding with the role that (critical) theoretical 
knowledge had in the process of further upgrading progressive worldviews (meaning that 
earlier acquired worldviews got their theoretical articulation) or transforming conservative 
ones.   
 
5.1. Acquisition of Worldviews 
 
As shown in the previous part on discursive performances, the hegemonic paradigm of 
transitional post-socialism produced tangible social and material consequences. Social 
disintegration, degradation of dignity and economic deprivation are, on a general level, 
something that former Yugoslav post-socialist condition brought to most people. However, the 
means of legitimation which included systemically propagated national, ethnic and religious 
hatred hindered the awareness about the real material condition of the majority.80 
Nonetheless, certain social mechanisms allowed the counter-hegemonic trajectory of thought 
to be paved in the case of minority within the deprived and dissatisfied majority. The most 
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important factors that played a role in laying the foundation for more comprehensive critique 
of the post-socialist condition (as traced in the previous chapter) are, among others: belonging 
to the working class, progressive social habitus, subcultural influences, “ethnic otherness” and 
progressive family narratives. These factors affected the cognitive formation of activists cross-
nationally, so the analysis is also following the cross-national trajectory.  
The issue that is somewhat crosscutting all these factors is linked with memory. If the one 
who ruled over the past is capable of ruling over the present and the future, then the “battle” 
for meaning over the past is essential for changing the present and the future. The line that 
divides hegemony from counter-hegemony is, thus, the same line that divides collectivized 
(ruling) memory from individual (contesting) memory. For the purpose of this work, it should be 
emphasized that both individual and collective memory are subjected to reproduction, as well 
as transformation. In precise terms, the field of consideration here are individual memories 
which could have counter-weighted the hegemonic collective memory. Depending on the way 
one engages with others or depending on the type of social networks one engages in, 
memories may be, in various periods of life, individually processed in different ways and within 
“different systems of notions” (Halbwachs 1992, 47). The way one perceives memories, as 
argued by Bartlett (1932), depends on cultural and internal values and norms. This perception, 
again, has a direct impact on the way one perceives present and imagines the future. In 
Bartlett’s schematic terms81 this means that hegemonic reasoning usually employs memory 
through assimilating, whereas counter-hegemonic reasoning primarily resists assimilating 
through sharpening. 
A very important set of insights presented in this chapter refer to the so called “activist 
biographies”. Doug McAdam (1999) and many others before him researched from this 
perspective. This literature usually talks about “biographical impacts of activism”, while looking 
at various aspects of “life after activism” or continuation of advocating certain (for instance, 
left) political attitudes, as well as activities in contemporary movements or other forms of 
political participation - or even – a number of divorced among the former activists of a single 
social movement (McAdam 1999, 121). In this research, I am indeed dealing with activist 
biographies – but with the specific focus on biographical impact upon “cognitive mapping” – 
rather than “activism” (in the sense of “incentives” for activism). I am looking at social dynamics 
and factors which have shaped activists’ “cognitive maps” before they became members of 
social movements. Hence, I am looking at number of factors which could have enhanced critical 
perception of social reality (past, present) and alternative assessments of the (desirable) future.   
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 Bartlett’s theory of reconstructed memory is based on the scheme that includes the following elements: a) 
leveling - which means simplifying memories; b) sharpening - which has to do with (over)emphasizing and 
highlighting details from the memory; and c) assimilating - which implies changing details from memory in order to 
fit what we learned in new situations (Bartlett 1932).   
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With help of these two theoretical notions I can proceed with the in-depth investigation of 
the very origins of (non-theoretical) counter-hegemonic reasoning within a given context, and 
discuss factors that affected this process in the three case studies in question.    
       
 
5.1. Social class (direct experience), family narratives 
 
There are different sociological understandings of the concept of class. Among the most 
significant theories are the ones from Max Weber on one side, and Karl Marx on the other. In 
his book “Understanding Class”, Erik Olin Wright provides a typology of three general streams 
in literature on class. The first, he argues, “identifies class with the attributes and material 
conditions of the lives of individuals; the second focuses on the ways in which social positions 
give some people control over economic resources of various sorts while excluding others from 
access to those resources” (Weber’s perspective); and the third “identifies class, above all, with 
the ways in which economic positions give some people control over the lives and activities of 
others” (Marxian perspective) (Wright 2015, pp. 3,12).82  
At first glance, it seems like the third, Marxian approach to class, is the most appropriate for 
assessing the relationship between class belonging and (counter-hegemonic) cognition in this 
work. In Marx, this link is famously called “class consciousness”, which allows for the dominated 
(working class) to become aware of its subordinated position, transforming from “class in itself” 
to a “class for itself”. As to the later, Lenin has become famous for arguing that the task of 
making proletariat “the class for itself” has to be delegated to the group of professional 
revolutionaries or the vanguard (party). My understanding of class, nonetheless, follows Wright 
who defines this concept as:  
“(…) a way of talking about the connection between individual attributes and these 
material life conditions: class identifies those economically important attributes of people that 
shape their opportunities and choices in a market economy and thus their material conditions 
of life. Class should neither be identified simply with the individual attributes nor with the 
material conditions of life of people, but with the interconnections between these two.” (Ibid., 
4) 
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Wright further elaborates each of these three sociological approaches to class. He also labels them: the individual 
attributes approach (first); the opportunity-hoarding approach (second), and the domination and exploitation 
approach (third).  See: Wright 2015, 1,15 
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There are also different traditions of putting labels on “classes”. It is not irrelevant whether 
we use terms such as “working class” or “lower class”; or whether one uses the term “middle 
class” or favors “class dualism” typical for Marxian kind of division between proletariat and 
bourgeoisie. Nonetheless, in this discussion I am using the term working class (as in Marx) 
because I am talking about a class which shapes discussions about both socialism and post-
socialism and is widely recognized as such in the field of my interest. In socialism, the working 
class was the main carrier of “revolutionary society”, and in post-socialism the working class 
“has gone to heaven”.83 Simultaneously, I am combining this concept with the concept of 
middle class that stems from the Weberian theoretical heritage.84      
Most of activists I had the chance to interview are coming either from the working class or, 
in some cases, from the (lower) middle class families.85 Here, I am talking about the class 
structure in the 1980s and (in the case of older activists), 1970s. In 1990s, however, the former 
middle class declassed and “joined” the former working class in its impoverished social and 
economic material condition. The middle class almost disappeared.86 Some of the activists I 
interviewed (especially in Sarajevo – six out of eleven interviewed) remember the late socialist 
times, while others have clearer reflection on the early post-socialist period. For instance, an 
interviewee coming from the suburbs of an industrial town in Bosnia testifies about hard living 
conditions during the late Yugoslav times: 
“Before the war, my family belonged to the working class. Life wasn’t easy – I remember 
my mom got her first washing machine in the 1990. I was a child but I was conscious of how 
difficult our life was, and how some people suffered more than others. This is the reason I 
always felt like I should protect the weaker.” (Interviewee no. 20)  
The working class in former Yugoslavia was not, of course, homogeneous in material terms. 
Washing machine was not a privilege, but it was not owned by every family. Bosnian, 
Macedonian or Kosovar working class stood lower on the social and economic scale than the 
ones in (north) Serbia, (urban) Croatia or Slovenia (see more in: Vojnid 1995, 78-81). Despite 
divergences between different Yugoslav republics different regions within single federal units or 
differences between urban and rural areas overall, what appears as a common denominator 
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 This is a song tittle from “Haustor”, one of the most popular rock bands from the 1980s, from Zagreb.  
84
 When I say “Weberian theoretical heritage, I refer to the “opportunity-hoarding mechanisms identify the central 
mechanism that differentiates “middle class” jobs from the broader working class by creating barriers that in one 
way or another restrict the supply of people for desirable employment. The key issue here is not mainly who is 
excluded, but simply the fact that there are mechanisms of exclusion that sustain the privileges of those in middle 
class positions.” (see: Wright ibid., 12) 
85
 This means that none of the interviewees came either from the class of “red bourgeoisie” during socialism 
(politicians, directors of big companies and alike), or from the class of “nouveu riche”, who were the only ones who 
were not working class (or underclass/lumpenproleteriat) in the early post-socialism.  
86
 See more about the economic downturn in the 1980s and (especially) 1990s in: Bartlet 1996, 151-156 
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among those interviewees who remember socialism is a memory of minimum of social and 
economic protection socialism offered. Another interviewee from Bosnia and Herzegovina, this 
time from its capital, indicates:   
“The old man was a typical socialist worker and my mother was a housewife. I was a 
typical socialist kid, like any other, at the time. You were in someone’s care. You lived in a 
country where nothing bad could happen to you. You weren’t hungry or thirsty. You knew that 
you would have a roof above your head.” (Interviewee no. 21)  
Social class as a potential factor in the process of construction of counter-hegemonic 
cognitive maps shows both its potential and limitations. With respect to the potential, difficult 
material conditions of the working class by the end of the socialist period could have brought a 
sense of solidarity and awareness, in relation to difficulties to which “working people” were 
exposed to. The post-socialist narrative advanced towards individualization of social and 
economic suffering, where every member of the community should struggle for itself, in order 
to achieve better material conditions of life. The situation was such that great majority of 
people remained on the social and economic margins. An activist from Belgrade:      
“In Yugoslavia, we were a typical “military family”. In the nineties we were really poor, 
and my father lost a lot of money because he was scammed. My mom lost her job and we 
survived by buying food in the local little store, without having to pay right away. Poverty 
marked an entire period of my life. What I also remember from the 1990s was that we were all 
in a similar situation. Others didn’t have much more money…” (Interviewee no. 35)  
Another potential of “class” comes from vivid memories of belonging to the working-class 
during socialism. In Sarajevo, most activists belonged to the generation older than their activist 
“colleagues” in Zagreb or Belgrade. Many of them were able to compare the two systems, 
socialism and post-socialism. Some of them had “only” basic social security (food, healthcare, 
housing, employed parents) in socialism, whereas others also remembered events such as 
holidays. The issue of holidays was insightful because, in the meanwhile, vacations became 
almost like a distant dream for the working class and “losers of transition”. A kind of life that 
the working class had in certain parts of former Yugoslavia (mostly urban areas with the 
exception of the least developed areas of the country) appeared as similar to what is nowadays 
considered a decent middle-class life.       
“At first, we lived with my father’s parents and then in 1985 my mom got an apartment 
from the company she was working for. I lived there with my parents and my late brother. I 
fondly remember that period of life. We had a house on Brač, an island in Croatia. Every year, 
we would spend our summer holidays there.”  (Interviewee no. 17) 
Some activists from Belgrade are old enough to have similar, almost identical memories: 
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“My childhood was marked by a memory and the experience of life in a system that was 
suddenly interrupted. Some things were taken for granted – you were Tito’s Pioneer, you 
carried a flag with the red star. Every anniversary of Tito’s death was announced with air-raid 
sirens, and I remember that they made us stand “at attention” in school.  I once asked my 
grandfather what changed since then and he answered – everything. In 1996/1997 I was in high 
school when the protests [of students against Miloševid] started. This is when I started thinking 
in more political terms. The protests were anti-government, and you could see that the 
government was doing bad things – there was no heating in schools, no buses, there was drama 
in our house. Then you started comparing present with the past, remembering that you went 
with your family to the seaside, to Dubrovnik, by plane. In the second grade of the elementary 
school we flew with our peers to the island of Brač in Croatia. You felt very intuitively that 
you’re fighting against those who interrupted this kind of life and made this mess. “   
(Interviewee no. 27) 
Serbian case shows that the notion of class may include influences of both proletarian 
material condition and rural environment within which this condition was portrayed. 
“Industrialized peasantry” could have thus, combined both material and non-material 
(discursive) conditions of the working class on one hand, and material and non-material 
conditions of life typical for rural environment, on the other. One of the activists from NDB 
says:    
“I was exposed to the working-class milieu, because my father worked in a factory. I 
remember his colleagues coming to our home and singing folk songs and playing harmonica. 
Maybe this was a folk subculture of sorts. On the other hand, I grew up in the rural milieu, 
surrounded by industrial workers and poor peasantry. They were working in factories and, at 
home, they were working on fields. I think this environment significantly influenced my 
thinking, this lower-class milieu. “   (Interviewee no. 30) 
Limitations of class as an explanatory tool, crop up when we simply declare: if most of the 
population in former Yugoslavia belonged to the working class, a significant number to the low 
middle-class and majority in early post-socialism to the impoverished precarious “underclass”, 
how come only a tiny minority ended up being on the track of progressive critical position with 
respect to the post-socialist reality? The answer can be found in the fact that belonging to the 
working class contained more than one normative aspect. Normative dimension of the working 
class in Yugoslavia was composed of historical background that discursively (and narratively) 
constructed it as a class in political terms. Working class in Yugoslavia was standing side-by-side 
with the Partisans, the carriers of the most important narrative about the anti-fascist struggle in 
the WWII. This narrative with two pillars, the working class and the Partisans, in both its official 
form and as private memories, had persisted several decades before it was contested by the 
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new (national) political elites. Whether or not a working class member had higher chances of 
developing counter-hegemonic perception of reality in post-socialism depended mostly of 
whether one safeguarded the “old” (Yugoslav) interpretation of the tight connection between 
the working class and anti-fascism. Majority among the working class members did not 
safeguard this image and this is why they could be used as material for voting and fighting in 
wars. Majority of activists nonetheless, came from the remaining minority among the working 
class, whose value systems remained similar to the ones dominating the socialist period. An 
activist from Zagreb:  
“When you're coming from a working-class family, you're facing everyday routines and 
habits you don't recognize as “high philosophy”. Solidarity, work, communities... The memory 
of self-management and the socialist system remained alive and strong after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia.” (Interviewee no. 5)  
Narration about class belonging played a significant role in paving the road for critical 
perception of the post-socialist reality. In both Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav era, social class and 
the material condition typical for the working class could have been interpreted in a 
progressive, self-conscious manner. Does the fact that some Yugoslavs did not have a washing 
machine make the Yugoslav experience inferior to the present one? Was Yugoslavia only a nice 
dream about solidarity, brotherhood and unity of all its nations, which had to collapse under its 
own weight? Or quite the opposite – was it a good opportunity, especially for the working class, 
which got destroyed violently from above? What is the legacy of this state? What about the 
heritage of anti-fascism and multi-ethnicity? All these, and many other questions needed to be 
addressed after dissolution of Yugoslavia. In some cases, they were addressed within families. 
An activist from Sarajevo:  
“My father was telling me about Yugoslavia, what kind of country it was, and what kind 
of society. It was my father who introduced me to the concept of class. I remember his stories 
about the period, right after the war just finished. I got back to these those concepts and stories 
ten of fifteen years after that, by myself - through readings and research.” (Interviewee no. 16) 
Establishing the rule over meaning with respect to the socialist past became extremely 
important, in the light of the events from the post-socialist period. On the other hand, the 
opposite tendencies of keeping memories of progressive achievements and the unfulfilled 
potential of this period alive became an obstacle to the new, post-socialist hegemonic 
narrative. Counter-hegemonic tendencies thus, became inseparable from a certain amount of 
awareness about progressive elements of the Yugoslav socialist legacy. Cultivating memory of 
the anti-fascist struggle in Yugoslavia is among its most important legacies. An interviewee from 
Sarajevo:      
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“The Partisan narrative is mediated through my family roots. My aunt was a very 
influential person in my life. I remember stories about her being in Partisans, how she was 
saving the wounded at Kozara.87 All these details, very powerful and vivid, remained in my 
head.” (Interviewee 25) 
Interestingly enough, the battle of Kozara became a “victim” of historical revisionism when, 
mainly Serbian and Croatian nationalists, started dealing with it during the 1990s. Croatian 
nationalists were actively ignoring and neglecting the heritage of Kozara because pro-Nazi 
forces of then Independent State of Croatia (NDH) participated on the side of the German 
Nazis. On the other hand, Serbian nationalists changed the rhetoric and instead of the common 
resistance of the Yugoslav anti-fascist Partisan army, put an emphasis on the fact that majority 
of prisoners after the battle were Serbs who were taken to the notorious concentration camp 
Jasenovac in NDH. The new Serbian interpretation of this event spoke about genocide 
committed over Serbs (mostly by Croats, but together with Germans), rather than the anti-
fascist heritage.88 Here we can see the significance of the anti-nationalist (and hence anti-
hegemonic) narratives and interpretations of certain events from the socialist and anti-fascist 
Yugoslav past. The link between anti-hegemonic tendencies and the socialist legacy (of anti-
fascism, in this case) was very tight because the link between new post-socialist hegemonic 
paradigm and historical revisionism was unbreakable. Legacy of the anti-fascist struggle in 
WWII was sometimes, indeed, overemphasized in the socialist era. However, this struggle was 
purposefully forgotten or turned upside down by the official power holders in the 1990s. The 
rule over meaning of these historical events fell into the hands of nationalists. Their rule 
nonetheless, never became absolute. Parts of the unconquered social fabric have persisted. 
Many present-day activists come from these, unconquered “corners”: 
“In 2014, when the police was beating up the generation of my students, I couldn’t be 
anywhere else but in the first rows. I was shaped, in that real sense, by the narrative from 
Kragujevac and the behavior of the teachers whose pupils were taken to be shot by the Nazis89. 
I still remember very well, the partisan movies and Yugoslav post-war cinematography, 
although I later developed a critical standpoint with that respect. Despite some exaggerations 
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 Kozara battle was held in Jun 1942, in northwestern Bosnia. It was one of the greatest battles between Yugoslav 
Partisans on one side and German and Croatian Nazi troops (Ustaše) on the other.  
88
 See more about the nationalist narratives on Kozara battle in: Zulumovid D. and Šahovid Dž. 2015; in: Sorensen 
M. and Viejo-Rose D. 2015, 223. 
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 As a revenge for the organized resistance (launched officially in July 1941), the Nazi occupation troops undertook 
a mass scale killing of civilians in the two Serbian cities, Kragujevac and Kraljevo. Around 2300 people were 
massacred, among them pupils of the gymnasium in Kragujevac. The most striking story from this tragic event, 
being retold repeatedly in history books in Serbia, is about the teacher who hugged one of his pupils just before 
the shooting and said: “Shoot, I’m still holding my lecture here”.  
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in those movies, no one can deny that, for instance, nurses in Sutjeska90 stayed with their 
wounded comrades, despite knowing they are most probably going to die there.” (ibid.)           
Among activists in Sarajevo (and partially Belgrade), there were people whose experience of 
socialism was based on more direct, “live” memories, rather than tales from childhood. This 
allowed them to compare the two periods of life, one they experienced in their youth (and 
childhood) in socialism and the other in their mature years, under post-socialism. An activist 
from Sarajevo:      
“Some fifteen years ago I finally shaped my clear and strong standpoint – by that time, I 
didn’t have one. Then I started to feel this big injustice within the society. People did not have 
the same possibilities in this newly constructed system. I started comparing the two systems I 
lived in and realized that the older one was much more just. Social differences also existed in 
socialism, of course – but they did not affect social dynamics, friendships and social interaction 
to the extent they do today.” (Interviewee no. 18) 
Apart from the experience of socialism, the experience of belonging to the impoverished 
working class (or underclass) in post-socialism also played a significant role. It came as an 
upgrade of belonging to the working class and exposure to the progressive narratives 
beforehand. Tangible consequences of the new post-socialist reality were, at first, more visible 
in smaller towns and former industrial centers. This is where they were observable better than 
in highly urbanized areas such as Belgrade. The effects were both symbolic and discursive on 
the one hand and quite material on the other. Serbian industry was collapsing under the weight 
of its government’s engagement in wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, as well as the economic 
sanctions and later, privatizations of the late 1990s and (especially) 2000s. Therefore, the 
industry collapsed because the paradigm changed from above. It came almost as a price that 
had to be paid for “national liberation”.91 The micro level of social relations started changing 
alongside, and to a certain extent, as a consequence of disintegrated economy. New social rules 
were about to be established and new class configurations set. An activist from Belgrade:   
“The city of Šabac was the best mirror image of the collapse of socialism. The chemical 
plant that was feeding the whole city collapsed and the narrative behind its collapse was that it 
was the fault of the incompetent communists. Communists, with Miloševid as their leader, were 
also accused of the failure to safeguard Yugoslavia. In the 1990s, the big bourgeoisie was rising 
and that rise was happening on the ruins of socialism. This was visible through the example of 
the class structure among pupils. Children from villages became different from city children. 
Everything related to the partisan movement and socialism was brutally erased and Šabac 
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 The battle on Sutjeska is another well know battle in WWII (May-Jun 1943).  
91
 See more on the conceptual paradox of “national liberation” in: Balunovid 2014. 
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became one of the most radical examples of erasing the socialist past. Not a single Partisan 
street name remained. The city got a new identity. That identity wasn’t close either to the spirit 
of my elementary social habitus of “healthy rural intelligence” or to the subculture I was slowly 
becoming part of.” (Interviewee no. 30)    
Similar trend is detected among activists in Zagreb. This pattern appears to be somewhat 
correlated to the process of disappearance of the working class from the social and political 
radar – especially in industrialized areas. Some activists coming from industrial cities witnessed 
the process of privatization and (consequent) disappearance of workplaces, destruction of 
factories and extinguishment of entire industrial branches. Consequences of transition 
appeared more tangible and discernible in such places, making their inhabitants live witnesses 
of their own pauperization, material and social degradation of an entire class, including their 
families. The city of Sinj, situated in the mainland of Croatian region Dalmatia, is one of such 
areas. An activist from Zagreb: 
“In the city of Sinj where I come from, there was a factory called “Dalmatinka”, where 
most of my family members were employed. This is why I was so attached to it. The employees 
were mostly women and they were the ones who contributed the most to the development of 
that region. This was very important to me. Dissolution of the system happened along with the 
privatization process and this is why the breakdown of Yugoslavia in my eyes, was more 
important as an economic, than an identity-related moment. This is, I think, the difference 
between older activists and our generation. They were paying more attention to human rights 
in the context of war, whereas our generation takes off from the perspective of economy 
where most injustices happened (…) Generally speaking, I think that our early worldview 
background is marked by the economic dissolution of Yugoslavia.” (Interviewee no. 3)   
Social image was, generally speaking, worsened by the increase of unemployment and loss 
of many social benefits for the majority. The perceived exposure to the consequences of 
transition in industrial areas could have not affected activists as isolated from the wider context 
that, among other features, includes the experience of war. A topic that became extremely 
sensitive was the issue of socio-economic conditions of the former fighters in war. Again, this is 
highly symptomatic when it comes to the position of the former working class that also served 
as “cannon fodder” during warfare. An activist from Zagreb: 
“I come from Sisak, a town that used to be one of the biggest industrial centers in 
former Yugoslavia, with strong iron and steel industry, petrochemical plant and chemical 
industry in general. I witnessed the mass scale disappearance of workplaces in my town. I also 
witnessed the situation with the war veterans, like my old man, who was retired at the age of 
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40 and never got reemployed. He suffered from PTSD92 and was never socially reintegrated 
again, nor did he benefit from any social help, whatsoever.” (Interviewee no. 11) 
Being socialized as a working-class member eventually turned out to be (almost) a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition when it comes to a critical direction of cognitive 
mapping. As history proved many times before, working class does not always choose the 
progressive side in periods of political/economic crises. This tendency (or empirical evidence 
from history) goes against the two most important theoreticians of class – Marx and Weber – 
who thought that big transformations increase chances for reaching, what Weber called, 
“naked class situation.”93 To the contrary, “naked class situation” proved to be “kept at bay” 
after the big transformation from socialism to post-socialism. Anyhow, while Marx and Weber 
theorized about the relationship between class belonging and social action, my intention here is 
to assess the relevance of class with respect to development of certain cognitive capacity for 
critical perception of, concretely, post-socialist condition.   
In sum, the social class does not necessarily determine the direction of cognitive 
development per se. It certainly has an influence, given the shared material and social 
characteristics among its members. Class, nonetheless, needs a political or other sort of “push”, 
in order to become a factor (or an actor) in this process. When I say “other”, I mostly refer to 
narratives that shape the perception of an experience or a memory. Certain progressive 
narratives and “frames” of memories and experiences are, on the other hand, undoubtedly 
more likely to be attached to the working class – more so than any other. Narratives cannot 
simply compensate real experience, while the experience itself (or memory of it) based on 
material condition typical for a given social class, may be used as an object of numerous 
interpretations. This tight nexus between material conditions and “the story behind them” 
seems to be crucial for taking the issue of class as a factor in the formation of counter-
hegemonic cognitive map. For instance, combination between belonging to the working class in 
material terms, and middle class in intellectual terms could have formed an appropriate 
illustration of this nexus between material and ideational dimension. An activist from Belgrade:  
“I come from a working-class neighborhood. Families of my friends were also working-
class families. My father was working for Serbian National Television and my mom was a 
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 PTSD is short from “Post-traumatic Stress Disorder” 
93 “Naked class situation” in Weber stands for the situation in which other indicators such as social status matter 
less than class, in the analysis of social stratification. Weber: “When the bases of the acquisition and distribution of 
goods are relatively stable, stratification by status is favored. Every technological repercussion and economic 
transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes the class situation into the foreground. Epochs and 
countries in which the naked class situation is of predominant significance are regularly the periods of technical 




teacher in school. There were lots of books in the house, so the atmosphere was a bit more 
intellectual. At some point my parents’ jobs became less paid than physical jobs (…) I 
remember, nonetheless, a situation in which my father managed to earn a bit more money. It 
was my birthday and he bought me a bit more expensive present. A friend of mine, who was 
with me when my father gave me that present, had that class-driven sigh, as if I’m leaving the 
flock. Anyway, my class origin is therefore proletarian in economic and middle class in 
intellectual sense.” (Interviewee no. 33) 
(Family) narratives could have “objectified” the experience (of socialism or material 
conditions of living), meaning that personal experience could have been taken as 
representative for building a general image about the world from it. This path of perceiving 
reality in accordance with the subjective, personal experience is, nonetheless, not detectable in 
all cases. Other activists, who shared the same material conditions of living, gained more 
tangible interpretations of class belonging through specific subcultural milieus, or factors typical 
for social habitus with exceptional characteristics. One sort of “upgrade”, of course, does not 
exclude the other. In some cases, they intersect. For instance, the factor of social class could be 
intersected with the issue of “ethnic otherness” and the feeling of double subordination, the 
one being related to class and the other to ethnicity or religion. The early experience of 
marginality, disadvantige and discrimination in such cases could lead to later politicization of 
the feeling of subordination. The roots of that resistance are often found in subcultural or other 
(narational) influences which helped out in the process of interpretation of the early life 
discriminatory experiences. An interviewee from Zagreb who grew up under conditions typical 
for Yugoslav gastarbeiter94 diaspora:     
“I experienced the hierarchical structure of the society (...) in a small town in Bavaria. I 
knew that my position was at the bottom of this hierarchy. Throughout early childhood, 
mimicry and hiding prevailed, but during adolescence this strategy transformed into a sort of 
rebellion and pride, readiness to get into conflict (…) I was a foreigner and as such, one has to 
feel a sort of harassment which is happening every day (…)” (Interviewee no. 12) 
Undoubtedly, early experiences of subordination, harassment and feeling of “otherness”, 
may possibly lead to more than one direction in the adolescence and the adult life. Same as 
belonging to the poorest and the most disadvantaged social class, this factor’s insightfulness 
depends on its combination with other factors. In most cases, the combination has to do with 
both social class and subcultural factors. Sometimes these two, or one of these two, were 
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 “The concept of Gastarbeiter (Guest-worker, Gastarbajter in Serbo-Croatian, pl. Gastarbajteri) arose first in the 
discourse of political economy (in Federal Republic of Germany during the 1950s) and later it entered other 
disciplines of social sciences and popular culture. It refers to temporary work migrants coming to West Germany 
(F.R.G., and later to other booming countries) as a “reserve army of labour” (K. Marx) supposed to return in the 
home country after accomplishing their purpose.” Daniel 2007, 293. 
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combined with (ethnic/national/religious) “otherness”. In the following subchapter I am 




5.2. The Issue of Identity and Feeling of “Otherness” 
 
 
The end of the “short 20th century” as Eric Hobsbawm (1994) labeled the period 
between 1914 and 1989, announced not only the defeat of “old ideological divisions”, and the 
end of the “Cold War”, but also the triumph of identity over class,95 capitalism over socialism 
and, consequently, neoliberalism over (welfare) social democracy. The winning amalgam of 
xenophobia and identity politics (Hobsbawm 1994, 567) and proliferation of the number of 
states came about as byproduct of this tendency. Ethnic, national and religious identities 
prevailed and practically swamped other dimensions of political and social life. Simultaneously, 
while identity became the focal point of political and social division, neoliberal economy was 
presented as “the solution” for the upcoming or newly developed identity-based discontents. 
Nonetheless, neoliberalism sneaked into the post-socialist space, almost “like a thief in broad 
daylight” (Žižek 2018), alongside with ethno-nationalist and “ur-fascist” (Eco 1995) tendencies. 
These tendencies in the former Yugoslavia gave rise to the creation of national/ethnic identity-
driven “prototypes”, which should have provided a clear-cut division between ethno-national 
and religious identities along which the former state had dissolved. A slight conceptual problem 
was the fact that people who could/should have been labeled as “Orthodox Serbs” or “Catholic 
Croats”, for instance, shared not only the same neighborhoods and cities/villages, but also 
family houses, rooms and, indeed, beds. Ethnic/national/religious “otherness” under given 
circumstances, became a latent reservoir for opposite, or counter-hegemonic ideational 
tendencies. For instance, children from “mixed” families (nine out of thirty nine interviewed in 
all three countries) could not fit any of the newly established (ethnic/national/religious) 
identities and were excluded from the dominant distribution of identity-based “roles”. An 
activist from Sarajevo testifies how such “alien” position looked like in practice:  
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“I lived in Mostar, in the Western side, as a child from a mixed marriage. From today’s 
perspective growing up during the war, in the western side of town, felt like I was growing up in 
Warsaw’s ghetto. I was wounded by a Muslim grenade and at the same time, my father was 
captured and spent a year and a half in the Croatian concentration camp [fighting on the side of 
Bosnian Muslims]. My sister found herself in Sarajevo when the war started. She had been 
studying there before, and she couldn’t get out afterward. In a way, these circumstances 
determined my worldview and caused my refusal to get along with any of the three versions of 
the dominant ethno-nationalist narrative.” (Interviewee no. 16)     
Mixed marriages indeed represented a sort of conceptual puzzle for ethno-nationalism. 
Division between “us” and “them” would have been much clearer if there were not for those 
who could have been both, “ours” and “theirs”, but neither “ours” nor “theirs”. Mixed 
marriages stayed in the middle of the ethno-nationalist conceptual gap. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was always famous for the biggest number of mixed marriages in former 
Yugoslavia, due to its remarkable degree of ethnic and religious diversity. This fact did not do 
much to prevent four years of bloodshed in the early 1990s, but it eventually reappeared as 
relevant in the post-war context in which divisions along ethnic and religious lines should have 
been reproduced or - contested:  
“Certainly, an important role in what I’ve become politically was due to a “mixed 
marriage” of my parents. This background caused a lack of possibility of having accentuated 
national identity. I’m coming from a Muslim-Croatian marriage, but majority of my friends 
were, as it turned out, Serbs.” (Interviewee no. 18) 
Mixed marriages represented a “pebble in the shoe” for the new nationalist project which 
was conducted in different states, following a similar scenario. By the same token, mixed 
marriages were one of the cornerstones of possibility to resist and safeguard at least minimum 
capacity to remain human, under inhumane conditions. In some cases, initial identity confusion 
and sense of non-belonging was often replaced by rejection of the new national/ethnic 
identities because these identities were by definition exclusive. Belonging to the Serbian, 
Croatian or other group was, in other words, formulated in positive and negative terms. 
Derridian notion of “constitutive outside”96 allowed this “outside” to persist in the newly 
established identities as a point of differentiation. Hence, definition of who are “we” always 
includes the reference to “them”, who serve us to define “ourselves” better. It was conceptual, 
but also a practical problem one could find itself in, when “Croatianism” and “Serbism”, for 
instance, stood side by side within one’s family. Conceptual gap thereby could have opened a 
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 “The outside bears with the inside a relationship that is, as usual, anything but simple exteriority. The meaning 
of the outside was always present within the inside (…)” Derrida 1988, 35. 
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possibility for alternative perception of reality and formation of counter-hegemonic cognitive 
map in the future. An interviewee from Belgrade:          
“I come from a mixed marriage. I was born in the city of Subotica97, in a working-class 
community, to which my parents also belonged. They were both Yugoslavs and my first 
identification was Yugoslav as well (…) my father is half-Hungarian and half-Croat. My mom is of 
Czech, German and Serbian origin. I remember dissolution of Yugoslavia through an anecdote – 
a man on the street asked me who I was and I replied “I’m Yugoslav”. Then he replied: “It 
doesn’t exist anymore” (…) I grew up like a little kid from “La vita e bella”. I knew we were 
ethnically mixed, and I knew we were Yugoslavs (…) after the war I accepted this new identity 
of being “mixed”. In my class majority was also coming from mixed marriages, so all those who 
were ethnically “clean” thought of this “cleanliness” as something odd.” (Interviewee no. 36)    
Belgrade, as the former capital of Yugoslavia, always had an image of an “open city”. Not so 
much for its cosmopolitanism, as much for its size – one could “survive” as an “ethnic other” 
much easier in Belgrade than in most other places in former Yugoslavia (apart from cities such 
as Rijeka or Tuzla that always nurtured cosmopolitan spirit). Nonetheless, it was always 
exceptionally difficult, much more than being a Muslim or a Croat, to be an Albanian in 
Belgrade. Harshness of the relationship between Serbs and (Kosovo) Albanians often produced 
very tangible and frequent experiences of discrimination and feeling of subordination. Here is a 
testimony of one of the activists from Belgrade, illustrating such experience:   
“I was born in a “mixed” family of a Serbian mother and a Kosovo Albanian father. From 
early childhood I was taught not to give importance to ethnic divisions. The second important 
fact coming from my mixed ethnic origin was that, as a family, we were exposed to 
discrimination as long as I can remember. You could feel it everywhere – in the neighborhood, 
in school, at work, in medical institutions (…) When my father died in 1992, these ethnic 
differences started dividing the family. I remember the 1990s as a period when I didn’t have a 
sense of belonging, I felt alienated and unable to establish any kind of contact. Many people 
around me found even my presence problematic. At the time I didn’t see myself as a victim. I 
thought it was my fault because I internalized the “guilt” that was externally projected upon 
me.” (Interviewee no. 28) 
Croatian case shows similar patterns. Unlike Serbia where the “ethnic other” could have 
been Muslim, Croatian or Albanian – in Croatia the main “constitutive outsider” was the 
“Serb”.98 In some cases, Serbian identity in Croatia, in a rather strange manner, appeared not 
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 Subotica is the city on the Serbo-Hungarian border, in the north of Vojvodina, a Serbian autonomous region. This 
entire region was always ethnically diverse.   
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 Potentially, this place could have also been occupied by the “Yugoslav”, but this signifier was in a direct 
connection to the Serbian “threat” – hence understood as euphemism for “grater Serbian project”. For a while, the 
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only as the antipode of xenophobic Croatian nationalism – but also of xenophobic nationalism 
in general (including Serbian as portrayed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia). This “identity” 
position is formed under specific circumstances and could have led to the formation of later 
(progressive) cognitive development only under these circumstances and in combination with 
other social factors. Among the most important ones was the fact that Serbian national identity 
in Croatia often included a strong reference to the anti-fascist heritage of Yugoslavia.99 An 
interviewee from Zagreb:       
“My mom was Serbian and my father was insisting on his Croatianism. That was the 
situation in which you could have become a nationalist or not, since my mom was strongly 
opposing nationalism (...) by saying that I'm a Serb I sought to build a position of resistance in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. This meant anti-nationalist resistance, anti-HDZ100, and anti-
establishment.” (Interviewee no 11) 
A similar phenomenon was detected in Sarajevo. The essence of Serbian nationalism in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was “outsourced” from the Bosnian capital to other parts of the 
country (that today fall under territorial unit/entity of Republika Srpska). When talking about 
Serbs who stayed in Sarajevo during the whole war period, one should mention that their 
position became very complex during and after it. The longest siege101 in modern history was 
held by the forces of Bosnian Serbs. Numerous Sarajevo Serbs fled the city. Some took arms and 
joined the army of Bosnian Serbs and some (though not so many) joined the official Army of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This army was assembled mostly of Bosnian Muslims (and a certain 
number of Serbs and Croats) and its chief commander was the first Bosnian president and the 
leader of Bosnian Muslims Alija Izetbegovid. Under such circumstances, the narrative of united 
and multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, for all its nations, promoted by president Izetbegovid, 
made Serbs who stayed in Sarajevo also the victims of (the army of) Bosnian Serbs who held the 
city under siege. The “ethnic otherness” in Sarajevo was thereby, at least in theory, resolved. 
Those who stayed in Sarajevo, regardless of their ethnicity, should have been the victims. 
Nonetheless, at the level of everyday social relations, things did not function as well. An activist 
from Sarajevo:  
“Before the war started, I considered Yugoslavia my country and we lived as Yugoslavs, 
even though the family was ethnically Serbian. I was therefore raised as a little Yugoslav. When 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bosnian Muslims were also targeted as enemies, but mainly outside Croatia (while Bosnian Croats were in conflict 
with Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia from Jun 1992 until February 1994).     
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 The fact that the Serbian National Council (SNV) in Croatia keeps insisting on anti-fascism as the most important 
value in post-socialism, confirms this statement. Probably the most progressive weekly magazine in the entire 
region, “Novosti” (issued by the Council), talk in favor of this judgment.     
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 HDZ is short from ‘Croatian Democratic Community”, the political party being the main carrier of Croatian 
political nationalism since the 1990s until nowadays.  
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 The siege lasted for 45 months or 1450 days, from the 6
th
 of April 1992 until the 19
th
 of March 1996.  
110 
 
the war began we found ourselves in Sarajevo which was bombed every single day. Two 
months after, my brother got killed by a grenade from Trebevid.102 All of a sudden, kids in 
school started calling me a Serb and Četnik.103 This was a very dramatic experience for me. I 
was constantly wondering, why was being a Serb more important that the fact that my brother 
got killed the day before and that my father was “on the first lines” [fighting for the army of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina]?” (Interviewee no. 17)   
This activist was, moreover, forced to identify himself as a Serb against his will and against 
the way he was raised. “I was never told to consider myself a Serb, I only knew about my 
country called Yugoslavia and us being Yugoslavs. I’ve never felt any connection to the identity 
they have imposed upon me”, he testifies. This forced identification had initially confused him 
with respect to his self-perception (during the war). After the war, it imposed an uncomfortable 
obligation of belonging to the group he never identified with. According to his own testimony, 
the experience of what ethnic division in Bosnia meant in practice, made him reject not only 
the imposed Serbian identity, but the whole logic of “counting and classifying” along ethnic 
lines. Under such circumstances, “ethnic otherness” could have indeed motivated nationalist 
reaction (meaning developing Serbian/Croatian/Bosniak nationalist sentiment, making one 
ethnic group subordinated to other(s)). However, in this case it was anti-nationalism (being 
against every nationalism) that prevailed. Why? In addition to the one detected in Croatia 
(which is anti-fascist affiliation), there are two more important intervening factors in Bosnia. 
First, the interviewee’s family decision to stay in Sarajevo during and after the war was 
important (instead of fleeing to Serbia or other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by 
the Serbian Army). Second, family’s atheist background played an important role. Even in the 
absence of explicit family narratives, new circumstances of war and post-war Bosnian society 
made atheism to be among decisive factors of counter-hegemonic cognitive development: 
“My family is not religious, even though Christmas, Easter and the Patron Saint Day 
(Serbian: “slava”) are respected as traditional heritage. The holy icon was also always present. 
Yet, as a kid I never went to church. No member of my family was baptized. The explicit socialist 
narrative was not present either. My family habitus was comfortable, without emphasized 
communist-socialist dimension, without clearer normative stances. The war brings novelty in 
the way we see ourselves. The whole set of social relations was changed” (ibid.).  
                                                          
102
 Trebevid is a mountain nearby Sarajevo and was a stronghold of the (Bosnian) Serb’s forces.    
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 The members of the army of Bosnian Serbs (and paramilitary groups) were colloquially called “Četniks” (In 
Serbian “Četnici“). Originialy, the Četniks were members of the Serbian monarhist, royal army who faught against 
the Yugoslav partisans by collaborating with the nazi-fascist occupators in the WWII (with the exception of the very 
beggining of the war). Thereby, the Serbs as an ethnic group shoul have been protected from discrimination 
because of what other Serbs were doing in their name.      
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The issue of religion in Bosnia during and after the war unquestionably occupied an 
important place as a determinant of social dynamics and positioning. Hence, it played a certain 
role in counter-hegemonic positioning of the activists as well. When I use the word “religion”, I 
mean a certain relationship one developed with it. The reason why this relationship appears as 
important for my research is the fact that Bosnia is by its constitution compound of three 
(constitutive) ethnic groups which, almost exclusively (in practice) correspond to the three 
different religious identities. Therefore, the importance of atheism was also confirmed by 
several other interviewees. Some emphasized the importance of their ancestors, who “broke 
off with religion”, whereas others found their atheist heritage to be among the key factors for 
rejecting religiously based ethnic divisions. “When they say, “us Muslims” or “us Bosniaks”, in 
spite of the fact I share the same trench with them, I do not unite with them along those lines”, 
said an interviewee (no. 18) from Sarajevo. 
Potential emancipatory role of ethnic/national/religious “otherness” was more likely to 
develop in less “contaminated” areas of former Yugoslavia. The city of Rijeka, for instance, as 
the biggest city in the Kvarner region of Croatia, never embraced nationalist narrative, which 
was the case in most Dalmatian and other Croatian cities. Activists coming from such places 
could have expressed their ethnic “otherness” more openly and thereby frame it as a sign of 
resistance, rather than counter-nationalism (this time Serbian). Interviewee from Zagreb, 
originally coming from Rijeka, testifies: 
“(…) my parents are communists, the working class. They have never been official 
members of the Communist party, but they were always a part of socialist and workers’ 
organizations. When the war began, the fact that they were both ethnic Serbs became 
important. At that time, I was already “the other”. They were very proud Serbs and they asked 
me to keep on saying to everyone that I’m a Serb. They told me, “Please, you have to”. That 
was maybe the moment of impudence (…)” (Interviewee no. 2)   
Among crucial factors for developing and/or tracing a solid path of counter-hegemonic 
perception of the post-socialist reality were progressive subcultural and/or social influences. As 
mentioned above, some activists happened to grow up in social environments that were never 
“infected” by strong ethno-nationalism. Still, some of them became parts of a specific 
subcultural milieu which significantly influenced development of critical “cognitive mapping”. 






5.3. Progressive social/subcultural habitus 
 
The concept of (social) habitus is, so far, most accurately developed by Pierre Bourdieu. 
In Bourdieu’s words, habitus represents “the durably installed generative principle of regulated 
improvisations, produced practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the 
objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the 
demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and 
motivating structures making up the habitus” (Bourdieu 1977, 78). In his understanding 
therefore, habitus has to do with the process of internalization of beliefs, perceptions and 
consequently, behaviors “that individuals carry with them and which, in part, are translated 
into the practices they transfer to and from the social spaces in which they interact” (Costa and 
Murphy 2015, 3). Often, the concept of habitus is used as a (central) reference to sociological 
studies that seek to cover deviances in social perceptions and behavior. Criminology, for 
instance, uses this concept in order to explain “individual motivations that underpinned the 
actions of the “juvenile delinquent” (France 2015, 74; in: Costa and Murphy 2015). What is 
deviant and what is not, however, is often perceived as a dichotomy between the “ruling 
commonsense” on one side, and the non-commonsense, on the other. As I already elaborated 
in the theoretical chapter, hegemonic discourses almost by definition see counter-hegemonic 
tendencies as deviant. If this is so, the endeavor of tracing the origins of such “deviances”, 
meaning the acquisition of counter-hegemonic “cognitive inputs” which happen to be on the 
“other side” of the dominant paradigm, could be conveniently assessed through the notion of 
(Bourdieu’s) habitus. 
Considering three case studies, what appears as relevant for the activists’ worldview 
formation, are two kinds of cultural/subcultural milieus: punk and wider social (urban) habitus. 
In addition, one should emphasize the influence of subversive periodic press, which happened 
to create less “observable” but very relevant and specific habitus for developing attitudes 
among its audience. In Croatia, for instance, during the war and after, two main critical and 
anti-nationalist publications were magazines “Feral Tribune” and “Arkzin”. More than a few 
interviewees stressed the importance of these two magazines for their pre-theoretical 
formative period. The very practice of reading these magazines was described by the activists 
as the moment of rebellion, in which one was consciously excluding itself from the community. 
Some of them came from families whose older members were friends with the “Feral” 
journalists, whereas others described these magazines as “witty and critical literature”. Their 
importance was even greater for the counter-hegemonic discourse because the city of Split, 
where “Tribune Feral” was published, was the location of one of the most disreputable 
concentration camps for Serbs during the war (“Lora”). This enabled some very conservative 
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towns in Dalmatia (the region to which Split belongs) to have an access to anti-Tuđman critical 
press.  
 
Sarajevo had its own specific “war-story” and its specific context. The most popular and 
most progressive weekly publication was called “Dani” (“Days”). However, none of the activists 
emphasized the role of this magazine for their early worldview formation. Instead, one of the 
interviewees stressed the role that the daily newspapers “Oslobođenje” (“Liberation”) had for 
her cognitive development. In her case, it was not about the content itself, but the inner 
organization of the collective that functioned (in Yugoslav times) as a typical self-managing 
company:     
 
“The atmosphere within the editorial staff of daily newspaper “Liberation”, where my 
mom was working, probably had an effect on me. In the 1980s, the employees were quite free 
and liberal. “Liberation” was the first newspaper in former Yugoslavia where journalists could 
vote and choose their editor-in-chief. As a kid I was spending a lot of time with the editorial 
staff of “Liberation”, absorbing the way those people were thinking and doing things.” 
(Interviewee no. 23) 
In Serbia, the headstone of the progressive social habitus was not developed around any 
newspaper or magazine. There were, especially in the late 1990s, some anti-war and anti-
Miloševid magazines (such as “Nedeljni Telegraf104), but these were not as influential and 
effective as Arkzin or Feral Tribune in Croatia.  Belgrade yet, had a culturally specific urban life 
inherited from the 1980s Yugoslav punk-rock and the “New Wave” scene. Even though the 
post-conflict developments left counter-hegemonic sections of social and cultural life in Serbia 
in traces, these traces could partially be found in public life of urban centers such as Belgrade, 
and partially in rare everyday social bonds which could have offered a different set of cultural 
and political value systems:        
“As teenagers we had a friend in our neighborhood that had a punk band. In his room 
you could find huge posters of the punk rock groups such as “Disciplina kičme”. Whenever we 
would bump into a group of older punk rockers, they would ask us what kind of music we listen 
to. Then someone among us would name a band and punkers would slap them and say: “You 
cannot listen to this music, they are Nazis”. These guys helped us learn about punk music. In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s I was into Clash and Joe Strummer, Stiff Little Fingers, etc. This music 
unequivocally inclined to the left, but I became aware of this during my later years” 
(Interviewee no. 35).    
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 Editor-in-chief of this magazine, Slavko Duruvija, was assassinated in front of his house in April 1999 (so, before 
the fall of Miloševid which took place in October 2000).   
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Period between 2000 and the beginning of the global economic crisis (2007/2008) was the 
least inspiring for subcultural and other counter-hegemonic content in Serbia. The public 
discourse was divided between nationalists and “civic” reformers. The latter group was led by 
then Prime Minister Zoran Đinđid, who was the leader of one of the biggest oppositional party 
in the 1990s (Democratic Party) and was commonly called the “first democratically elected 
prime minister”. The Serbian “post-socialism” discursively started only with Đinđid, since 
Miloševid was percieved by the civic and the nationalist opposition to be the sucsessor of 
socialism. Furthermore, Miloševid did his best to show himself as a socialist, in spite of his 
obvious and well-known nationalism. The first two years of Đinđid’s mandate were spent on 
total dominance of the two sides of the post-socialist medal: the nationalist and the “civic” 
reformist side – meaning the two sides of the “transitional medal” (as explained in the 
subchapter on post-socialist condition in the chapter one)105. No space for any kind of 
alternative was in sight. After March 11, 2003, when Zoran Đinđid was tragically assassinated,106 
the country fell in a state of emergency (and chaos). Public debates were continually and 
exclusively led between two sides of the (same) post-socialist coin: one being more 
conservative and nationalist and the other more civic and liberal.107  
For those who spent their teenage years in Serbia at the beginning of 2000s, most 
alternative subcultural and social practices were out of sight. Belgrade was the biggest city (not 
only in Serbia but also in former Yugoslavia) and it was the place where the counter-hegemonic 
subcultural and social space was still “reproducible”, despite unfavorable social and economic 
conditions. This is to say that other towns, among which some had remarkable anti-fascist 
tradition and subcultural scene, struggled to find space for alternative cultural content and 
alternative visions of reality. By the late 1990s the alternative scene was already destroyed. 
Some “isolated islands” remained within urban centers, but even those islands of, specifically 
punk subculture, were at risk to shift “rightwards”. Activists who spent their formative years 
during the late 1990s still had the chance to catch the wave of then existing punk scene which 
was still fraught with anarchist ideas. For some activists, this represented the cornerstone for 
future interest in anarchist and other critical literature. One of the most prolific punk scenes in 
Serbia of the 1990s was in the city of Šabac:  
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 See the graph 5.1. bellow.   
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 The assassination was planned and organized by mafia and former members of the state founded secret service 
military unit called “Unit for special operations” (JSO). The executor, Zvezdan Jovanovid (JSO), was sentenced to 
maximum 40 years in prison. The same sentence was imposed on the former JSO commander chief Milorad 
Ulemek. The leaders of the mafia group that were also involved in this assassination were killed by the police while 
resisting arrest.      
107
 The final binding of these two sides of the post-socialist medal happened in 2012, when former extreme 
nationalists ruled over the moderate ideological center. The former nationalists came closer to the ideological 
center and established the rule which is still active today. They are embodied in one person – President Aleksandar 
Vučid. Under his rule, the notion of “modern European Serbia” on one hand and the “great Serbian nation” on the 
other were able to converge and stop being perceived as mutually exclusive notions.   
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“I got interested in politics through the punk scene of the 1990s. I was finishing my 
elementary school.  For me, this was all about anarchism and fanzine brochures. It was this 
newly emerging alternative left scene because Miloševid and JUL108 were back then perceived 
as left. In the brochures one could find classics of anarchism, from Kropotkin and Bakunin to 
Guerin and his history of anarchism. When I started high school, Šabac was already engulfed in 
punk –one of the most famous punk bands from Šabac is “Goblini”109, but at that point, there 
were some 25, 30 bands in town. Nonetheless, this scene soon collapsed and evaporated.” 
(Interviewee no. 30) 
Interestingly enough, during the late 1990s activists from Zagreb experienced both Serbian 
and Croatian punk scene. In some cases, these two punk scenes overlapped with strong effects 
of progressive narratives from home. In others, they retroactively interpreted (social) class 
position or feeling of subordination and/or “otherness”. Internationalization of worldview 
typical for the punk scene (of Yugoslavia and post-Yugoslav states), could have counter-
balanced the post-war situation in which all the sides in conflicts claimed to be (at least) 
partially victorious and, by the same token, victims of crimes committed by other side(s).  
Moreover, punk was building cross-national ties by removing barriers which were built in order 
to prevent inter-ethnic and international collaboration. On the other hand, it was precisely this 
sort of collaboration that appeared as necessary precondition for any sort of progressive and 
anti-hegemonic venture, be it discursive or practical (activist). Under such circumstances, 
counter-hegemonic tendencies indeed had to occur cross-nationally. Otherwise, they would not 
have high chances to develop at all. An activist from Zagreb:  
“I grew up surrounded by explicitly anti-nationalistic, anti-fascist, socialist narratives. 
This is what made militant radical ideas of the hardcore punk scene much easier for me to 
swallow. As we were growing up in the 1990s, worldview of the scene was in direct 
confrontation with the dominant worldview in Croatia. We were part of this scene and as such, 
we engaged in squatting activities, we were voluntarily helping homeless people, etc. That was 
the underground hardcore scene in Croatia that also had its equivalent in Serbia – in music 
bands such as “Hodu? – nedu!”, “Totalni promašaj”, “Debeli samuraj”, “Unutrašnji bunt”, 
“Diktator” etc. We were in contact with the Serbian scene during the 1990s, at a time when 
anti-war campaign was led. Throughout the early 2000s, these were the channels used to 
establish new [international] networks after the war.” (Interviewee no. 7)   
Punk mediated between factors such as social class and/or feeling of otherness on one 
hand, and the exposure to alternative counter-hegemonic media contents (such as “Arkzin” or 
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 JUL is short from Jugoslovenska levica (eng: The Yugoslav Left).  
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 “Goblini” is still among the most popular alternative bands in Serbia and the region of former Yugoslavia. For 




“Feral”) on the other. Punk could have linked the position of structurally imposed subordination 
and/or the feeling of “otherness”, with the point of politicization and resistance. In many cases, 
alternative media and punk went hand in hand and jointly influenced cognitive formation of 
future activists. Another activist from Zagreb: 
“For me, the whole journey started with music, with local punk culture. There were 
some music bands you wouldn’t expect to have punk worldviews. Band “Zabranjeno pušenje”, 
for instance, had a different connotation in Croatia than in Serbia.110 Through “KUD Idijoti” and 
other bands, one would find their way to “Arkzin” and other magazines.” (Interviewee no. 5)      
Punk subculture also played an important role in the early cognitive formation of activists in 
Sarajevo. Bosnian capital was the headquarters of the Yugoslav punk-rock scene in the 1980s. It 
represented the place of authentic innovation in the field of cultural production. Its most 
famous cultural “wave” became famous under name “New Primitivism”, which appeared as “a 
sort of socio-cultural avant-garde” in the mid-1980s (Mišina 2013, 164).111 Interestingly enough, 
one of the main features of this, at first subcultural and later popular cultural movement, was 
“profound anti-intellectualism and distrust of people who relish empty rhetoric (…)” (ibid., 
166).112 The punk-rock scene in Sarajevo was very rich and influential locally, but also with 
respect to the wider Yugoslav cultural trend called the “New Wave”. This cultural movement 
preceded “New Primitivism” and appeared as an entry point into the world of punk, especially 
for activists who were teenagers during the late 1980s. An interviewee from Sarajevo: 
 “I think it was important that I grew up on the “punk” scene. I got into this milieu 
through EKV and Azra113. The scene gave me a sort of framework in life, one which always 
pushes you to rebel. This is why I’m, in general terms, closer to practical anarchism than theory 
of socialism.” (Interviewee no. 15)  
Sarajevo of the 1980s was a cultural laboratory of a sort. For centuries, this city frequently 
found itself at the crossroad of “civilizations”. During the last decade of socialism, it became an 
intersection of Yugoslav cultural and subcultural life. This was of tremendous importance for 
Sarajevo’s social habitus, which was previously left out from the epicenter of Yugoslav cultural 
                                                          
110
 Among the most prominent members of “Zabranjeno pušenje“ were Sarajevo born movie director Emir 
Kusturica and the front man “dr. Nele Karajlid“, both of which became Serbian nationalists after the war (arguebly, 
even during the war).  
111
 “New Primitivism did not limit itself to the role of reshaping the rock culture in former Yugoslavia. The 
movement also took hold in the realms of poetry, painting, theater, and film (…) its influence is clearly recognizable 
in the early works of Emir Kusturica”. Levi  2007, 63; See more about Sarajevo “New primitivism” also on pp, 62-67 
112
 Anti-intellectualism has remained an acute characteristic of Bosnian society until today and may possibly help 
us explaining, in cultural terms, some tendencies within the 2014 social movement and its collective identity. More 
will be said in the next chapter on “Theoretical Dimension of New Critical Thought.”       
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 “EKV” from Belgrade and “Azra” from Zagreb were among the most prominent music bends in the 1980s. Both 
were perceived as leading representatives of the “New Wave”.  
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life led in Belgrade and Zagreb (and Ljubljana, to some extent). The social image and climate of 
the city based on “New Primitivism” from the 1980s, significantly changed during and after the 
war. Its traces, however, kept living through the unfortunate generation of youngsters whose 
significant formative (teenage) years of life were marked by the decade that preceded the 
warfare. Another interviewee from Sarajevo: 
“Punk taught me to question everything and observe things critically. I’m always looking 
for another angle of perception. As teenagers, we would spend hours talking about various 
topics, discussing endlessly and criticizing each other’s standpoints. My early phase of thinking 
about the world is unquestionably related to what was going on in the 1980s, on Sarajevo’s 
music scene. I was in the epicenter of the punk-rock scene.” (Interviewee no. 23) 
The influence of the 1980s to the generation that grew up in culturally avant-garde 
environment turned out to be especially important in the period after the war. This might partly 
explain the fact that most activists born and raised in Sarajevo come from a bit older 
generation. Those who knew Sarajevo of the 1980s and experienced war in their late teenage 
years were “better off” than the generation growing up in the post-war Sarajevo, at least in 
terms of likeliness of forming counter-hegemonic mindset. Some of the activists I interviewed 
were wounded in war. Others lost siblings or directly fought in war. Still, all these factors turned 
out to be “weaker” in terms of influence upon individual cognitive formation than subcultural 
influence of the period when Sarajevo was the cultural capital of former Yugoslavia in the 
1980s. 
Insights form the punk subcultural scene, nonetheless, were not so coherently articulated. 
This subcultural milieu was indeed colored by certain values and readings but abounded in 
pamphlet-type literature, rather than substantial anarchist and left-wing literature. Anarchist, 
socialist and left-wing ideas were circulating through fanzines and other “easier” readings. The 
punk scene was not theoretically deep, but even pamphlets in which one could bump into 
authors such as Kropotkin, Bakunin or John Zerzan, could have signified a transition from the 
already acquired value systems in the non-theoretical phase, towards their systematization, 
politicization and (systematic) theorization in later phases of cognitive development. An 
interviewee from Zagreb:    
“I was listening to hardcore music which is, by definition, oriented left. I was reading 
fanzines (...) music scene had its common sense, but this common sense could not lead you 
towards more specific [theoretical] directions – you would hear about Kropotkin and you would 
read fanzines – this was all constitutive of the alternative scene’s habitus.” (Interviewee no. 12) 
In Serbia, punk subculture was in a significant decline in the period following the fall of 
Miloševid in 2000. In most parts of the country, as already indicated, early 2000s were marked 
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by the evaporation of progressive punk from the 1990s. For a moment, it seemed that society 
did not need rebellion anymore. Miloševid was gone, wars were over and the new “pro-
European” political elite took over. Nonetheless, the situation started changing in the twilight 
of global economic crisis, along with rise of various movements, both globally and in the region 
(primarily in Croatia). The influence of punk was reemerging as the narrative about the 
“European” Serbia started losing ground due to rapid precarization of work, deindustrialization 
and indeed, impoverishment. By the same token, the other, conservative (nationalist) side of 
the transitional medal slightly weakened. The influence of the newly emerging punk subculture 
reached the city of Užice (called Tito’s Užice, under socialism), a town in south-western part of 
Serbia. The “new breath” was enriched by an additional ideational ingredient, apart from 
anarchism or more traditional socialism. An interviewee from “Don’t let Belgrade D(r)own”:        
“From 2007 to 2009 we would gather in “Krš” (eng: “Mess”). It was a punk “dump” 
where we had feminist tea parties. We would usually talk among ourselves or with guests. I 
remember an instance where we had punkers from Sweden and Russia. It was the first time I 
got exposed to the radically left pamphlets and fanzines, which provided us with digested 
overview of left- wing ideas.” (Interviewee no. 34)       
Furthermore, cultural influence of punk in Croatia was sometimes combined with or 
supplemented by the effects of living in towns which also represented “isolated islands” of 
progressive social dynamics (for given circumstances). Cities such as Rijeka or entire regions 
such as Istria never strayed “right” (or at least “as right”) in their dominant social (and partially 
political) discourse. Some activists coming from Rijeka which is still a bastion of critical and anti-
nationalist (above all) cultural production got in touch with counter-hegemonic incentives 
through theater.  
“In high school I was dealing with Brecht and other alternative stuff. By that time, I 
already became a punker. I was listening socially conscious bands such as “Cacadou Look”. We 
also had an alternative theater that focused mostly on Sartre. We were performing behind 
closed doors. I guess I was lucky to be a part of that group. I think it was about being in Rijeka, 
where we already had some literature, magazines and the subversive cultural scene. For a 
young member of the alternative scene, exposure to such cultural contents was quite 
important.” (Interviewee no. 2) 
Apart from limited reach of progressive magazines with quite restricted audience on one 
hand and progressive subcultural habitus on the other, whole cities could have taken over the 
role of progressive habitus, as well. The influence of Croatian city of Rijeka, reached the 
activists’ scene in Sarajevo.   
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“I went to high school in Rijeka, which is a particular place to live. I was surrounded by 
people who inherited partisan tradition and always voted for SDP.114 My (wider) family was no 
exception. During that period, I was constantly listening to stories against nationalism and 
clericalism.” (Interviewee no. 16)    
In this case, the chain is created between belonging to the working class, progressive family 
narratives and progressive social habitus. Interestingly enough, this activist later studied at the 
Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb, which turned out to be very important for diffusion of the 
method of direct democracy from Zagreb to Sarajevo.  
On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina has its own “counterpart of Rijeka”. The 
industrial city of Tuzla also inherited the anti-fascist and anti-nationalist tradition that persisted 
in this great industrial center of former Yugoslavia for more than twenty years after the war.115 
It is not by chance that the 2014 uprising in Bosnia started in Tuzla, as a rebellion of the working 
class which was declassed and, in a meanwhile, became underclass. Once upon a time 
populated by the working class, pegging away in industrial giants “Dita” or “Polihem”, the city 
of Tuzla became a place where social unrest was most likely to occur due to privatizations and 
transitional robbery. Anti-nationalism and anti-fascism played a decisive role in shaping anti-
hegemonic minds of the youth who grew up under poor economic, but much “richer” social 
conditions (in comparison to the rest of Bosnia). An activist from Sarajevo:    
“I became aware of what Tuzla meant to me, in formative sense, only after I moved to 
Sarajevo. I was never conscious of my friends being Serbs, Croats or Bosnian Muslims. I hadn’t 
been aware of the significance of these ethnic signifiers before I moved to Sarajevo. In high 
school, I was lucky enough to be a part of a wonderful collective, socially sane and ethnically 
mixed.” (Interviewee no. 20)  
Unlike Rijeka, Tuzla suffered quite a lot during the war period. A striking fact about Tuzla is 
that it hosted refugees who were running away from the bloodiest war crimes, including the 
genocide in Srebrenica. Refugees who carried brutal and terrifying stories with them found 
shelter in houses of Serbs and Croats who fled Tuzla during the war. Despite such newly 
established social context, Tuzla resisted ethno-nationalism to a much greater extent than the 
rest of the country.  
“I moved to Sarajevo after high school, in 2002. I was really bothered by people 
perceiving me as a Muslim, because of my name. I never felt I belonged to this group and then I 
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 SDP is short from “Social Democratic Party” which grew out of the Croatian branch of the Yugoslav Communist 
Party. To a significant extent, the party abandoned the left-wing tradition, similarly like it happened throughout 
Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall.    
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 Nationalist parties never managed to come to power in the city of Tuzla since the war onward.  
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started revising my own identity. I was thinking about pros and cons – could I identify myself as 
a Muslim or not. The more people pushed me into that box, the stronger I resisted. I didn’t 
want others to tell me who I am. That is why Tuzla is so important – there was no way I could’ve 
been a Muslim in the context where I grew up. By identifying myself in such way, I would’ve 
detached myself from my social basis, from my friends. Our grandmas’ were praying and going 
to mosques and churches, but us… We were an independent entity.” (ibid.)      
I observed an additionally interesting twist related to the social habitus of Tuzla, especially 
in comparison to Sarajevo. Younger generation of activists found their version of “punk” in the 
post-war Tuzla, even though punk was already “dead”. The subversion under given social 
circumstances (described above) was found in the “forbidden fruit” – turbo-folk music that 
symbolized Serbian nationalism. Subversion was found in a daring move. They enjoyed music 
performed by one of the most prominent Serbian nationalist singers, wife of a (war) criminal, in 
spite (or precisely because) of her symbolic role during and after the war:  
“In the early 2000s when I was in high school, listening to Ceca116 was unacceptable – it 
was common sense. She was Arkan’s wife117 who was singing for the Serbian army during the 
war and had war-provoking statements. Still, we were youth that considered themselves 
progressive and we could listen to Ceca’s music while considering it as a sort of rebellion” (ibid.) 
This rebellion represented, more than anything else, a refusal to comply with emerging 
social climate resting upon taboos, (ethno-national and religious) divisions and “tribalization” of 
society. This refusal did not have a purpose of breaking any specific taboos such as Ceca and 
her music. The refusal was much more categorical and fundamental. Its significance became 
clearer only ten or fifteen years later, when boldness to listen (and enjoy) Ceca’s music was 
replaced by participation in the anti-hegemonic social movement, aiming to overthrow political 
elites who (perhaps) did not listen Serbian turbo-folk, but did bring the country to the edge of 
destruction. 
Serbia did not have bastions similar to Rijeka or Tuzla. There were no bigger anti-hegemonic 
and unconquered fortresses of alternative social (and political) reality in the post-socialist 
period. Instead, activists from Belgrade were usually coming from various “isolated islands” of 
progressive thought and subcultures (including punk, but not only). Spaces which could have 
offered a sort of basis for such social developments were not numerous. One gymnasium in 
                                                          
116
 “Ceca” is a nickname of a singer whose real name is Svetlana Ražnatovid. 
117
 “Arkan” was Željko Ražnatovid’s nickname. He was one of the most notorious (war) criminals from Belgrade’s 
criminal milieu. He was the chief commander of a paramilitary unit called “The Tigers”. After his death in 2000 (he 
was killed by a rival criminal gang in Belgrade), the public learned that he was accused of war crimes before the 
International Criminal Court in the Haag. Many consider the massacre in the Bosnian city of Bijeljina, where 
Arkan’s unit entered in March 1992, to be the unofficial beginning of war in Bosnia. 
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Belgrade, for instance, played this role of “free space” for unconstrained debate and 
development of alternative visions of social reality in the late 1990s:  
“The Ninth Gymnasium looked like a home for all the “exiles”. All the “geeks” found 
their place there. The community of people was created. These four years were a sort of a 
renaissance for me. R. was my classmate (…) we fostered the culture of discussion, of thought 
and exchange of opinions. I have the impression that both of us were shaped by being together 
in this environment. We had a professor of sociology, Milica Vukovid, with whom R. and I had 
numerous discussions. During her lectures, we would engage in discussions with each other. 
She was the first professor who I perceived as an authority figure, whom I respected. She 
encouraged us to talk and express our opinion out loud.” (Interviewee no. 28) 
As discussed above, family is another type of progressive environment for acquisition of 
parallel value systems. Being anti-nationalist and cosmopolitan in the 1990s was often a 
consequence of specific features of one’s primary social habitus, even if direct and explicit 
interpretation (narration) behind it was absent. In this specific case, I am referring to peculiar 
family lifestyles that could replace explicit manifestation of progressive narratives. Peculiarity 
could lay in the absence of traditional family gatherings at dinners and lunches and having a 
more relaxed but joyful moments of living a “rock ‘n’ roll” life alongside one’s “hippie parents” 
(Interviewee no. 37). Alternatively, the story could develop as in the testimony of another 
interviewee from Belgrade: 
“My mother was going through divorce, and she wanted to die. We recorded a mixtape 
with music for her funeral. It had The Beatles, Janis Joplin, the Stones… In the end, she survived 
and we still have that mixtape. This was our starting point. During the war, my mom’s sister was 
living in the city of Prijedor [Bosnia and Herzegovina] and she asked us if she could send her 18-
year-old son to Belgrade because he was about to be mobilized in the army. We managed to 
bring him to Belgrade, and he started living with us. At some point my mom couldn’t take care 
of all of us because she had to work. She found an ad by a 21-year-old girl from Sarajevo who 
could take care of us. Her name was Tanja and she ended up in Belgrade because she took a 
wrong train. Instead of Moscow, she found herself in Belgrade. They were all running (from war 
in Bosnia) and her parents took the train to Moscow, her sister to Frankfurt. For a long time, 
they didn’t know where the rest of the family was. This is how Tanja came to live with us. After 
some time, Tanja wanted to find her boyfriend who stayed in Sarajevo. We all started looking 
for him, found him through some connections we had and brought him to Belgrade. He moved 
in with us as well. My mom was still making the mixtape. During my elementary school, I lived 
in a small commune where all of us learned how to sing and play instruments. We also painted 
a lot in order escape reality that surrounded us.” (Interviewee no. 29) 
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The importance of subcultural or wider social habitus for the cognitive formation of 
individuals is also evident from stories of activists who grew up abroad. The subchapter on 
social class showed how feeling of subordination and borderline racial discrimination in a small 
Bavarian town prompted activist no. 12 from Zagreb, to take a certain direction in thought. 
Instead of discrimination, an activist from the Bosnian popular movement went through rather 
different experience - in Libya.     
“My first encounter with the notion of revolution happened when I started elementary 
school. As a child, I didn’t really know what it meant, but I knew we were supposed to be a part 
of something much bigger, which again came out from the struggle of Libyan society. We were 
opposing something. I remember this documentary about Omar Mukhtar, a revolutionary who 
fought against Italian occupation. Throughout my childhood, I was constantly exposed to 
narratives of Libyan liberation and the necessity of struggle for your own freedom.” 
(Interviewee no. 24) 
This sort of experience, memories of “singing anti-imperialist songs as pupils” and watching 
the only TV channel broadcasting anti-American TV shows, did not play a role in individual 
cognitive formation per se. Moreover, its specific direction was set only when this early 
experience and exposure to certain characteristics of Libyan social habitus got mixed with the 
Bosnian context. There is a clear parallel between this case and the case of the activist number 
20, whose awareness about the progressiveness of social habitus in Tuzla emerged only after 
moving to (less or non-progressive, postwar) Sarajevo. In this case, Libyan experience starts 
interacting with the one of the postwar Bosnia, since the entire family came back to Bosnia 
after the war. Despite coming from a religious, Muslim family, my interviewee fell into the zone 
of discomfort when she came back:            
“They wanted to put me in a box of Bosniak ethnic group, because of my name or 
religion. I felt a sort of organic disgust and hostility towards it. That construction was 
unacceptable for me. Reasons for “breakup” with “my” group were probably subconscious and 
had to do with my early socialization outside this country. After coming back, I expected 
something better – even though at the beginning, as a teenager, I would have gotten myself in 
such traps, from time to time.” (ibid.)     
An interesting ingredient in this case was the inflow of refugees from Bosnia to Libya during 
the second half of the armed conflict in Bosnia. Libyan social habitus remained intact, but at the 
micro level (of family and neighborhood), things gradually changed with the inflow of refugees. 
A small Yugoslav community in Libya dissolved along with ethnic conflict in Bosnia and 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. Even while living there, the interviewee was at one point faced with 
“us” and “them” construct. However, when she came back to Bosnia, her initially acquired 
worldview overruled the picture of a broken “Yugoslav dream”. It was, in other words, the 
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macro level of her social habitus (Libya), rather than micro or meso (broken Yugoslav 
community within Libyan) that her cognitive mapping was eventually built upon. Through 
documentary and socially engaged fiction movies at Sarajevo Film Festival, feminist workshops 
and later, her studies, she capitalized on anti-imperialism, internationalism and, finally, 
socialism from her experience in Libya in the early period of life. Thereby, social habitus won 
over the picture of broken Yugoslav community in Libya and the specific ethno-centric social 
habitus of her later life in Sarajevo. However, there was an additional element in this equation, 
a rather peculiar one. Reference to this specific case is the beginning of the following 
subchapter in which I discuss “peculiar” tendencies within (non-theoretical) counter-hegemonic 
cognitive development.  
 
 
5.4. The Role of Religion and Other “Peculiarities” 
 
In the subchapter on “identity”, it was shown that atheism was important for 
developing counter-hegemonic cognitive maps. This is not to say that, essentially, religiousness 
cannot go hand in hand with emancipation. As a matter of fact, many progressive, left leaning 
thinkers argued in favor of the essential closeness between, for instance, branches of 
Christianity and socialism. Authors such as Badiou (2003) often spoke about ideas of St. Paul in 
the context of socialism, whereas the whole branch of “theology of liberation” established a 
more general link between Christianity and emancipation. In the context of Yugoslav post-
socialism, however, the ever-strong tie between religion and exclusivist, regressive and violent 
ethno-nationalism, was established from the very beginning of “transition”. Therefore, there is 
nothing more intuitive than to say that religion should have been excluded from any attempt of 
counter-hegemonic cognitive “positioning”. Still, my data shows that linkage between religion 
and emancipation is a matter of function that religion has, rather than essential overlapping 
between the two, religion and emancipation. I found out that non-politicized religious 
sentiment118, accompanied with other factors listed above, could have opposite function from 
the one prescribed to it by the dominant paradigm (based on divisions and hatred). Instead, it 
could serve as a model for moral basis, upon which a certain mixture of other factors would 
build up a counter-hegemonic direction of reasoning. I proceed here with the last quoted 
interviewee from Sarajevo:   
                                                          
118
 When I say “non-politicized” I refer to the misuse of religious sentiment for the sake of everyday politics and 
feeding up ethnic and national divisions.    
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 “In Libya we lived in a district for foreigners, in a residential area. The guard of this 
neighborhood once complimented my father’s old jacket. On the following day, my father 
bought the same one, but new and gave the old one to the guard as a present. That same day 
his new jacket was stolen. I remember him telling us this story at lunch, regretting for not giving 
a new one to the guard. He is religious and he thought this was a warning from God.” 
(Interviewee no. 24)    
The non-politicized religious sentiment has to do with the rejection of using it to deepen 
social and political divisions that were built into the systemic framework imposed on Bosnian 
people by the annex four of Dayton peace agreement (Bosnian constitution). Bosnian ethnic 
and religious diversity is misused in order to divide the entire society along ethnic and religious 
lines. Misusing religious sentiment thus, served for strengthening a sense of ethnic belonging 
(and hatred) and, consequently, legitimizing the status quo. Those who managed to keep their 
religious sentiment, without allowing it to be misused for political purposes, actually 
strengthened the possibility of counter-hegemonic reasoning. It is indicative that the 
interviewee no. 24 grew up in Libya. So, if one wonders about factors which could have 
“protected” religious sentiment from political manipulation and misuse, a possible answer 
could be physical absence from the epicenter (Bosnia) in the period when this endeavor was 
reaching its peak. At the same time, not allowing one’s own religious beliefs to get 
instrumentalized for the sake of empowering ethno-nationalist discourse, could have also 
meant using it as a sort of moral basis for progressive upgrades. Another interviewee from 
Sarajevo:            
“I attended medresa, a religious high school and I assume this is what makes me unique. 
We had a student magazine and in the second grade, I had to write an article about March 8. 
This was my first politically engaged article about women and their position within society. The 
upgrade came later, at the university – not through curriculum, but through friends and a 
couple of professors.” (Interviewee no. 19)    
Religion in Bosnia, same as ethnicity, cannot be bypassed if one analyzes political and social 
processes in this country. In the context of acquisition of non-theoretical, early life counter-
hegemonic knowledge, religion may be therefore represented either negatively (by not being 
present) or as exempted from the burden of ethno-nationalism (meaning as being autonomous 
with respect to political instrumentalization). In both cases, religion (its absence or presence) 
appears as an influential factor for later progressive upgrades. Regardless of whether we are 
talking about religious sentiment exempted from ethno-nationalism, or non-religious (atheist or 
agnostic) family backgrounds, both scenarios strongly affected cognitive development of the 
activists in Bosnia.  
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Croatia followed a similar pattern. The persistency of tight linkage between Croatian 
nationalism and Christianity (Roman Catholicism) made a linkage between religion and any 
progressive endeavor almost impossible. As stated by an interviewee from Zagreb, “one goes 
through religious experience in the public space and media exclusively through nationalism”. 
Nonetheless, social sensitivity might initially come from Christianity, and thereby come closer to 
the domain of “theology of liberation”. An activist from Zagreb: 
“I come from a conservative family. When I first joined the student movement my 
worldviews were still pretty conservative. As a child I attended religious ceremonies and went 
to church. My old man was a nationalist and this stuff also composed my early life “cognitive 
map”. What was going on at the Faculty of Philosophy, I thought, had some things in common 
with Christian postulates of social justice. The demand formulated as “free education for all” 
didn’t sound as something foreign to me. This logic, according to which everyone should take 
care and be “responsible” for themselves, was never close to my reasoning. I always thought 
that people should be given the right and equal access to education and healthcare.” 
(Interviewee no. 9)   
In combination with other factors (for example, being directly exposed to side-effects of 
transition while growing up in an industrial city and witnessing destruction of production in the 
post-socialist era), some activists managed to choose unconsciously (or semi-consciously) a 
progressive social habitus for their higher education and study at the Faculty of Philosophy, for 
instance. Social sensibility typical for Christianity could have been re-contextualized and seen 
from a different angle – this time without nationalist ingredients. That is why some of them 
ended up involved in the student movement. Social habitus of the Faculty managed to pick up 
on certain elements of Christianity, rearticulate meanings that are prescribed to direct 
experiences (such as facing parents’ unemployment and downfall of entire sectors of 
production and industry across Croatia), as well as add new insights and open new areas of 
interest. Second phase of cognitive development in such cases neutralized the nationalist 
framework of religious (prior) socialization. Another interviewee from Zagreb:   
“I come from a distinctively right-wing family. I didn’t become a left-winger under its 
influence. Moreover, I inhabited some right-wing attitudes from my old man. However, the 
family was never right-wing in economic, but in a political sense of nationalist rhetoric. “Most 
right” elements of my early worldview were not articulated in a serious manner or through 
serious literature. All the things I inherited were a result of passive internalization of different 
sets of meanings and signifiers in my childhood.” (Interviewee no. 8)   
Here one can clearly observe something that was already mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter and had to do with “activist biographies”. In general, I am dealing with the 
cognitive sources of developing critical mindsets before activism – rather than cognitive 
126 
 
consequences of activism. In this particular case, one could observe how activism transforms or 
reconciles conservative values (such as religious sentiment) to progressive value systems – 
through activism. This is important to be stressed because of the third case study which 
appears the most peculiar out of the three cases in question.  
In Serbia, this pattern of conversion of conservative values inherited from home has to be 
more carefully explained due to the phenomenon I visited above – “Serbian (ideological) 
paradox”. Let me briefly elaborate. In the early 1990s the president of Republic of Serbia (and 
from 1997, of SR Yugoslavia) and the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia Slobodan Miloševid, was, by 
the same token seen as a “guardian” and a destructor of the socialist Yugoslavia. As mentioned 
above, he was a (self) declared socialist who insisted that his politics seek to defend socialism 
from nationalist tendencies coming from other republics (especially Croatia). Similar perception 
of Miloševid was shared among the Serbian nationalist opposition. The leaders were either self-
declared Četniks (the term is explained above), or right-wing liberals, or conservatives. Very few 
of them were siding with left (social) liberalism. The irony was that Miloševid’s “Yugoslavism” 
was just a disguise for his (ethnic) nationalism, whereas the opposition’s anti-Miloševidism was 
both anti-Yugoslav (hence anti-communist) and (ethno) nationalist. Miloševid was seen by the 
West (or what is later to be often called the “international community”), as the “factor of 
stability” in the region. A perfect illustration of this confusing situation comes from the British 
“The Guardian”, which published an article with a headline: “Nationalists challenge Miloševid”. 
Even more surprising, from today’s standpoint, is the fact that the article in which “The 
Guardian” wrote about Miloševid’s relation to his “extreme nationalist opposition”, was 
published on October 7, 1993, in the midst of wars in Croatia and Bosnia (Billig 1995, 48).119 
This schizophrenic situation constructed what I label as “Serbian ideological paradox”. On one 
side there were Miloševid and “his” nationalists, and on the other were anti-Miloševid 
nationalists. The remaining (and very narrow) political space was reserved for the right wing 
liberals (liberals in economic and right wingers in political sense), (very few) social liberals, and 
(classical) conservatives. Anti-war and anti-nationalist campaigns were almost exclusively 
reserved for the social sphere and the anti-war movement.  
This context appeared as peculiar not only conceptually, but also when compared with both 
Bosnian and Croatian contexts. In Croatia and Bosnia the main protagonists of war were openly 
                                                          
119
 Michel Billig uses this example in order to back the main thesis exposed in his “Banal Nationalism”, that state 
nationalism expressed through various practices of reproduction of national state is usually neglected as opposed 
to nationalism which comes from other actors (other than the state) and mostly in more explicit and violent forms. 
Even violent state nationalism, such as Miloševid’s, was not properly perceived for almost a decade (before the war 
in Kosovo started in the late 1990s).  
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anti-communist clericals, especially Slobodan Miloševid’s biggest enemies – Franjo Tuđman120 
and Alija Izetbegovid121. Miloševid’s nationalism was, apart from being disguised by the 
narrative about Yugoslavianism – quite secular. He never played the card of (Orthodox) religion. 
On the other hand, it was the nationalist opposition that attempted to “clericalize” the 
discourse. This sort of confusion certainly made worldview choices of younger generations 
more difficult to build, since the lines of social and political divisions were not clear. An 
interviewee from Belgrade: 
“My mom was a pro-Četnik right winger, but at the same time she was against war. At 
the same time she participated in the trade union’s struggle for public sector. This was all 
completely confusing. My father was a local councilor of DEPOS122 who served two terms. This 
is where I first saw how village community gathers in order to solve a common issue. My 
parents supported Vuk Draškovid.123 During the late 1980s I was exposed to nationalist 
narratives that questioned socialism.  Yugoslavia was perceived as “the biggest mistake Serbian 
people made”. Before the war started, my parents were against it. However, I was raised in the 
spirit of the old Yugoslavia. It was a strange, right-wing but anti-war narrative, mixed with 
clerical literature that found its place in our house, even though my parents were atheists. I 
think this kind of literature was there only because the Yugoslav socialism was being 
questioned. Demonization of Marxism and socialism prompted me to be even more radical. 
This is why I started critically looking at Miloševid’s “leftism” and oppositional right-wing 
narratives (present at home) – from the anarchist perspective.” (Interviewee no. 30)  
Being against Miloševid as a teenager or being a child from a family that supported 
opposition during the 1990s did not guarantee much, when it comes to capability to take a 
counter-hegemonic stance. What did it mean to be a Yugoslav, a communist, a Serbian 
nationalist, a “Serbo-Communist”, a right winger or a left-wing liberal and what was the role of 
religion in the construction of all these categories, was much more blurry in Serbia than in 
Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina. To commit to a counter-hegemonic cognitive “direction” in 
Croatia and Bosnia, one had to have atheist or non-politicized religious background. In Croatia, 
if you were against the ruling HDZ, you probably held a more progressive position than the one 
represented by HDZ and the unity of “God”, “motherland” and “nation”. In Bosnia, if you were 
                                                          
120
 Even though Franjo Tuđman was a member of the Communist Party, he was convicted as a Croatian 
(nationalist) dissident twice – once during the early 1970s after the so-called “Croatian spring” and then again in 
the early 1980s.  
121
 Alija Izetbegovid was the author of the “Islamist declaration” (1970) and convicted twice as a Muslim nationalist 
– once in 1946 under occupation, for being a member of the “Young Muslims” who fought against the Partisans 
(together with the occupation forces) and again in 1983, when he was accused for Muslim nationalism.    
122
 DEPOS is short from “Democratic movement of Serbia”, and it was a right center coalition of several political 
parties.  
123
Vuk Draškovid was the leader of SPO (Serbian Renewal Movement). He was agitating for the renewal of the 
monarchy and was a nationalist and anti-communist.   
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against the three ethno-national ruling parties (Croatian HDZ, Bosniak SDA and Serbian SDS), 
you were more likely to be more progressive than them. In Serbia, if you were against Miloševid 
you could have been more progressive, but also more regressive than him, and vice versa: if 
you were in favor of Miloševid you could have been as regressive as him, or, simply deceived in 
the perception of Miloševid as a guardian of socialist Yugoslavia which was threatened by all 
other nationalisms, but Serbian. 
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SPS is short for Socialist Party of Serbia, which was founded as a legal successor of the Communist Party of 
Serbia, from the socialist times. JUL is short from the Yugoslav Left, the sister party to the SPS, founded by Mirjana 
Markovid, Slobodan Miloševid’s wife. SRS is short for Serbian Radical Party, founded by Vojislav Šešelj, later 
convicted by the International Tribunal for war crimes in The Hague. DS is short from Democratic Party.” DEPOS” is 
short from “Democratic Movement of Serbia”, the first oppositional coalition against Miloševid. It was composed 
of four center-right political parties, including the most serious opposition to Miloševid at the time, Serbian 
Renewal Movement (SPO) which was led by the monarchist and a right-wing writer and politician Vuk Draškovid. 











Misconceptions inherited from this paradoxical political climate in the early phase of 
cognitive development could have been compensated either by other factors which I 
elaborated above, or through the second phase of cognitive development which included 
theoretical influences. Through exposure to generic type of knowledge, one’s value systems 
and worldviews could have been upgraded or clarified, on one hand, or disregarded, dismissed 
or transformed, on the other. In the following chapter I am discussing the second phase of 
counter-hegemonic cognitive development, which is reserved for (potential) theoretical 






















5.2. Acquisition of Theoretical Knowledge 
 
So far, it has been shown how early political socialization and the counter-hegemonic 
cognitive basis was set in place. In this chapter, I am digging into the origins and channels of 
diffusion of theoretical knowledge which, as shown in the fourth chapter, played a significant 
role in creation of the comprehensive critique of the post-socialist condition. The focus is on the 
most influential literature when it comes to cognitive development of activists. By the same 
token, this chapter is grasping specific authors and particular pieces of literature perceived by 
the activists as (most) important for their individual cognitive development. I define this 
category as “cognitive click” which is triggered by an author or a book that initially illuminated 
the path of cognitive upgrade which the activists followed from that point on. Equally 
important are the channels of diffusion of theoretical inputs which shaped (individual) activists’ 
cognitive maps. 
As indicated in the chapter on theoretical framework, the work of Thomas Rochon 
concerning the role of critical communities in conducting social change is taken as a general 
theoretical framework for assessing the relationship between theory and activism. The role of 
critical communities and critical ideas is, hence, logically linked to the role of progressive social 
movements, because both actors preform, think and act from the standpoint of the “weakest 
pillar of the bridge”. Ideas that occur within the circles of critical communities almost naturally 
get employed, reworked and contextualized by social movements whose mission is to put 
certain ideas into practice. Ideas hence, play an important role in what Gramsci calls “war of 
position”. What remains to be done is to explore the way in which this interaction takes place. 
This is precisely what is this chapter seeking to achieve, in the context of the post-socialist 
Yugoslavia.  
 
5.2.1. Cognitive Clique and main Theoretical Influences 
   
Testimonies regarding theoretical dimension of individual cognitive development of my 
interviewees showed a significant degree of diversity of theoretical influence. This was the case 
even within single case studies, where members of the same social movement had different 
theoretical affiliations. The most diversified is the municipal movement from Belgrade. If one 
had to emphasize a single field of movement’s “expertise”, it would be, of course, the field of 
urban development and “commons”. However, the “theoretical image” of NDB is much more 
heterogeneous than it might appear. Apart from urban developmental studies and the fact that 
many activists are architects by training, other spheres of theoretical interest include political 
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theory, feminist studies, (political) philosophy, political economy, etc. Nonetheless, studies of 
urbanism and urban development appear as the cornerstone of theoretical equipment for 
many Belgrade’s activists. It is precisely within this field of study that some managed to 
experience the “cognitive click”, understood as a “window opener” for further readings, as well 
as personal inspiration for engagement in social and political activism:    
“Even though Lefebvre and Margit Mayer were important to me, I consider Jane Jacobs 
as the “click”. She wrote “The Death and Life of Great American Cities”. After that, I read an 
incredible story about her opposition to Robert Moses and the whole project of construction of 
New York. On the margins of what she wrote about what New York should look like, I found an 
article about her and her sister who were on the brink of poverty. Jacobs lost the possibility to 
earn for a living and both of them were forced to eat baby food for two years. Here, one 
recognizes the amount willpower needed to endure something for the right cause. Later, she 
inspired millions of people.” (Interviewee no. 29) 
Here we learn that activists pay attention to what is written, but also to the author of the 
writing and the context. Side stories make even the most abstract writings more 
comprehendible. They provide narrative but also provide incentives for both (further) readings 
and (social/political) action. If the “story behind” matters, if it is inspiring or dramatic, one may 
easily become inspired to read abstract literature and to fight one’s way through a challenging 
text. This effort appears as worthy, given the back story. These stories are usually personal, as 
the case of Jane Jacobs illustrates. It seems like a “perfect case scenario” that would include a 
high quality, comprehensible text and an astonishing back story, is everything but a myth. 
Another testimony shows that good style of writing may go hand in hand with high quality 
content and an astonishing (personal) story behind.  
“Authors who somewhat paved my theoretical path were, firstly, Hannah Arendt and 
later, when I discovered him, David Harvey. They are not so similar, except for the fact that they 
both have exceptionally enticing style of writing. You feel excitement when reading authors 
who are brilliant in polemics, whose writing is simultaneously insightful when it comes to 
theory, and superbly styled, like a small literary masterpiece. This is where my interest in 
political theory comes from. I found Arendt’s discussion “On Revolution” highly interesting, and 
her associative approach to politics appealing – as opposed to the Schmittian dissociative 
approach (…) an active life as the foundation for political community is something I inherited 
from there – the perception of community as active unit…” (Interviewee no. 33) 
David Harvey is highly important for the activists of NDB. He opened a whole new 
intellectual horizon for many of them. Their interest in urban development emerged through 
“discovering” Harvey. His declaration “Right to the City” was translated into Croatian and 
prompted some activists from Belgrade to start thinking in a similar direction. The issue of right 
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to the city was, moreover, the converging point, or the point of gathering of activists. Harvey is 
credited as appealing and important due to his ability to “put complex things in understandable 
terms”. His book on neoliberalism or his tutorials on Marx’s “Capital” and the concept of “right 
to the city” were seen as understandable and applicable due to receptiveness, persuasive 
power and argumentative strength of his work.  
A similar pattern was detected in Sarajevo and Zagreb. Sarajevo’s popular movement 
though, has an additional ingredient. Apart from the importance of writing style and lucid 
reflections of reality, it was heritage of the last Yugoslav war that posed questions for which 
one could not find answers in everyday life or politics, but often in literature or theory. Things 
in reality seemed clear. It was something else that puzzled some of my Sarajevo interviewees. 
They wondered about the emotional side of personality, the possibility or impossibility to resist 
events that were structurally predetermined. Literature they found relevant ranged from 
psychoanalysis to classical political theory: from feminism to more orthodox Marxism. Quite 
expectedly, as in Zagreb and Belgrade, Hannah Arendt occupies an important place in cognitive 
development of some interviewed activists in Sarajevo. 
“After finishing studies in literature, I took post-graduate studies of nationalism at the 
CEU. This was an attempt to understand what happened here. At the CEU I got closer to social 
constructivism in the context of international politics. This seemed too one-dimensional for me, 
somewhat lukewarm and this is why I kept on looking. At some point I found myself between 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt. By the way, I've always been drawn to 
authors who write innovatively and intervene differently in terms of ideas and style of writing. 
Towards the end of my CEU studies, I got interested in what Arendt had to say about political 
action, where it came from and how one should resist the automatism of events.” (Interviewee 
no. 25)    
For this interviewee, Hannah Arendt provoked a “cognitive click”, but in combination with 
Machiavelli’s “Prince”. She continued using theory as an instrument for activism. For her, a 
logical step after Arendt and Machiavelli was Lenin who, besides Gramsci, represents the 
greatest synthesizer of theory and practice of the 20th century. The emphasis on the 
attractiveness of style of writing is crucial if an author aims to resonate with curious minds. 
Lucidity, innovation, boldness and vividness are always appreciated by the activists, even in the 
most abstract theory. Activists in Sarajevo (and Belgrade) say that regardless of whether one 
agrees with Arendt and her philosophical and/or political work, her style of writing (especially 
in books like “Eichmann in Jerusalem” or “On Revolution”) catches their attention. ”Catchiness” 
of theory is something that can make it closer to political practice and (especially) to the minds 
of those who look for cognitive inputs and sources of a new imagery in order to act.  
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Student movement from Zagreb, as the most vanguard activist group in terms of theoretical 
equipment, included individuals whose political and theoretical views corresponded with the 
most radical left wing theory (and practice). Considering the issue of “cognitive click”, however, 
even those who belonged to the most radical wing of the movement did not refer that much to 
the “usual suspects” of the radical progressive theory. When asked about the most influential 
thinker responsible for his cognitive development, an activist from the student movement 
(again) emphasized the style of writing and polemical power of an author who managed to 
scale down complex philosophical discussion, without losing on depth of thought.      
“This is definitely Bourdieu. Of course, it wasn't just him that I was reading, but he 
managed to articulate the critique of rigid ahistorical philosophical discourse. This critique was 
polemically intonated, clear, and applicable at once. In this instance, I'm talking about “Ce Que 
Parler Veut Dire” (eng: Language and Symbolic Power). Here you can find a critique of Althusser 
and Heidegger, of this rigid, highly philosophical discourse.” (Interviewee no. 10) 
Yet another author appears among those whose work enabled a “cognitive click” for 
activists in Zagreb. His opus of work made some major disturbances within critical thought. 
Many perceive him as the main “culprit” for the post-modern gelatinization of classical 
materialism while others have no trouble accommodating him within the wider spectrum of 
critical thought which has overall, done more good than damage to modern critical thinking. An 
activist from Zagreb:    
“The author who had the greatest influence on me was Foucault. He “knocked me off 
my feet”. Discussions on sex and sexuality – that was extremely important to me. Production of 
knowledge and the relationship with institutions, reasons why we shouldn’t look at them in the 
Althusserian way… I soon realized, through Marx, the extent of Foucault’s scope and 
limitations. I finally managed to put all these insights under the same framework.” (Interviewee 
no. 2)   
Interestingly enough, other interviewees from Zagreb positioned Althusser and his essay 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus” quite high on the scale of influential theory. By the 
same token, Althusser was used even as a negative reference, where the critique of his work 
contributed to the counter-hegemonic tendencies in the region more than Althusser himself. 
Žižek’s “Sublime Object of Ideology”, was also influential in Zagreb, but mostly as an entering 
point for other sources referenced in it. Žižek also appears as a point of reference in Sarajevo, 
both as an entry point for other references and, more directly, as a “cognitive click”.  
“I enrolled the psychology department. Under influence of Professor Ugo Vlaisavljevid I 
got interested in human relationships and emotional structures. For me, that was the first wave 
of politicization through theory, in a scope provided by the discipline of psychoanalysis. All my 
134 
 
intellectual attention was directed there. In Freud I found insights on ethics and soon realized 
that these corresponded to my ethical structures. “I consider nothing human (to be) alien to 
me”.125 The left critical thought came later, and the entering point for me was Žižek. The 
moment I started reading him, I was already a semi-conscious Lacanian. In Žižek I found more 
complex interpretation of Lacan and a mix with Marx in the “Sublime Object of Ideology”. I 
remember there was a book presentation, by Renata Salecl and I picked up Žižek there, from a 
friend. He definitely made things more complex to me. He made Lacan clearer, but then 
puzzled me with this other field integrated with Lacan. In order to resolve this puzzle I started 
reading Lenin, Marx etc…” (Interviewee no. 17) 
There are two aspects of this testimony that should be analyzed further. An interesting 
insight may be detected if we look at the relationship between Freud and Lacan on one side, 
and Bosnian “trauma” on the other. The field of psychoanalysis reveals the very nature, the 
ontology and the function of trauma in human lives. In his “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” 
Freud writes about trauma, while dedicating special attention to what he called “traumatic 
neurosis”. Of course, here we will not dig deeply in Freud’s work, but it is worth mentioning 
that he writes about traumatic neurosis two years after the end of “the terrible war which has 
just ended (and) gave rise to a great number of illnesses of this kind” (Freud 1920, 6). After the 
war in Bosnia, there was also a tendency to choose literature that may be applied to the post-
war condition. Similarly, Lacanian approach used trauma in order to define the real itself. Going 
back to the style of writing, Žižek’s “The Sublime Object of Ideology” not only manages to 
explain Lacan (and defend him from the accusations for “post-structuralism”), but also links 
psychoanalysis to Marx, Hegel’s dialectics, post-Marxism, essentialism and anti-essentialism, 
Mouffe and Laclau, etc.  
Strong material and psychological repercussions of the early 1990s had an effect on 
theoretical directions chosen by activists (especially in Sarajevo). Relevant theoretical sources 
often appeared as answer providers to various questions that popped up during and after the 
war. Starting from very personal issues such as identity, to structural or ideological background 
of ethno-nationalism, chauvinism and genocide, the activists sought to resolve multilevel puzzle 
of the unfortunate events and their social, economic and material consequences. This is why, in 
some cases, theory served as a “safe zone” where one could find, at least, abstract answers to 
the real-life questions. Even in the times of war, many escaped reality by reading books. It was 
fiction and less abstract non-fiction which dominated over more abstract theory during the war. 
Some activists started their reading “journey” with books about concentration camps because, 
as one of them testifies, “it had a calming effect on her during the war”. Others were studying 
                                                          
125
 This statement was first proclaimed by the Roman play writer Terence, and Freud’s work on human 
subconscious was often linked to it.     
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literature and sometimes spending long hours indoors, reading and engaging in discussions 
while waiting for shooting to stop. 
“I started studying literature in 1992, when the war begun. I was wounded and had to 
pause my studies, but I continued in 1994. These conditions in which we were studying 
literature were crazy. We were reading everything – from James Joyce to Iliad and Odyssey. 
Sometimes, when there was shooting outside, we were forced to stay in (either in the 
classroom or professors’ apartments) where we were acquainted with critical thought and 
conducted critical discussions.” (Interviewee no. 23)  
The list of authors who managed to convey a clear but complex message and inspire 
activists is certainly longer than what was spotted thus far. Similar role to that of Harvey, for 
the students in Zagreb,  was played by Joseph Choonara and his peace „Unraveling Capitalism“, 
in which he managed to „explain Marx in a simple way but without underestimating the 
audience“ (Interviewee no. 14). The influence of the Frankfurt School was also detected. Other 
authors such as Simone Weil, Eric Hobsbawm, Ellen Meiksis Wood, Noam Chomsky, Perry 
Anderson, Naomi Klein, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Karl Marx, Silvia Federici, Jacques Ranciere, and 
Fredric Jameson appear as relevant in the process of “cognitive accumulation” or “cognitive 
maturation” (not necessarily “cognitive click”) – especially in Zagreb.   
For some activists, this sort of critical literature represented an entry point, and for others, 
an upgrade of what they had previously been exposed to. Here I refer to those who were 
influenced by punk subculture and accompanying literature. For some activists, “entry point” 
materials included mainly the anarchist fanzines and pamphlet type of literature. Here, we have 
the case of an activist from Belgrade who got in touch with critical literature quite early in his 
youth - through punk:        
“I started seeing myself as an anarchist quite early in life, during first few years of high 
school. I gladly read literature about anarcho-communism, Kropotkin the most. One of the most 
important books for me was Kropotkin’s “Anarchism and Moral”. Interestingly enough, it was 
Zoran Đinđid who wrote the preface of that book.”126 (Interviewee no. 30) 
Socio-political context and the convincing style of writing are not the only factors that had 
an impact on the choice of literature. External events or living / studying abroad also influenced 
the choice of literature one could get in touch with. The reasoning is twofold. Firstly, those 
activists whose formative years overlapped with war and the first decade (and a half) after the 
                                                          
126
Tragically assassinated prime minister of Serbia (2001-2003) Zoran Đinđid was famous for his critique of the 
socialist Yugoslavia both academically and politically. In his youth, this critique was coming from the left anarchist 
positions, whereas in later years the critique shifted perspective and was coming from the (right) liberal 
standpoint. According to his own testimony, his PhD studies at the University of Konstanz in Germany, under 
supervision of Jurgen Habermas, affected this ideological shift.     
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war had a very limited access to critical literature in general. Those were the years when the 
hegemonic discourse was manifesting itself offensively (because it was in the early phase of 
imposition of the new ruling paradigm). Secondly, the events outside former Yugoslavia which 
have, somewhat in parallel dictated new trends in thought and social/political action, were 
almost invisible for the region which got itself preoccupied with the 19th century trends, such as 
nation state building. An activist from Zagreb who spent a period of studying at Humboldt 
University in Berlin:  
“My long March“, a book compound of Rudi Dutschke's speeches and writings was very 
inspiring to me. Long after the blockade [of the Faculty of Philosophy], I got back again to this 
book and realized how many similarities one may track between their struggle and ours. At the 
same time, it came as a bit of a depressing insight, since you figure out the cyclical nature of 
certain struggles. Some things have, practically, never moved progressively forward.” 
(Interviewee no. 4) 
This statement also shows that social movements and their experiences do resonate with 
activists to come. Social and political movements may serve as a form of inspiration and/or 
motivation, especially when the insights come from the very actors involved in struggles. Rudi 
Dutschke and literature dealing with his speeches and writings hence resonate with today’s 
activists. Most of inspiration for social action, in terms of cognitive processing and perceiving 
certain phenomena as socially and/or politically problematic, yet comes from the kind of 
literature that is not dealing directly with social movements. Bearing that in mind, it seems like 
Marx’s 11th Thesis on Feuerbach127 poses too sharp division between philosophers and social 
change. Philosophers do not directly change the world but inspire and shape cognitive maps of 
those who seek to do so. After (political) philosophy, the most influential branches of literature 
include sociology and (critique of) political economy. Side by side with other branches of critical 
theory, the region of former Yugoslavia witnessed the revival of feminism, as well. This branch 
was influential across the region and inspired many activists who took part in the progressive 
and counter-hegemonic social movements. An activist from Belgrade: 
“It was the afro-feminist literature that opened a whole universe to me – authors such 
as Audre Lorde or Kate Millett. I was into radical feminism of the mid-1960s and 1970s. I was 
interested in questioning power relations within patriarchal society, but also within movements 
for emancipation – the way in which women's movements perpetuate patriarchal models of 
power relations. My belief in the necessity of participation, deliberation and perception of 
personal as political comes from this literature.”  (Interviewee no. 34) 
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 “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”  
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The problem with former Yugoslavia was, again, a fact that some topics or branches of 
literature had to be reinvented or rediscovered, for example feminism. After 1978 and the first 
feminist conference (in Southeast and Eastern Europe) held in Belgrade,128 the Yugoslav 
contribution to (the second wave of) feminism was sidelined in the light of the upcoming events 
(of war and transition). The socialist Yugoslavia received international attention due to its 
specificity (both in its internal autonomous socialist organization and international non-aligned 
orientation). Its intellectual production has yet, evaporated with the dissolution of the country 
and the warfare. The attention was, both internally and internationally, shifted towards ethno-
national, religious and conflict-related issues. From “the most important role model for 
democratic socialism and a leading role in safeguarding international peace” as Erich Fromm  
wrote in the preface of the Yugoslav edition of “The Sane Society” (1963, 24), this dissolved 
political space became one after which scholars named hotspots worldwide. This is how we got 
“Balkanization” as a “hot” term that describes ethnic tension, social and political fragmentation 
and instability.  
What is important here is that identity-based literature could not have shaped anti-
hegemonic mindsets in the post-Yugoslav context. On the other hand, it could have shaped 
either hegemonic or reformist cognitive coordinates. Therefore, the interrupted process of 
(critical) intellectual production in and about Yugoslav socialism had to be somewhat 
reinvented. This reinvention included revival of the memory about intellectual production in 
Yugoslavia. “Going forward, by remembering” as once put by the contemporary Croatian 
philosopher Boris Buden,129 became for many conditio sine qua non of a counter-hegemonic 
cognitive development. In other words, without bearing Yugoslav experience in mind no 
tangible social change could be imagined. An interviewee from Sarajevo:                       
„The first topics I got interested in were related to feminism. These topics were in line 
with self-discovering and wondering why you can’t be a feminist if you’re wearing a hijab. I 
discovered some articles from the history of feminism. I soon realized that all those topics with 
cultural and identity-based background do not have serious conceptual foundation. I found way 
more serious foundation in feminism from the socialist era, which stemmed from Yugoslavia 
and AFŽ [Women’s Antifascist Front]. This guided me into fields where I’m currently at.” 
(Interviewee no. 19)       
The range of critical theory that managed to reach, affect and shape cognitive maps of 
activists in the former Yugoslav region is hence quite wide: from the Critical theory, to 
feminism, classical Marxism, anarchism, post-Marxism, classical and modern political theory, 
                                                          
128 See more about this conference in Bonfiglioli 2008  
129
 From the endorsement of the book: Suvin, Darko. 2014. Samo jednom se ljubi: Radiografija SFR Jugoslavije. 
Beograd: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.  
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political economy etc. Schematically, this is how the influence of theory upon the activists looks 
like when observed for each case: 
Table 5.1: Cognitive Clique 
Cases  Sarajevo’s Popular 
Movement 





















    
Authors Arendt; Žižek; Lacan; 





Mayer; Millet; etc. 
Specific Tittles  “Sublime Object of 
Ideology” (Žižek); 
“The Second Sex” (de 
Beauvoir); etc.  
“Language and 
Symbolic Power” 




(Choonara); etc.  
“On Revolution” 
(Arendt); “Right to 
the City” (Harvey); 
“The Death and Life 
of Great American 
Cities” (Mayer); etc.  
 
 It is beyond any doubt that the space of former Yugoslavia inherited much more critical 
(theoretical) knowledge than it produced in the post-socialist era. The strongest influence is 
nowadays coming either from the socialist past or from abroad because new ideas and 
practices did not stop appearing in different places and corners of the planet, in the meanwhile. 
The following subchapter talks about further theoretical insights that affected the occurrence 
of counter-hegemonic tendencies in three countries, as well as the specific institutional and 
non-institutional channels of their diffusion – both internal (within the ex-Yugoslav region) and 






5.2.2. Diffusion of Theory 
 
As indicated in the theoretical chapter, I am dealing with diffusion of value systems and 
theoretical knowledge understood as “cognitive inputs”, that serve for the formation of 
individual and collective “cognitive maps”, rather than practical “now-how’s” or “ready-made” 
frames, tactics and repertoires. An important role, when talking about diffusion, is reserved for 
brokers that can be individuals, as well as entire subcultures, or various types of institutions. In 
classical social movement terms, as argued before, the focus is on interpersonal contacts, 
organizational linkages, or associational networks (Tarrow 2005). For the purpose of my work I 
am, in the first place, introducing a distinction between institutional and non-institutional 
channels of diffusion. By the institutional channels, I refer mainly to the universities and 
research centers and institutes, which are entitled to diffusion, as well as the promotion and 
production of knowledge in every country in the world. On the institutional side, I make further 
distinction between domestic (internal) and foreign (external) channels, meaning that they 
could be either within or outside the borders of the three countries in question. Considering 
that after dissolution of Yugoslavia, most of the internal institutional channels of diffusion of 
critical thought were closed or, to a large extent, congested so that the new “transitional” 
paradigm could be set in place without major obstacles, it sounds intuitive that external 
institutional channels prevailed over the internal ones. By non-institutional channels of 
diffusion, I mean NGO’s, alterative cultural centers, individual brokers and alike. 
While the whole region was dreaming about modernization through privatization and 
economic growth through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), what actually occurred was (further) 
social and economic stratification and capital accumulation. This typical transitional narrative 
was, nonetheless, already challenged outside the borders of former Yugoslavia, in both 
academic and wider social and intellectual circles. This means that the very system, towards 
which the whole region was heading, had been challenged abroad even before the transition 
was in full swing. The chance to get in touch with critical theory was given to one of the activists 
from Belgrade who did his MA at the Central European University in Budapest:      
“Dorothee Bohle was the head of my department at the CEU. When I first met her and 
the people in her circle, I said to myself: “Where have you been all this time”. The range of 
authors we were reading spread from left liberals to democratic socialists like [Perry, aut.rem] 
Anderson or Wolfgang Streeck. It was the first time I found out about the concept of 
“commons”. I attended two courses on political economy, and one of them was “Capitalism in 
crisis”. This was astonishing for someone who’s coming from the Faculty of Political Science in 
Belgrade where we were studying macro-economy. Suddenly, at the CEU I was reading about 
“commons” or Karl Polanyi. I remember some chapters of his work that we were required to 
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read, his critique of the notion of “rational man” led by interest (…) “Why are we defending 
competition in capitalism in which the stronger wins – let the race be held until the end…”…This 
is what I liked most in Polanyi.” (Interviewee no. 36)    
The field of political economy was quite developed in former Yugoslavia (it is enough to look 
at the corpus of works of Branko Horvat130 for instance). However, during the last thirty years, it 
almost evaporated as a field of study. Political economy could have been enlightening and 
precious in revealing the very essence of the new economic logic that affected the whole 
region. Apart from the economic degradation that destroyed social fabric of entire societies, 
what made social image degradation possible was a sudden interruption of intellectual and 
cultural life. All the achievements and seeds of emancipation from the socialist times were 
either erased or sidelined. New wave, “Praxis” philosophy, self-management – that was all gone 
and replaced by the mass “culture”, free market economy, intellectual passivity and, hence, 
assimilation to new conditions of life.    
According to the testimonies of my interviewees, the new conceptual understanding of 
“where we stand” and “where we are going” did not manage to reflect the real-life effects of 
transition. The whole narrative of “development”, “democratization”, “Europeanization”, 
“liberalization” and (thereby) “modernization”, simply did not correspond to the real-life 
experience of the great majority of population. All these buzzwords embodied nothing else but 
the process of legitimation of (peripheral) capitalism. On the other side, there were almost no 
people left who would be both willing and able to deconstruct the essence of the new 
economic and social reality. Therefore, one had to look for ideational indications that could tell 
what went wrong elsewhere. With aid of economic sociologists such as Streeck or sociologists 
such as P. Anderson, one could better understand the phenomena that shaped both social and 
economic reality on the (post-socialist) capitalist periphery. The importance of external 
channels of diffusion, mainly universities and particular professors (the last case, for example, 
showed the importance of Dorothee Bohle), was evident when domestic institutional channels 
were partially or totally closed. Another, similar experience comes from an activist from Zagreb: 
“A year and a half before the blockade of Faculty of Philosophy, I spent some time at 
Humboldt University in Berlin – at the sociology department. This was an exchange program 
and, as luck would have it, people talked a lot about RAF due to the 30-year anniversary of the 
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 “Horvat became widely known for his scientific contribution, early on (Benjamin Ward introduced a coinage 
Marxism-Horvatism into theory of economics). That is why he was invited as a visiting professor to over eighty 
universities and scientific institutes in the world (…): University of Michigan (1968), University of Florida (1970), 
American University, Washington (1970, 1972, 1974), Catholic University of Chile (1972), University of Stockholm 
(1973/4), University of Dar Es Salaam (1975), University of Notre Dame (1978), University of Paris (1978), Yale 
University (1984-5), Cambridge University (1986), University of Southern California (1987), University of California 
at Berkley (1993).” Stipetid 2003, 8 
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“German autumn”. While reading some stuff on the German student movement and RAF, I was 
thinking about how one can easily resort to terrorism if a society does not react to the obvious 
examples of injustice and if mechanisms of resistance are nonexistent. This was 2007/8.  At the 
same time, it was the anniversary of the 1968 and suddenly, I found myself surrounded by 
literature on student movements. I remember attending lectures on urban sociology and 
gentrification held by Andrej Holm. At that time, he was organizing protests due to 
gentrification in Prenzlauenberg and shortly after he was accused of terrorist conspiracy and 
arrested. I did a small research and realized that he was accused because of the law passed 
after RAF. This law allowed pressing charges for conspiracy if a person was simply suspicious. I 
remember some parts of the official indictment, such as “he did not use mobile phone” or “he 
was using code words for communication such as “gentrification”. This case had a strong 
influence on me and my future interest in RAF and radical movements, both theoretically and 
practically.” (Interviewee no. 4) 
In the previous subchapter, I mentioned the influence of social movement literature on 
shaping counter-hegemonic mindsets of the activists in former Yugoslavia. Even though the 
most influential theory was usually more abstract – from philosophy to political economy and 
more general type of sociology, it was social movements’ practice, direct experience or 
engagement in social movements abroad that could have become an entering point to the 
social movement literature. In Sarajevo, we could detect a similar trend of (external) 
institutional diffusion of (activist) practice, which this time opened doors for (further) 
theoretical upgrades concerning social movement literature. One activist testified how the 
activities of the M15 movement prompted her to search for social movement literature which 
then served as a theoretical upgrade of practical experience.  
“In 2012 I went to Barcelona to conduct a research. My former supervisor invited me. In 
Spain I became aware of mobilization. I could observe what was going on and talk to people 
from the “M15” directly. Under their influence I started reading about social movements. When 
I came back to Bosnia, I gathered some people and we started working on the edition where we 
focused on social justice. Seven days after we presented our work, the protests in Sarajevo 
started.” (Interviewee no. 25) 
The reason why this case is relevant for the social uprising in February 2014 in Sarajevo is 
because it was precisely this activist who gathered the “core” group of the popular movement. 
Here, we can practically trace the source and the channel (broker) of diffusion of ideas from 
one social movement to another. The wave of European uprisings, especially the one in Spain 
with the “M15” movement got diffused through an (external) institutional channel – the 
University of Barcelona.  
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Another case of external institutional diffusion through particular brokerage for theory was 
detected in Zagreb. This activist did not go abroad to study: he grew up in Germany and came 
back to Zagreb as an adult. His broker for critical theory was no one else but the school 
principal. An interesting event “activated” the brokerage: 
“I was wearing the “Nazi punks fuck off” T-shirt with a broken swastika. This was in late 
1993 or early 1994. At some point, I was sent to the principal’s office because some professors 
reported me and asked for her intervention. She invited me for a meeting and told me that 
some professors and pupils found my T-shirt insulting. “Insulting for whom?” I asked (…) the 
principal looked kindly at my grumpiness and stubbornness and gave me Fromm’s “The 
Anatomy of Human Destructiveness”. This is how I got introduced to his work. At the time, I 
was not fully able to understand it linguistically, but I found it interesting. Then I found another 
Fromm’s book in my aunt’s house. This was a starting point and my interests turned towards 
literature, and later towards Camus, Nietzsche etc.” (Interviewee no. 12) 
Not everyone had a chance to study or at least spend some time studying abroad. Internal 
institutional channels were to a large extent cut off but, in some cases, critical ideas managed 
to bypass structural and other obstacles and reach the (future) activists. Syllabuses of humanist 
and social studies were significantly changed after dissolution of Yugoslavia. The greatest 
changes were made in history books, on all levels of education. However, some disciplines such 
as architecture or literature remained mostly unchanged, at least when it comes to more 
classical literature. An interviewee from Belgrade:  
“More serious engagement with reading and reaching the level of a solid political 
consciousness came with my studies of literature which were a gateway to critical theory. You 
had to read Foucault, which was close to the anarchist narrative. Other French authors such as 
Derrida and Barthes were there as well (…) when you explore certain genres, such as tragedy, 
you need to go through Hegel or sociological theories of family, political philosophy and the 
theory of state, etc.” (Interviewee no. 30) 
The updated critical literature which could have accurately resonated with the then present 
state of affairs was lacking, but “the classics” could have served as a solid starting point for 
further theoretical upgrade. If disciplines such as political science or sociology were “erased” 
from most references to critical literature, a “careful eye” could have caught more up-to-date 
references in some less “straightforward”, or “suspicious” disciplines. An activist from Zagreb: 
“For me and many other people, cultural studies played the role of substitute, in 
absence of Marxian and other critical theory, which was almost eradicated from the Faculty of 
Philosophy. These studies were quite important, especially their British “branch” with its critical 
component. Through the analysis of contemporary consumption within capitalist society, we 
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actually got a chance to analyze what was happening around us in Croatia – with opening of 
new shopping centers and other changes. Things we were reading about in cultural studies 
were actually happening around us.” (Interviewee no. 10)   
Roughly, here can be identified three types of institutional channels of diffusion in former 
Yugoslavia: unchanged syllabuses; individual professors (brokers); and finally – newly 
established (educational) institutions with a pinch of criticalness. The last term mentioned was 
not discussed so far, but there is one institution of such kind in Sarajevo which played an 
important role as a channel of diffusion of critical theoretical knowledge. Apart from the earlier 
mentioned Sarajevo’s professors such as Ugo Vlaisavljevid (in the context of psychoanalysis) or 
Gajo Sekulid131 who could transmit counter-hegemonic theoretical knowledge from the past, an 
important role was played by the institution called ACIPS, the alumni network of the Centre for 
Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies. An interviewee from Sarajevo: 
“During my first year of studies, ACIPS was quite committed and proactive in terms of 
organizing public lectures and workshops. I went to the feminist workshop with my sister. I 
remember some lecturers… During their talk, I found myself silently repeating – “yes”, “of 
course”, “sure”... What I felt or gone through before without placing these feelings and 
experiences in a specific context, they articulated for me. This is how my theoretical path was 
set and I started reading on my own. That same year, during summer, I got a present from a 
friend – “The Second Sex” by Simone de Beauvoir. I spent the whole summer reading that 
book.” (Interviewee no. 24)  
This testimony somewhat sublimates the entire logic of what I have already talked about in 
the theoretical chapter. The role of generic knowledge is hereby presented as a systemizer of 
previously acquired value systems. It establishes links between fragments of value systems by 
abstracting the level of thinking which, eventually, upgrades and improves reasoning and makes 
it more plausible to undertake a social/political action.  
While new institutional channels of diffusion were, nonetheless, rare, the new internal non-
institutional channels played an important role in systematizing and abstracting non-theoretical 
knowledge. Diffusion of critical knowledge through non-institutional channels was slowly 
happening since the 1990s. Alternative publishing houses, social centers of alternative culture 
or festivals of critical theory, activism and art (such as “Subversive Film Festival” in Zagreb or 
“Open University” in Sarajevo), significantly contributed to the diffusion of critical literature and 
art on the one hand, and interaction between activists and thinkers, on the other. Under 
circumstances of institutional closeness and rigidity, as well as the offensive nature of the 
dominant paradigm, this trend is not surprising. An interviewee from Zagreb:    
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 Gajo Sekulid is a philosopher, translator (from German) of philosophical books, including Hannah Arendt. 
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“In 2005/6 I got the password for New Left Review (NLR) from the guys from Multimedia 
institute “MaMa”. The following two years I was randomly choosing authors. Every night I read 
a different author. NLR was important to me because they covered many different fields – from 
culture to cinema, art, literature, political economy… Before that, I dedicated some time to the 
“Frankfurt school” and existentialists – which corresponded to my teenage affinities. When I 
discovered the “Frankfurt school”, I became equipped with a critical weapon that stemmed 
from a certain type of pessimism. At least, that is what I thought while reading Adorno, the 
“Dialectics of Enlightenment”, etc. Fromm was important to me as one of the first authors 
trying to synthesize Marx and Freud. Right at that time, Žižek’s “Sublime Object of Ideology” 
was translated. This piece echoed quite strongly, and it was widely read.” (Interviewee no. 12) 
Non-institutional internal channels of diffusion did not develop only in Zagreb. However, the 
alternative theoretical scene in Zagreb had a very strong impact on the rest of the region. This is 
why the first big scale anti-hegemonic activist endeavor (the occupation of the Faculty of 
Philosophy in Zagreb), played a role of a diffusion channel. Occupation thus affected activists in 
Belgrade and Sarajevo, but also many among the activists of the student movement itself. 
Many of them found their first, or first convincing theoretical articulation, precisely during or 
due to the blockade.  An interviewee from Zagreb: 
“After the blockade I learned where my frustration was coming from. The main problem 
was that there were no answers to questions and phenomena happening around me. My 
thoughts were my only source of explanation. At the Faculty of Philosophy (before that I was 
studying law), I got in touch with Alex Callinicos and his essay on theory of education. As a 
result, I got more interested in the issue of higher education. After that, S. gave me some 
books, and I started reading Athussere, Marx, Lebowitz, Harvey…” (Interviewee no. 1) 
As already stressed in the fourth chapter, student movement indeed represented the 
critical vanguard for the entire region and thereby emitted critical discourses and transmitted 
knowledge, inwards and outwards. Some activists who took part in Sarajevo uprising and 
organized plenums in 2014, also participated in Zagreb student movement in 2009. Originally 
coming from the Herzegovinian part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this interviewee got herself 
equipped with theoretical apparatus in Zagreb. She came back to Bosnia, to Sarajevo, only 
couple of months before the protests started:    
“I start realizing who I am, politically, only when I came to the Faculty of Philosophy in 
Zagreb. This was a very specific environment, where people had similar worldviews to those I 
previously acquired. This is where I equipped myself with clearer articulation of different issues 
– from social justice, to anti-nationalism, equality, anti-homophobia… Everything I had already 
known, I started understanding as a part of a wider context. The key period for my theoretical 
formation happened at the time of the blockade. This was the first time I heard about the 
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concept called neoliberal capitalism. I already read some Marx and I knew about the Marxist 
reading groups but the moment I really became aware of my social environment was when the 
occupation started. You realize that there are many people around you whose knowledge of 
certain issues is so deep and comprehensive. You just feel like a kid next to people like Ž, or K… 
Step by step, you gain self-confidence and you start reading more and articulating things in a 
clearer and more convenient way, on your own…” (Interviewee no. 16)  
When talking about diffusion of ideas from Croatia to the rest of the region, one should 
mention that the student movement was not the only source/channel through which critical 
ideas spread outside Croatia. Before the student movement, there was a group of urban 
development and green activists and theorists whose work eventually overlapped with what 
NDB movement from Belgrade started doing couple of years later. It was the so called “Pula 
group”132 that produced ideas which soon got diffused eastwards, towards the Serbian capital 
city. The brokering role was, among others, played by the group gathered around the 
movement for “Varšavska Street” in Zagreb133 whose activities took place between 2006 and 
2013. Even though green and urban development activists were not directly involved in the 
student movement in Zagreb (but were highly supportive, providing the student movement 
with infrastructural and logistical support), they were more directly involved in the occurrence 
of similar activist scene in Serbia and acted as true brokers for diffusion of ideas from the “Pula 
group” to the NDB activists in Belgrade. An interviewee from Belgrade:  
“I found the publication issued by the “Pula group” called “The City of Postcapitalism 
and the Operation City: Handbook for Neoliberal Reality”. There you could find the articles 
written by Lefebre, Harvey, Smith… “Pula group” was the first who started dealing with issues 
such as city development, its alternatives and pushed forward the concept of right to the city.” 
(Interviewee no. 29) 
It is not by chance that the activists from Belgrade got influenced by Zagreb (and Pula). By 
the time of 2008/9 global economic crisis, Serbia still did not develop an independent, larger 
scale, substantially critical activist scene. No relevant social actor had gone out of the box 
designed by coordinates imposed by the transitologist paradigm.134 Situation in Croatia was 
somewhat different. By 2008/9, conditions for the occurrence of the student movement were 
already set in place. It is not by chance that many other universities across Croatia supported 
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 See more about “Pula group” on the following link: http://praksa.hr/zadruga/   
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 “Varšavska Street” is euphemism for series of actions conducted by two organizations: “Green action” and 
“Right to the City” from Zagreb from 2006 until 2013. The main goal was, at first, prevention of building a shopping 
mall and a garage in the city center (in Varšavska Street and downtown Zagreb, including the square called “Cvjetni 
Trg”). Actions included direct actions, protests, petitions and other.  
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 The exception was the student movement which occupied the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade in 2006. Even 
though it was this group which had a certain degree of influence upon the student movement in Zagreb three 
years later, it never reached either public visibility or political credibility in Serbia.     
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their colleagues from Zagreb and occupied their universities as well. This means that the critical 
consciousness and the activist network were already developed. Apart from the activists 
gathered around “Varšavska Street”, the role of brokers for diffusion of critical ideas was also 
played by events. The occupation of the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb was certainly the most 
significant one. An interviewee from Belgrade: 
“You couldn’t find Harvey at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade, of course. In 
2009 I went to Zagreb and found the edited volume of “Right to the City”. This is how I got 
interested in spatial aspect of social justice. This aspect seemed very appropriate for 
politicization because it’s the most visible (…) For May Day holiday I went to Zagreb just to see 
what is going on over there. This is where I found these books. I witnessed to endless 
discussions at plenums and saw how emotional they were. At the same time, nonetheless, 
discussions were functional and tactical. I have never seen something like that before, not even 
in movies. I saw enthusiasm, alternative lectures… That was a festival of events. They literally 
made a small political community which was way more important, even for education itself - 
than the shitty university they were occupying. They made a space of active socialization.” 
(Interviewee no. 33)  
The reason why this activist went to Zagreb was the already built network of friends and 
acquaintances between activists (and future activists), from Belgrade and Zagreb. Their 
friendships were formed during the above-mentioned workshops and seminars organized by 
various NGOs which sought to teach the youngsters about “liberal and civic values”. 
Internalization of those values was supposed to create a new generation of carriers of 
transition and consequentially, the new liberal (“open”) society. Anti-nationalism, tolerance, 
cosmopolitanism and openness of mind were compounding elements of such workshops and 
seminars. Their attendees were usually anti-nationalist by primary socialization. However, their 
critical minds (according to the testimonies) simply found the new NGO driven discourse of 
tolerance and liberal values either as “not showing the full picture” or often misleading. NGOs, 
hence, ended up having the unintended effect of gathering more radical minds than they could 
possibly comprehend and control. Both general reality and personal (family) social and 
economic conditions of those youngsters simply did not correspond with their discourse. That is 
why some sessions also served, according to the testimonies, to make fun of the (imposed) 
narratives.  
The activists (mainly from Zagreb and Belgrade) who attended these “schools of peace and 
tolerance”, as they claim, were fully aware that most of the economic and appropriate political 
(institutional) reforms which caused social and economic degradation were underpinned by 
these same NGOs and their donors. Most of the international and domestic NGOs played an 
essential role in promoting what is usually called “European values”. This was how the narrative 
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of modernization, democratization and Europeanization was pushed forward. The final 
consequence was the establishment of the binary opposition between the pro-European, 
moderate reformers and the anti-European, nationalist camp (especially in Serbia). The “radical 
wing” of the attendees took what was useful from such gatherings (personal contacts) and 
discarded what was useless for tangible social change (basically, everything else).  
“My interest in politics began at summer camps where some Americans aimed to gather 
us (from the region of former Yugoslavia) and talk about reconciliation. These gatherings played 
an important role in my decision to study political sciences and raised my general interest in 
politics – but not in a direct way. There was usually “peace, peace, peace, no one is guilty”135 
kind of atmosphere and we would go there and make fun of it. They first wanted us to get into 
fight with each other and then to reconcile. This was my entry point to politics. At the first year 
of my studies I got tired of all these nationalism related topics and started being more 
interested in social justice.” (ibid.)   
The attendees of such seminars often felt treated as the pioneers, not to say kids, who 
needed to learn about what they are supposed to build, and how. This treatment of the post-
socialist societies as “schools”, in which its constituency is infantilized and perceived as pupils, 
is known in the literature on post-socialist transition as well.136 Clearly detectable and visible 
misconceptions of the new civil society were often justified as necessary or “natural”, as painful 
but in the end – just. Layoffs after privatizations were not the focus – the accent was on the 
“rationalization of economy” instead. Certain perspectives of the economic endeavors were 
either ignored or purposefully sidelined. Both mainstream institutional and non-institutional 
channels of diffusion of ideas and thought were swamped with transitional narrative.  
Another goal of counter-hegemonic tendencies in the post-socialism was to shed light on 
the fact that the beginning of transition after dissolution of Yugoslavia was not the “ground 
zero” of social, political and economic development of this region. When talking about diffusion 
of critical (theoretical) knowledge, one should emphasize that some activists lived, learned, 
read and overall, experienced the Yugoslav era that became the biggest “enemy” of the post-
Yugoslav hegemonic discourse. Sarajevo’s popular movement was mostly compound of activists 
older (on average) than those in Zagreb and Belgrade. Some of them were born during the late 
sixties and seventies. This difference had also certain effects to the theoretical sources and 
channels of diffusion of critical knowledge. Here we can observe an increased possibility of 
theoretical stagnation among those who were in their early 20s when the war in former 
Yugoslavia (1991-1995) begun. Deprivation of the possibility to read and possibly, get affected 
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 This is a song that is usually sung among kids after fights, during which they clutch each other’s pinky fingers 
and sing the chant as a sign of reconciliation. “Mir, mir, mir, niko nije kriv” (Serbian version).    
136
 See: Buden 2012 
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by critical theory especially applies to those activists who were either participants in the war or 
had to run and hide in fear of being mobilized and sent to war or, got wounded during the war 
as civilians. Their early theoretical inputs were not deep or systematic, but they were in some 
ways more powerful, in comparison to what the next couple of generations were exposed to, 
during their teenage years. Historical moment was different. The role of Yugoslavia in 
international affairs and its internal organization were different as well. An interviewee from 
Sarajevo:                 
“I was getting theoretical information sporadically – mainly through real experiences, 
documentary movies and conversations. I was fascinated by Bader-Meinhof, Brigate Rosse, ETA, 
IRA. I found these topics in newspapers’ articles during high school. I looked at those people as 
if they were heroes from the Greek tragedy… No matter how powerful their rivals were, and in 
spite of numerous deadlocks, they still had the courage and strength to fight. I wasn’t sure 
whether they should’ve killed Aldo Moro, but the very fact that there are people who do not 
“go with the flow” seemed appealing. I remember that Slobodan Drakulid held a presentation 
of the book called “Terrorists” in Zagreb. Those people really came! You could see them, with 
their beards, yellow fingers and sunglasses. Those were the channels of my theoretical 
impulses.” (Interviewee no. 26) 
The last channel of diffusion worth mentioning has to do with internet which had already 
been in common use for couple of years before the rise of the student movement in Croatia in 
2008/2009. This channel might be thus prescribed to the external events which affected the 
counter-hegemonic reasoning in the former Yugoslav region via internet. Considering that the 
student movement started occurring alongside with the global economic crisis, this factor 
undoubtedly appears as relevant for both collective endeavors and individual interest in certain 
political issues. As indicated by one of the interviewees, “the dynamics would have been way 
different had we been the same age in 2002” (Interviewee no. 10). Nonetheless, the crisis with 
its global consequences triggered individual interest for certain branches of literature and 
streams of theory. This interest, yet, would have never been triggered had there not been for 
internet and online platforms through which knowledge was acquired. An interviewee from 
Zagreb:   
“Before the blockade we had a reading group that talked about Marx's “Capital”. People 
from various universities participated, not only those from the Faculty of Philosophy. We were 
reading other texts as well – for instance, I remember reading Laclau. This was by no means a 
simple endeavor, since there was no conventional institutional framework, and no one 
previously held lectures about it. I think the catalyst was the 2007/8 economic crisis. There 
were different web portals (Guardian, Monthly Review) where you could find articles and 
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references to books tackling this issue. The moment of crisis was therefore important because 
the system turned out not to be as good as we thought.” (Interviewee no. 10)  
The factor of crisis inspired future activists to start reading literature relevant for the 
historical moment they found themselves in. We have already mentioned that some of them 
found the “New Left Review” quite appealing and perceived it as a relevant source in those 
times. Crisis, thus, appeared as an external factor contributing to the choice of topics, literature 
and authors. Theoretical insights and the acquisition of more abstract knowledge (on topics 
related to the crisis, among others) helped systematize their worldview value/knowledge 
systems before, during and after the practical endeavors undertaken by the student movement. 
The external factors for literature choices at the level of (theoretical) systematization of 
previously adopted worldviews are not limited only to the global economic crisis. Considering 
the generation of activists involved in the student movement in Zagreb, these pre-crisis events 
played a role in the period between the non-theoretical (worldview) and the theoretical phase 
of individual cognitive development. One could label this period as the phase of 
experimentation in the transitional period between worldviews and more serious conceptual 
apparatus: 
“I remember when the situation with movements and [anti-G8 protests in] Genoa was 
acute. At that time, I was dabbling with research on “Black Block” and similar topics. 
Simultaneously, the issue of Islamic fundamentalism was omnipresent and I considered it as an 
identity of resistance, something similar to being a Serb in Croatia. This is why I started reading 
Said and other literature related to political Islam. This prompted me to start studying Turkish 
language at the University.” (Interviewee no.11)     
The wave of social movements’ confrontation with the globalized capitalism was much 
more than a marginal political phenomenon, and it was already reaching a significant level of 
strength during the late 1990s. Nonetheless, echoes of events such as anti-WTO protest (also 
called “Battle for Seattle”) in 1999 or anti-G8 protest in Genoa in 2001, did not reach societies 
of former Yugoslavia (at the time of happening) in a form of direct incentive for social action, or 
indirect channel of diffusion of critical theory. A radical critique of the status quo was at the 
time still absent from this region. The hegemony of the post-socialist condition was still too 
strong. However, such echoes did reach some members of the former Yugoslav youth later, 
when they were in their early formative phase. The time for operationalization of the acquired 
knowledge was, again, about to appear only several years later. What remains important is that 
critical knowledge managed to find a way through and launch the wave of counter-hegemonic 
thought and action in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before the concluding 
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Theory undoubtedly influences counter-hegemonic construction of reality. Critical 
theory, to be more precise, “challenge the existing social order” (Keucheyan 2013, 2) by 
challenging the dominant paradigm along its three pillars expressed through narratives about 
the past, present, and the future. The hegemonic interpretation of reality along these three 
time references stands for the process of reproduction of the existing power relations in the 
present moment and as an “investment” for the unchanged power relations in the future. 
Hegemonic perception of the past is nonetheless, very important for the hegemonic forces and 
usually the hardest to deconstruct for the counter-hegemonic forces.  
In the given context of post-socialism, the struggle over meaning of the socialist (recent) 
past has become central on the “battlefield” where hegemony and counter-hegemony 
compete. In this chapter, one could notice how challenging became, for the activists who went 
through the experience of socialism, to distinguish between their personal experiences and 
collectivized dominant memory of socialism. Even personal memory (which is personal 
experience encapsulated as memory) tends to show all its susceptibility to externally imposed 
revisionism and easily “assimilate” the newly established official (collective) memory.  
On the other hand, the youth has grown up without any previous experience or memory of 
the socialist times. They were socialized and educated in the post-socialist zeitgeist. Knowledge 
that seeks to counter-balance such tendencies of historical revisionism comes both from 
theoretical and non-theoretical camp. On the non-theoretical side, it is the knowledge based on 
the “non-contaminated” memory of socialism, usually conveyed through family habitus. The 
cases of Belgrade and Zagreb especially show this pattern, whereas the case of Sarajevo also 
includes activists who had their own memory (“non-contaminated” by the post-socialist 
interpretation of it) based on personal experience (they did not need family mediators). 
At the side of theoretical knowledge, the dominance of post-socialist perception of the 
socialist past could be contested under condition of that early socialization predisposed further 
development of a critique (though some exceptions are also traced). Alternatively, though in 
rare cases, theory could have played the role of the “corrector” of conservative worldviews 
inherited from the family habitus. An instance where generic (theoretical) knowledge plays a 
more significant role is the counter-hegemonic perception of the further, hence pre-socialist 
past. Narratives of the “glorious past” of specifically “just” inclinations of a certain nation 
throughout centuries are usually constructed through the means of historical revisionism. 
Picking some elements of heritage and neglecting others, as well as pure falsification or 
exaggeration of historical events were constitutive of that endeavor. Serbian “Kosovo battle” or 
Croatian “1000-year dream about a nation” fall under such narratives. The task of critical 
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theories is, nonetheless, not only to combat these narratives and illuminate their falseness. 
Their task is primarily embodied in building and supporting a critical stance with respect to the 
function these narratives have in legitimization of contemporary state of affairs in post-
socialism.  
Domination over the past is the basis for domination over the present and the future. The 
battlefield of the present is, nonetheless, different due to a single feature: direct experience is 
not missing because everyone lives in present times. Intuitively, no one would expect that 
socially disadvantaged and economically deprived are doubtful about their social and economic 
condition, regardless of the dominant narrative behind it. If this was so, resistance would not be 
exceptional, and researchers would not study it. The situation is reverse precisely because 
narratives about the past and the future interfere with the perception of the present. 
Illumination of the present condition is inseparable from demystification of the past and the 
future, but it also has its own autonomous misconceptions. Theoretical insights about these 
misconceptions, from the domain of the Critical theory (Frankfurt School) or critical urban and 
municipal studies have very much to say about consumerism, gentrification and many other 
phenomena which have been shaping individual lives in post-socialism. In Zagreb, theoretical 
influences leaned to the side of Critical theory and Marxism of a more classical type and to a 
certain extent, post-Marxism. In Belgrade, it was municipalism and critical urban studies that 
prompted many individual activists to reassess the dominant vision of the “development” of 
Belgrade in present time. In Sarajevo, there was more psychoanalysis and classical political 
theory (among other branches of literature). This is why generic knowledge could have played 
an important role in revealing the logic behind contemporary processes within the post-socialist 
time and space.  
The non-theoretical knowledge, on the other hand, could cover the side of direct 
experience that managed to avoid being encapsulated by the greater transitional narrative. If 
someone’s parents lost their job in an industrial town, if factories were destroyed through 
privatization, one needed no special glasses to perceive that, objectively, life became more 
difficult and insecure. Seemingly, no generic knowledge was needed for such endeavor. Yet, the 
narrative about “painful but necessary transformation of the economy” stayed at the very 
center of the post-socialist legitimation machinery. Knowledge extracted from direct 
experience needed either theoretical supplement (as argued above) or some sort of additional 
non-theoretical insights which could come from the counter-hegemonic journalism, subversive 
art contents or similar sources. Together, these two types of knowledge, theoretical and non-
theoretical, could form a counter-hegemonic set of knowledge which was then to be acquired 
through certain channels, and under certain (social) circumstances.  
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Consequently, it was not only the past and the present, but also the projection of future 
that had to be deconstructed. There is a saying in Serbia: “Our future is very predictable, unlike 
our past”. This means that uncertainty stays in the past, since the historical events constantly 
get reset, reframed, forgotten or falsified under the weight of historical revisionism. On the 
contrary, the future is very certain and bright since the transition will inevitably end up 
“successful”. In a nutshell, this is how the transitional narrative goes. Due to lack of any possible 
experience from the future, the role of non-theoretical knowledge in deconstruction of such 
hegemonic projections is reduced. Possibly, this role may be played by certain literature, such 
as dystopian descriptions of future society whose traces in form of signs or “poetry from the 
future” (Horvat 2019) could also be detected in present times. The narrative about “brighter 
future” is, nonetheless, to be more powerfully deconstructed by the means of logic and critical 
theory. 
“The light at the end of transitional tunnel” and its brightness is induced by means of 
transitional narrative about the past and the present. This light at the end of transitional tunnel, 
as argued by Žižek, could also be portrayed as “another train approaching from the opposite 
direction” (Žižek 2014, 248). The most efficient theoretical apparatus through which the 
projected “transitional” future could be challenged is probably the one of political economy. 
Analyses that can cover the relationship between the economic center, semi-periphery and 
periphery, usually show either limited or no chances of having any sort of “brighter future” 
under given unequal economic relations.  
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Even though these inputs come from individual activists, the final shape of movements’ 
discourses and their conceptual content is the product of specific dynamics of collective identity 
formation. In this part, we discussed the origins and channels of diffusion of critical knowledge 
acquired by individual activists. In the following, final part, we are dealing with the dynamics of 
collective identity creation that allowed the above-mapped concepts and individual cognitive 





















Chapter 6: Consolidation of Discourses through Collective Cognition 
 
In the chapter four, “Mapping Concepts”, the three epistemic discourses were 
decomposed. From the analysis, it became clear that all of them rest upon counter-hegemonic 
epistemic content. In order to trace the origins of conceptual apparatuses employed by the 
three movements, I started digging deep into the origins of the acquired counter-hegemonic 
knowledge, on the level of individual activists. After elaborating the role of theoretical and non-
theoretical knowledge in the process of what McAdam calls “cognitive liberation” (and 
formation of critical cognitive maps), the research circle can be closed by analyzing the 
dynamics of conceptual/epistemic discursive consolidation.  
In order to do this, one should look at the specific niche of the process of collective identity 
formation which is, to remind the readers, presented in this work as “a process of integrating 
different sources of cognitive influences into a movement identity” (Eyerman and Jameson 
1991, 70). This specific niche has to do with conceptual positioning within collective identity 
building. In the “discursive part”, I tackled the theme of structural and contextual factors, as 
well as factors related to the type of a given social movement that played a role in this 
positioning. All these factors could partially explain epistemic contents of the three types of 
discourse from the macro perspective. In this part, focus is shifting from macro to meso level 
and addresses internal/organizational characteristics of social movements. Primarily, the aim is 
to assess internal organizational and other advantages and/or disadvantages, which affected 
the way in which epistemic discourses of the three activist collectives have been constructed. 
Thereby, I seek to illuminate the way in which individual cognitive inputs were subjected to the 
forces typical for collective identity building (in the wider sense of meaning) and, consequently, 
the way in which these cognitive inputs ended up organized in epistemic discourses as detected 
in the chapter four. In addition, I am looking at the way in which internal organizational factors 
affected conceptual choices and coherency of conceptual edifices, overall.   
To remind the readers, the main front-running master-frame in Zagreb was constructed 
around the issue of “free education”, causes of its degradation (neoliberalism, interest of 
capital, etc.) and a set of supportive master-frames compound of concepts such as (social) 
justice or social and economic rights. In Belgrade, the main focus was on the commons, public 
goods and “right to the city”, whereas the set of supportive master-frames included reinvention 
of the concept of self-management, the rule of law and alike. Finally, Sarajevo’s “front-running” 
master-frames were social justice and (human) dignity, supported by concepts such as 
“transitional theft”, nepotism, corruption, etc. Obviously, Belgrade and Zagreb had narrower 
“frontrunners” and more general supportive master-frames. Sarajevo, on the other hand, had 
more general frontrunners, and more specific supportive master-frames. One should wonder 
156 
 
why these epistemic discourses, apart from the above analyzed structural and contextual 
factors, ended up having such shapes. Considering that activists, individually, carried more than 
a few theoretical (and non-theoretical) streams of thought, the research showed that the 
process of collective conceptual identification was determined by several 
(internal/organizational) factors. Among others, the identified factors are:  
1. Activist networks;  
2. Level of interpersonal trust;  
3. Organizational forms: deliberation and hegemony;  
4. Social base and external factors137 
These four factors are detected throughout the empirical research which included both 
discourse analysis and qualitative in-depth interviews. Additional epistemic tools of mine were 
firsthand insights on the dynamics of collective identity building, especially in cases of Sarajevo 
and Belgrade. In the context of the main research focus, the four factors through which the 
discursive consolidation is to be assessed and analyzed are derived from various formal and 
informal social and scientific activities undertaken before and throughout the research process.   
 
6.1. Genesis of the Development of Activist Networks 
 
The role of social networks in social movement studies has been widely researched. 
Within cultural approach, “social ties have been treated as consisting of 
processes of meaning attribution” (Diani 2003, 5; in Diani and McAdam 2013). This approach is, 
as argued in the theoretical chapter, only partially applied in this thesis. Nonetheless, what 
concerns me specifically is not the question of how different collective actors get to form 
alliances (networks) once they are already established as separate actors. Instead, the question 
of how networks matter is about to be addressed in “relation to inter-organizational dynamics, 
while wondering what can the shape of inter-organizational links tell us about the main 
orientations of specific movements” (ibid., 4). The focus is, in other words, the interaction 
between individuals and smaller groups whose intercommunication eventually ended up as a 
single activist entity. Furthermore, network analysis is suitable when dealing with internal 
dynamics of various segments of collective identity formation, including discursive 
consolidation. This perspective, namely, “prompts a reflection on the relationship between 
social networks and the cognitive maps through which [collective] actors make sense of, and 
categorize their social environment, locating themselves within broader webs of ties and 
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 Under “external factors” I mean both transnational influences and effects that eventually came from another 
city or region within the same national state. 
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interactions” (ibid., 5). Before final consolidation, the three social movements in question 
undertook three different “networking” pathways.  
Firstly, the Croatian activist scene was quite fragmented prior to the blockade (of the 
Faculty of Philosophy) in 2009. Green, anarchist and anti-war groups were present, but not very 
connected. None of them (except for the anti-war campaigns and activities) received any 
serious public visibility. In 2007/8 the discussion over Croatian membership in NATO provoked 
activists and groups to organize and agitate against joining this military alliance. The anti-NATO 
protests became the first point of serious convergence between activists of various interests 
and profiles in the post-socialist Croatia.  
Simultaneously, a group of students started organizing joined reading sessions on Marx and 
other critical thinkers. Central reading group was the one focused on reading “Das Capital”. In 
parallel, the internet forum with students of the Faculty of Philosophy was gathering people 
who discussed different social and political issues. Most of the ideological and other 
divergences typical for processes of collective identity building actually took place online, 
before the occurrence of the well-organized student movement in 2008/2009. This is why deal-
braking conflicts among the core members had already been resolved (with or without 
agreement on certain points) by the time discursive consolidation and joined activities reached 
their peak. This does not mean that no divisions existed within the student movement. Most 
generally, the most important division that the core group inherited from the past was the one 
between more theory-oriented people and those who were more into practical action.  
Those who were more theory-oriented had previously discussed major conceptual issues in 
a sort of, “intellectual isolation”. Those involved in previous actions such as anti-NATO or anti-
Bologna (higher education reform) campaign (carried out mainly by the group gathered in the 
so called “Bologna section”) came out of these actions more united. On one side, there were 
people from the internet forum and the reading/debating group, whereas on the other were 
anti-NATO activists, the Greens, members of the student parliament and members of the newly 
established “Bologna section”, in charge of analyzing documents related to the (Bologna higher 
education) reform. Even though the “theorists” participated in the big protest against joining 
NATO (2008), the crucial question remained – how to bring the two groups closer to one 
another. The “practitioners” were successful in mobilization and this is what made them 
relevant. The “theorists” were, nonetheless, equipped and seemingly capable of articulating a 
more radical critique:   
“We [the “Bologna section”] organized the first protest in spring 2008 and it was framed 
as “let the institutions do their job”. The “Bologna reform” was not questioned as such, but the 
inability of the reformers to implement it. This protest was organized by the so called “Bologna 
section” and 5000 people showed up. This was the first time in 20 years that so many students 
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participated in a protest. Everyone was worried about their studies. At that moment, it was 
clear that students were willing to do something and become active.” (Interviewee no. 14) 
The “theorists” were more radical in their views than the “practitioners”. Discrepancy 
between radical nature of the theorist group and reformism of the majority in the practice-
oriented group showed two opposite tendencies within the movement that was about to occur. 
Reconciling these two groups, yet, became the conditio sine qua non for the establishment of a 
solid collective and consolidation of the collective’s discourse. At the same time, one could see 
what bridging theory with practice actually looked like. The theoretical branch wanted, after 
almost two years of discussions via forum and reading groups, to politicize the student issue. 
Others from the “practice-oriented” branch were (mostly) concerned with finding the way to 
challenge much narrower problems – such as the “Bologna reform”.  
More importantly, these two fractions came together before the blockade and this is why 
the group of people working on the strategy for occupation grew to a couple of dozens. They 
managed to come together mainly due to personal contacts which, again, they owe largely to 
the specificity of the social habitus within which the movement was occurring. Things were not 
however arranged smoothly, precisely because of the divergences between more and less 
radical activists coming from the two groups:  
“The first serious conflict within the group happened between those who perceived the 
student issue as something to be kept as strictly technical and those who thought of politicizing 
the whole thing. The first group *of “practitioners”+ was thinking in terms of redistribution, 
wanting to address the “inefficacy of the state apparatus”. However, when the main agitators 
and supporters of the blockade came closer to those from the student parliament, the number 
of people founding the initial group grew to 40-50.” (Interviewee no. 12)  
The biggest event that these two groups organized together was the student protest in 
November 2008. That was the first protest “for free education”. By that time, a higher level of 
synchronization between theory and practice oriented groups was yet to be achieved. This 
protest was among those activities that brought people together and helped them to get to 
know each other better. Undoubtedly, this familiarity preconditioned the very possibility of the 
two fractions to come together138 in the dawn of the act of occupation. They became one 
“body” that expressed itself through “initial committee”. This committee became the core of 
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The “practitioners” and “theoreticians” are formulated here on the basis of previous collective activities. Some 
people were (almost) exclusively concerned with reading groups (Marx’s “Capital” for instance), others (almost) 
exclusively with practical actions (anti-NATO campaign, “Bologna reform” protest). This does not mean that people 
from one group did not participate in the activities of another. There were two focuses, practical and theoretical, 
and this analytical division seeks to capture these two “specializations”. 
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the student movement, with its more theoretical group on one side and more practice-oriented 
branch on the other. 
The municipal movement in Belgrade (NDB) had several years of developmental genesis and 
network building before it took the final (discursive) shape. Tracing this genesis mostly means 
following the two processes: one being the occurrence of the activist scene in Belgrade in 
general; and the other process of gathering and formation of what will later become the core 
group of NDB. The movement itself is, as we have already seen, comprised of individuals with 
various interests: from urban development and architecture to political theory and philosophy, 
literature, cultural politics, art etc. “Right to the city” appears as conceptual “glue” that 
nonetheless had to find its way through a dense network of interpersonal linkages and 
interactions.  
First contacts between the (future) activists were established in several different ways. 
Some of them went to school together, others knew each other from the (re)emerging 
subcultural (punk) scene, or they knew each other from the neighborhood but started hanging 
out more intensely later. Seminars, workshops and “reconciliation programs” also enabled 
people to meet each other. “George Soros connected us”, one of the activists jokingly declared.  
“They would gather us and start talking about “open society”. We would then sigh every 
time they said something foolish. I remember when two guys - one from Zagreb’s initiative 
“Right to the city” and one member of today’s NDB, started singing “Bandiera Rossa” (…) then 
the organizers would usually start blackmailing you, saying that you won’t get a scholarship if 
you don’t listen. But you’d turn around and you see many familiar faces from the subcultural 
scene. You’d locate them and you’d hang out with them – otherwise you could go crazy 
listening to all those fantasies about “open society”.” (Interviewee no. 30)     
Importantly, initial networking and consolidation of the future NDB activists was happening 
within a wider process of (re)emergence of the alternative activist scene. Croatian actions for 
Varšavska Street and the student movement, as well as the ideas such as David Harvey’s “right 
to the city” spread to Serbia. Diffusion of ideas pushed forward marginal activist scene in 
Belgrade and resulted in several smaller and bigger scale actions in the years to come. 
Belgrade’s activist scene has not inherited any sort of previously assumed or constructed 
habitus within which it could have matured (like it was the case with the Faculty of Philosophy 
in Zagreb). Instead, its development went hand in hand with various smaller scale activities that 
were supposed to build a more serious activist scene. 
NDB’s “journey” started when several partially interlinked or simply parallel small-scale 
activities converged and started “communicating” with each other. One of the decisive 
moments was when the two activists who had a radio show called “The Ministry of Space” 
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(streamed at the “New Radio Belgrade”) and those who organized street galleries – came 
together. The linkage between them was partially made through punk subculture and partially 
as acquaintances from “the city”.139 This was when the core organization of (future) NDB called 
“The Ministry of Space” was created.  
Apart from NGO workshops, (punk) concerts and house parties, the forerunning activities to 
the NDB included two bigger scale actions. The first one was the occupation of the building of 
“Inex Film” in 2011.140 From then on, the process of consolidation of the alternative activist 
scene got accelerated. What followed were smaller scale activities and gatherings and, 
consequentially, the occupation of the cinema “Zvezda”141 in 2014. Only in retrospect did “Inex 
Film” and “Zvezda” become constitutive elements of the genesis and consolidation of this 
movement. In parallel, the (future) NDB kept pushing the activist scene forward, as the (still 
underdeveloped) activist scene pushed the NDB.  Consequentially, this municipal movement 
became the most influential new actor of Serbian alternative activist scene.     
The importance of previous activist experience, including the above mentioned two bigger 
scale and several smaller scale actions, was confirmed in 2015. The “core” group gathered 
around “The Ministry of Space” was enriched by individual activists and other smaller 
organizations that were joining along the way – from the occupation of “Inex Film” (2011) to 
cinema “Zvezda” (2014). Both “Inex Film” and “Zvezda” were actions in which different actors 
tried to claim hegemony over meaning. In “Inex Film” the anarchists finally prevailed, even 
though the “Ministry of space” was best organized. In spite, or precisely because of that, they 
decided to leave and let the space “take on a life of its own”.  
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 Here lies an interesting specificity of Belgrade as the biggest center of urban life in former Yugoslavia. Several 
interviewees indicated Belgrade party life as important for connections, acquaintances and finally, friendship. One 
of the core activists of NDB was famous for his house parties. One of his closest activist “colleagues” today - 
explained how she met him in person only after she had been attending his parties several times. The reason she 
had not met him at the parties before, was that they were always so crowded that she never managed to get 
further from the stairs. She never actually managed to enter the house. The “urban” momentum of Belgrade has 
persisted until nowadays, but the subversive character of its party life has been either significantly weakened or 
lost.        
140 “Inex Film” was a social cinematographic company dealing with movie production and distribution. It was a part 
of former Yugoslav mega company “Inex” that was among the biggest exporters in the socialist Yugoslavia. The 
estimated value of this company was couple of hundreds of millions of euros. Today, the building of “Inex Film” in 
Višnjička Street is devastated and abandoned. Inside there are no traces of its history. Hence, it may be seen 
through the paradigm of brutal capitalist transition and privatization we have been witnessing in the last twenty 
years (…) Due to symbolic value that this space had in the context of Yugoslav cultural production and its heritage, 
and due to the fact that it was created as a space of social property belonging to then socialist society, we found its 
usage a legitimate act of using common infrastructure for the needs of contemporary collective production,  
knowledge exchange and development of cultural and activist contents.” This description is taken from the second 
call for collective action in the occupied building of “Inex Film” on the 14.5.2011. Available online: 
https://kontekstprostor.wordpress.com/tag/inex-film/  
141 See more about the occupation of “Zvezda” on the following link: http://tourdescinemas.com/zvezda-cinema-
beograd/?lang=en   
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Meanwhile, the future “core” of NDB partially flowed into the NGO sphere (roundtables, 
public debates, publications etc.) and partially continued thinking about possible spaces and 
methods of a more systemic contestation of the status quo. Occupation of the privatized and 
practically dysfunctional cinemas in Belgrade was in their thoughts ever since they left “Inex 
Film”. Finally, in 2014, together with students of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts and culture 
workers (most of them pertaining to film and theater industry), they occupied cinema “Zvezda” 
in the very center of Belgrade. At first, it looked like the cinema could have become a perfect 
symbol of the transitional theft and a suitable niche of politicization. 
 “The whole thing became more politicized with “Zvezda”. The guy who bought the 
cinema didn’t buy it because he wanted to run it but because he wanted to extract profit. He 
could do it because someone close to the day’s government allowed him. His name is Nikola 
Živanovid and he is the best man of Mlađan Dinkid.”142  (Interviewee no. 27) 
It turned out, however, that the majority focused exclusively on issues concerning workers 
in the film industry. Another attempt of politicization thereby failed. The importance of both 
“Inex” and “Zvezda” was, nonetheless, confirmed later. The years of 2014/15 were significant 
because the “Ministry of Space”, together with some ten people from other fields, formed the 
cornerstone of the NDB movement. 
Finally, epistemic discourse of the popular movement in Sarajevo developed through events 
that happened prior to consolidation of the “core” activists. In other words, the protest events 
in Tuzla and later in Sarajevo simply forestalled collective identity formation, including 
discursive consolidation of the popular movement. This process took place along the way. The 
order of events, whereby the unarticulated and (quite) violent protests preceded the formation 
of more or less formalized group of activists with some vision, imposed a serious organizational 
limitation and prevented the group from taking more serious control over discourse.  
Since the core group came together after the beginning of protests, their gathering could be 
perceived as a reaction to the protests. The collective “cognitive map” was, hence, yet to be set 
in an ad-hoc manner, retroactively. What the activists could try was channeling the energy from 
the streets into the plenary session and organizing discourse around the demands coming from 
the street itself. This was, nonetheless, not an easy endeavor:  
“Look, there was complete chaos on the streets, an uncontrolled madness. There were 
just crowds without any compass (…) I went out to protest on the fifth day and the only thing I 
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 Mlađan Dinkid was the Governor of the National Bank of Serbia from 2000 to 2003. After that he participated in 
all governments until 2013 either as the finance minister or the minister of economy. After 2013 he was engaged 
in businesses between Serbia and United Arab Emirates, as a vice president of the committee for cooperation 
between these two countries.  
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knew was that we’re protesting in support of the people in Tuzla. I recognized many people 
from the “Bebolution”143. After setting the institutional buildings on fire, the whole thing 
could’ve gone in many directions. Someone had to channel all that anger, to articulate it 
somehow. We were at high risk. They [the police] could’ve easily started shooting at us had the 
protests taken a certain direction. It could’ve happened easily, had all of this been limited to 
setting buildings on fire, without articulating a more specific goal.” (Interviewee no. 15)  
Channeling popular discontent, heterogeneous in expression but caused by the same 
systemic failure of the post-socialist transitional Bosnia to meet the needs of its own people, 
would have probably been less difficult had there been a ready-made activist network with 
organizational (infra)structure. When the protests began, the activists could rely only on 
superficial acquaintanceships with people involved in other smaller scale protests before 2014 
(like the protests after Denis Mrnjavac’s death in 2008144 or the “JMBG” (“Bebolution”) protests 
in 2013). These superficial acquaintanceships, nonetheless, initiated the process of more 
tangible interaction between activists that, in most cases, rested on theoretical debates and 
cooperation. In the months preceding the protests, namely, a group of people applied to the 
public call, wanting to participate in the working group for “social justice”. Those who got 
accepted came together to read, debate and in the end, write a publication together. The work 
of this group was initiated by an activist who came back from a working (research) visit to 
Barcelona and secured funding for this project. A week before the protests started, the 
publication was presented in Sarajevo. At the time of presentation, no one thought this joint 
work could become, although weak, a sort of social (and conceptual) base for the foundation of 
the popular movement’s “core” group. This core managed to write a couple of proclamations 
during the early days of street protests which, somewhat, universalized demands coming from 
the street. Oftentimes, people were not ready to give in and abstain from further 
particularization of demands. The sense of caring for others was truncated, which initially 
decreased the likeliness of forming a solid political entity.   
 “There was a man who said that all war veterans who spent 18 years in the bureau for 
the unemployed should get compensated, and he indicated the exact amount of compensation. 
Then we asked him why he is singling out only those who spent 18 years in the bureau, he 
responded: “Because I’ve been unemployed for 18 years”.” (Interviewee no.25) 
At the beginning, listening and transmitting “signals” from the street protests was the main 
preoccupation of the “core”. This is why, when talking about the “core”, we are in fact talking 
                                                          
143
 “Bebolution” is a colloquial name for the protests which took place in 2013 in Sarajevo. The protesters gathered 
after a sick baby died due to the complex administration. They could not issue her birth number on time, in which 
case the baby could have been sent abroad for treatment and possibly, save her life.   
144
 Denis is a boy who got killed in the tram by a group of teenagers who stabbed him to death because he “looked 
at them”.  
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about the organizers (of plenums) whose initial role was to convey the sentiment from bellow, 
rather than to shape meaning and provide directions for political articulation. 
“Our role was to channel, rather than to organize and control the discourse of messages 
we’re sending. We simply couldn’t do more, even if we wanted. People were coming in with 
demands, and if you didn’t take them into account you could immediately leave. This was our 
social base, all these people. We had to take into account everyone’s demands: from those 
coming from Alipašino polje145 whose electricity bills kept coming even though the electricity 
was shot down; to the former workers of “Hidrogradnja” who complained about their 
destroyed factory which was once constructing airports. The substance of what we tried to 
communicate in the coming weeks stemmed from what those people said in the streets and 
later, plenums.” (Interviewee no 17) 
Evidently, established or semi established activist networks are better capable of 
“constructing an issue” and “politicize” certain social economic problems, as well as pointing at 
their importance and emphasizing their “weight” for social and political community. By the 
same token, well established activist networks are more capable of reacting adequately to 
external events, sudden uprisings and protests, as well as channeling collective outrage, anger 
and dissatisfaction. Consequently, gradual mobilization as detected in Zagreb and Belgrade is 
more suitable for development of solid cognitive edifice, whereby each concept employed 
through discursive performance has, at least, a roughly assigned discursive role. Ad hoc 
processes of collective identity construction and discursive consolidation, as detected in 
Sarajevo, have initial limitations that are very difficult to be compensated afterwards. In 
situations of sudden outbursts of accumulated discontent, when even well-established social or 
political networks/actors have problems with managing complex situations, ad hoc attempts of 
articulation are most likely condemned to failure. Moreover, gradual evolution of collective 
identification and discursive consolidation brings about a certain level of trust. Primarily, trust is 
to be established among the “core” activists, and consequently, between the “core” and the 
wider group of activists and supporters. The following subchapter talks about the role of trust, 
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 Alipašino polje is a neighborhood in Sarajevo.  
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6.2. The Role of Trust 
 
Talking about networks is not only important due to overall coherency of meaning 
attached to collective actions. It is also important because certain types of networks or, better 
said certain characteristics of networks fuel or discourage the establishment of trust among the 
activists. In theory, the linkage between networks and trust is discussed in studies which 
emphasize the relevance of networks’ density. In late 1980s, James Coleman (1988; 1990) was 
already talking about dense networks as cultivators of trust. His approach was leaning towards 
the rational choice theory which assumes that dense networks encourage trustworthy relations 
because individual actors rationally assess that trust pays off. The logic is that dense networks, 
in which everyone knows each other well, make the reputation of an individual highly 
dependent on their behavior. Every non-solidary or damageable behavior, according to this 
approach, puts an individual to risk of being ostracized from the group. This is, however, not the 
approach I am applying here. Other conceptualizations, which instead suggest that “dense 
networks can cultivate a sense of duty amongst their members and/or a sense of solidarity” 
(Blumer 1969; Mead 1967), are more appropriate. Such understanding tells us a lot about the 
linkage between networks and inter-personal trust, but observe cooperation from a more 
“organic” perspective, rather than the perspective of strategic advantages and rational choice 
theory (see: Crossley, Bellotti, Edwards, Everett, Koskinen, Tranmer 2015, 33). I will address 
trust for each case. 
The process of discursive consolidation within collective identity formation of the municipal 
movement in Belgrade, functioned in the best spirit of the formation of “general will”, 
understood in the sense in which Rousseau developed it, as an aggregate of differences.146 
Rather than leveling them out, differences were initially accepted. People involved included 
those coming from the independent cultural scene, NGO’s and other subcultural circles. While 
sharing substantial ideals and more general aims of their common struggle, even the narrow 
“core” group was heterogeneous with respect to specific interests and means for accomplishing 
the shared ideals:  
“D. has always been more into topics with a stronger political message. A. has been 
interested in housing and housing policies, evictions and social justice. He insisted on including 
as many people as possible. M.'s interest has always been oriented towards culture and cultural 
policies. Mine is a similar story.”  (Interviewee no. 29) 
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 For further philosophical explication of the “general will” and the application to contemporary 21
st
 century  
world, see: Azuma 2014.  
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Composition of the core group was non-hierarchical and at the moments fuzzy (according to 
the testimonies of some members and former members who specifically emphasized this 
characteristic), but the general horizon of what was commonly desired as the field of action 
was quite clear. The image of where the struggle is supposed to lead was, nonetheless, clearer 
in the heads of those who had been there from the beginning, since the “Inex Film”. The 
decisive role in discursive consolidation and meaning attribution was, therefore, played by the 
“Ministry of space” whose members “unlike others, always had a clear vision about where to 
go” (Interviewee no. 28). As this interviewee testifies, this does not mean that their ideas were 
always better, but they were often better articulated. According to him, this is what determined 
the general direction of the Initiative “Don Let Belgrade D(r)own”.  
Trust among the core members was built in a long process and many years of network 
building and activism from “Inex Film” onwards. The basis for trust between those who 
“jumped in” during and after the occupation of “Zvezda”, and those who had already been 
involved in the struggle for common spaces since “Inex Film”, rested upon respect (and maybe 
appreciation) of mutual differences and consolidation of (more substantial) similarities among 
activists. When I asked one of them how come they remained together in spite of tangible 
differences, he replied: “Because we didn’t put labels on each other’s foreheads.” 
The main line of division was between more liberal (civic) and more radically democratic 
(left) streams. These kinds of divisions are, of course, much longer-lasting. Reconciling “the 
citizen” and “the man” (or the “people”) persisted in theoretical debates ever since the early 
phases of Enlightenment. This dispute is still cutting across lines of ideological and conceptual 
differences between the liberals and the socialists/communists, as it has been for centuries. 
Such conceptual clash found its place within NDB as well.  
 “I remember that we had internal disagreement about an article written by I. in the daily 
newspaper “Danas”. V. thought that he criticized the concept of “citizenship” too much. I find 
these kinds of debates fruitful, as a matter of fact – especially for the people who hadn't dealt 
with concepts before. It was a good occasion for them to start thinking about concepts. We 
have created a friendly environment, we trusted each other and under such circumstances, 
people can learn from each other.” (Interviewee no. 36)  
There were two factors which decisively affected the final result of these internal disputes. 
Firstly, the “core” had more leverage because its members were there from the beginning of 
the process and they built the strongest network (between each other and with others).147  
Secondly, they were, on average, more theoretically equipped and, hence, more trustworthy 
when it came to discursive profiling of the movement. The “core” eventually succeeded to 
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 A sort of “exclusivity” of the core members was specially emphasized by the activists who are not in the core.  
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reconcile different streams within the movement, where the “citizens” met the “people” and 
the leftists met the liberals.  
The core was capable of this due to its internal cohesion based on trust, on the one hand, 
and, to some extent, the trust they received by the rest of the movement, on the other. Here, 
one can observe the major difference in the level of trust within the “core” and between the 
“core” and the rest of the movement. In the prior case the network was very closed and dense, 
but the (“external”) relationship with other activists/actors was never as dense. Closeness 
among the “core” members was based on long lasting friendships and gradual building of 
mutual trust through formal actions and informal meetings. Others, who were joining along the 
way, never managed to pierce to the “core”. In most cases, they stayed external to the dense 
network developed within it. In a way, this allowed the “core” to manage and decisively shape 
(epistemic) discourse. At the same time, this is what caused limitations with final consolidation 
of the movement.    
The case of Zagreb showed similar tendencies with a slight, but significant difference. As 
already explicated previously, the foundations for the key endeavor in 2009 had been already 
set. Like Belgrade, the “core” group, as well as a wider circle of activists, got to know each other 
beforehand which, in a way, launched the process of building trust between them “on time”.  
“We should definitely stress the fact that a great number of people knew each other 
years before the blockade and did many things together. This led to the establishment of trust 
between them. Even when we differed in views and opinions, it never led to divisions.” 
(Interviewee no. 5) 
Soon, trust became crucial, primarily for the “core” group, and later for conceptual 
consolidation of discourse and collective identity (overall) which was, same as in Belgrade, to a 
significant extent dictated by the “core”. Furthermore, trust represented the cornerstone for 
the establishment of a solid organization of the entire movement. This means that trust spilled 
over from the “core” to the rest of the group, thus securing a sort of hegemony of the “core” 
within the wider scope of the student movement. This hegemony became evident at plenary 
sessions (plenums) that soon became the central decision-making body of the movement.  
How was that possible? Even though the movement was inclusive and open for everyone 
(not just students), the only group that acted as an organized entity was the “core” group which 
established an envious level of trust among each other before the blockade. Solid organization, 
of course, did not come out of nowhere. The “core” group members had experience in 
organizational activist issues (from the “practitioners”) and theoretical grounding (from the 
“theorists”). Both qualities were inherited. Previously existing social networks thus supplied the 
newly established entity (the student movement) with certain organizational skills carried out 
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by the activists who, furthermore, created a dense network of trustworthy activists. We already 
elaborated how this dense network was created. Now, the question is how they managed to 
convey trust and portray themselves as trustworthy in the eyes of wider student movement 
and, consequently, how they established their discourse to be hegemonic? The   first answer is  
good organization:  
Wherever you could trace some sort of organized activities at the Faculty, you could also 
trace left-leaning tendencies. There were, of course, many students who were leaning to the 
right, but they were not well-organized. (Interviewee no. 5) 
The second answer points at the habitus of the Faculty of Philosophy which reproduces by 
itself a sort of dense and specific environment which structurally encourages trust. This 
happens both due to its legacy (of being “rebellious faculty in the past decades) and the very 
nature of a University which is inevitably producing dense and trustworthy relationships more 
than most of other environments where competition often prevails over trust.  
Despite the lack of previously established activist network, trust among the “core” members 
of Sarajevo’s popular movement was reached almost automatically, the very day protests 
started. The process of trust building was not gradual, but automatic – because it was created 
under the pressure of an external event. Under conditions of semi-chaos on the streets and the 
necessity of an ad-hoc reaction, a “blank” trust among the “core” group members was the least 
they could have given to one another. The real problem with trust, nonetheless, appears in 
relation to the wider movement. According to the testimonies, the tendency was to search for a 
new master, rather than to build mutual trust and create a new political subjectivity from the 
bottom-up. It comes as no surprise that a “Lacanian” among the activists describes the situation 
in the following way: 
“When you analyze our situation, it turns out that the convergence between workers, 
students and others meant nothing else but a hysterical demand for someone powerful to 
protect us, to embrace us and say “everything is going to be alright”.” (Interviewee no. 17)     
Of course, a famous proclamation of Lacan in the context of the French 1968, whose 
activists this psychoanalyst perceived as “searchers for a new master” (Schroeder 2008, 56), 
resonates with the case of popular uprising in Sarajevo as well. The fundamental problem, and 
there was no dispute about this among my interviewees, occurred between the two conflicting 
tendencies: the one of the “core group” to launch the bottom-up process of “building People 
through the process of political becoming” (Bosteels 2013, 5) by insisting on horizontal 
processes (such as plenums); and the popular demand for a “new master” who can save the 
(yet non-constituted) people from the “transitional misery”. The “core group” was not, 
however, willing to give in to such general sentiment. They insisted on the horizontal process 
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despite possible obstacles, because they found it crucial to create something radically new in 
terms of (new) social and political subjectivity. These tensions within the same movement – the 
inability of the rank-and-file to go through the process of “political becoming” without being 
fatally damaged on one hand; and the “core’s” perception that it is necessary to go through this 
process which included building trust (in order to accomplish desperately needed tangible 
social and political change), on the other; turned out to be unresolvable deadlock under given 
circumstances. While the rank-and-file sought leadership, the leaders refused to take the lead.  
“The organizers almost never spoke at plenums. We were doing it on purpose. This 
turned out to be a mistake because we allowed others to shape discussions. We faced the side-
effect of our decision not to have leaders, and that is why we hit a wall. The public was 
persistent in its attempts to identify who’s standing behind the plenum. People needed 
someone who’s going to lead them, who could be glorified or blamed for a potential defeat. 
They wanted someone to take responsibility for what was going on. No one among us was 
ready to take this responsibility.” (Interviewee no. 16)   
The side-effects of horizontality created a great amount of mistrust among the participants. 
All of a sudden, everyone was suspicious and considered a potential “infiltrator”.148  Of course, 
the mistrust was not without justification. Indeed, there were many people infiltrated by the 
police, security services and political parties who participated at plenums, trying to jeopardize 
the whole process. However, the line between “us” and “them” was too fluid because most 
people did not know each other beforehand and no one knew if a person sitting next to them is 
reliable or not. “Conspiracy theory spreads where people don’t know each other and where 
there is no hierarchy.” (Interviewee no. 18) 
An additional dimension of mistrust was created between the plenum and “the street”. The 
first couple of plenums served as collective psychotherapeutic sessions rather than constructive 
and powerful (additional) weapon in hands of the protestors, suddenly the image of plenum got 
another meaning. Apart from seen as “agora” and the “temple of direct democracy”, it was 
perceived by some as a pacifier of the street protests, as something that weakened the 
“impeding” power of “the street”. According to this interpretation, “the street” heated up the 
atmosphere and somewhat managed to hinder the routine of everyday life – whereas the 
plenum cooled it down and deadened the blade of the street protests.  
                                                          
148
 Infiltration and externally driven provocation are, of course, not typical only for “horizontal” social groups. 
What often appears as specific in their case with this respect – is that there is no ready-made (hierarchical) 
mechanism of resolving eventual externally driven provocation and/or infiltration. It is, moreover, especially 
troublesome if the external sabotage through infiltration takes place from the very beginning of collective identity 
formation.        
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“Protests become a virus that attacked a rotten society. The political structure could feel 
it. People were in the streets, the trams didn’t run, and the everyday life was disturbed. The 
very moment people from the street retreated to a big plenary room, they stopped causing 
problems for the structure. The protest was watered down by the plenum. In my opinion, a 
major goal should’ve been to increase the number of people in the street, not to decrease it. 
Actually, we eliminated ourselves as a problem for the political elite because the basic purpose 
of the protest was to block or at least disturb everyday life.” (Interviewee no. 20)  
Trust is hence, supposed to be the cornerstone of every well-organized collective. Chaotic 
atmosphere from the street got diffused to the plenum which only partially managed to tame 
the cacophony of deprived and dissatisfied voices. One may rightfully wonder how the plenum 
managed to articulate a meaningful discourse under such unfavorable social, structural and 
organizational conditions. 
Firstly, the network developed within the “core” could be considered (almost) dense, 
although it was built ad hoc. Within the “core”, density and trustworthiness were accomplished 
by pure necessity to react quickly. On the other side, the rest of the movement was yet to be 
constituted as such (dense and trustworthy) through plenums. The above described mistrust 
among the participants of plenums, as well as tensions between the plenum and “the street”, 
made the mistrust spill over towards the “core” as well. We could see that some documents 
had been produced before the plenum was established and the idea of the “core” was to move 
public attention away from ethno-nationalism and towards social justice. This was the first step 
which was, to an extent, successful. The idea to push this agenda more straightforwardly, 
though, was jeopardized by many factors, among which overall lack of trust was crucial. 
Thereby, the “second step”, meaning a solid organization and smoother collective identity 
creation – was more difficult to achieve.  
Both trust and the degree of development of the activist network had a tangible effect upon 
the discursive consolidation in all three cases. Another angle of observing this process, 
understood as the process of prescription of meaning through discourse, can be concerned 
with issues of social base and external influences. Following subchapter is explaining why these 







6.3. Social Base and External Influences 
 
External factors that affect discourse consolidation and diffusion of ideas from one 
social movement to another have been widely researched. While the focus of this work is on 
the diffusion of ideas from critical communities to movements and (individual) activists, I 
consider here however the diffusion of some organizational principles, such as direct 
democracy. This means that, in some cases, ideas that were already diffused from critical 
communities to social movements became familiar to similar social movements through inter-
movement cooperation. It was also stated before that ideas get diffused, but also reshaped and 
accommodated to a given context with aid of social movements. What makes imported ideas 
useful rather than counter-productive, within a given context? When talking about 
appropriateness of diffused ideas, one should pay specific attention to whether this “receiving 
context” has a solid and firm social base149 for implementation of ideas – keeping in mind that 
these diffused ideas were initially developed for or applied in other contexts. Given that the 
social base, even if existing might be passive in times without contentious social and political 
activities, its relevancy could be best assessed in times when ideas and incentives for action 
occur. I shall thus start exploring the importance of the social base by mapping external 
influences in the three case studies and look at the capacities for reception, accommodation 
and practical (political/social) usage of these influences in domestic contexts of the three 
movements in question. 
In Zagreb, the most important external influence affecting the student movement came 
from the overall global climate and the period in which various global initiatives and 
movements started inspiring each other, on the wings of rebellion against neoliberal policies in 
higher education and other fields. Within such climate, some movements, events or indeed – 
literature, affected the student movement in Croatia as well. Apart from student struggles in 
Belgrade and Ljubljana, examples of positive and negative practices in higher education policies 
were important external signs on how things could, should, or should not be organized.  
“S. made a pamphlet for the first protest in November 2008. In the following six months 
many things happened internationally and this helped us as well (…) We were familiar with 
examples of commercialization of higher education from countries like the UK and the opposite 
tendencies in countries like Finland. Because some people were theoretically equipped to 
understand and formulate clearly our demands, we opened up the possibility of taking these 
examples into account and accommodating them to domestic context.” (Interviewee no. 1) 
                                                          
149
 See the footnote number 66.  
171 
 
Previously acquired theoretical references and conceptual apparatus was therefore 
important (also) for understanding how external experiences are accommodated. Several 
interviewees mentioned Alex Callinicos and his “Universities in a Neoliberal World”. The 
relevance of this author overcomes the level of individual cognitive incentive and reaches the 
level of influencing discursive performance and articulation of that identity. When talking about 
the external factors furthermore, we are talking about insights from practical experiences 
getting diffused and serving as inspiration for the movement. 
“I think that global movements, the world economic crisis and occurrence of the 
translated literature which had not been available in the region hitherto, are among the main 
factors contributing to the occurrence of similar tendencies here in Croatia.” (Interviewee no. 3) 
Global trends of resistance, the economic crisis, commercialization and commodification of 
education hence, did have a spillover effect. Both theoretical and practical knowledge got 
diffused across space, but also across time. The inflow of critical literature, ideas and practical 
experiences did have an effect on the way in which the activists were interpreting and 
addressing certain social and political phenomena. Inspiration for the form of action 
(occupation) and method of decision – making (direct democracy through plenums) also came 
from the outside. 
The critical discourses and the first well-articulated critique of the transitional paradigm in 
the post-Yugoslav context reemerged, nonetheless, as a consequence of interaction between 
external incentives and specific domestic condition, as well as domestic actors and cognitive 
influences. The student movement in Zagreb was therefore, an authentic entity despite 
external influences it was exposed to. The movement managed to develop an ever more 
serious critique of the post-socialist reality, by pointing at the specific niche of higher education 
and addressing it through lenses of the local context. Even though its occurrence is related to 
certain global trends of contestation of the neoliberal paradigm, as well as the rise of student 
movements around the globe, these trends represented an additional tail wind, rather than a 
direct trigger or a role model.    
“At the moment in which we acted, the crisis still had not eaten the national budget, the 
tuition fees at the Faculty of Philosophy were still way lower than in other faculties. We chose 
the moment, not vice versa, and it was us who made a big deal out of the whole situation in 
higher education.” (Interviewee no. 14) 
A solid social base is of course, pervading all the previously indicated factors within 
discursive consolidation. It has an especially important role in dealing with the way in which 
external influences will be accommodated. The student movement was carried out by students, 
even though all the citizens could have participated at the plenary sessions. A solid social base 
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was embodied in a more or less defined profile of activists and clearly defined social habitus 
within which the movement arose. The high level of trust both among the “core” members and 
later between the “core” and the rest of the movement comes from the fact that the social 
base was clear and social habitus open, but at the same time well-defined and structured. 
Consequentially, the role of the “external factor” in was assessed by the activists as 
inspirational, supportive and overall positive, because its potential “side effects” were 
neutralized. Under “side effects”, I mainly consider imported ideas and practical experiences 
which simply do not fit a given domestic context or, cannot be carried out successfully because 
there is no actor who could do it. The possibility of critical assessment of external influences, 
contextualization and adaptation, as well as conversion or rejection of certain aspects of 
external influences, lies in the level of consolidation of a given social movement and a clear 
social base. While the student movement managed to filter certain external influences, the 
popular movement in Sarajevo had more difficulties with accommodation of such impulses. 
Sarajevo’s popular movement was exposed to the external influences from Zagreb on the 
one hand, and from the city of Tuzla, on the other. In both cases, we are talking about different 
types of movements vis a vis the popular movement in Sarajevo. Unlike the student movement 
from Zagreb which was influenced (but not determined) by similar tendencies on the (student) 
activist scene worldwide, the popular movement in Sarajevo was strongly affected by the labor 
movement in Tuzla, and less strongly by the student movement from Zagreb. In combination 
with the absence of a clear social base, these divergences made the popular movement more 
vulnerable. 
The link between Tuzla and Sarajevo, where Tuzla represented a direct trigger for the 
uprising in the capital, has already been mentioned several times. What appears as crucial in 
this context is a degree to which the external influence enabled or disabled the local movement 
to fulfill its aims. And what was the aim of the popular movement in Sarajevo? This could 
probably be the creation of a popular subject which could/should have addressed the ever 
wider set of compounding elements of the problem called “the post-socialist Bosnian 
condition”. Sarajevo was nonetheless, similar but at the same time way too different case from 
Tuzla where the wave of popular uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina actually started. Tuzla had 
a strong tradition of the working class resistance, whereas Sarajevo could count neither on the 
(organized) working class nor on any other clearly defined (culturally constructed or materially 
grounded) social actor. No organized group of people could have stood behind the protests and 
helped out in securing the social basis for the movement. This had to be done along the way, so 
after the uprising had already started. The overall consequences of the external influences were 
hence, more negative than positive.  
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The influence from Zagreb had a similar effect. The organizers of the Sarajevo plenums were 
insisting on horizontality, led by the experience of Zagreb’s student movement (but also Tuzla 
which has followed the same decision-making method). The idea of having plenary sessions 
where everyone could speak out was imported into the context which was not as suitable as 
the other two. The reason was again, the absence of a clearly defined social base and, 
consequently, unenviable situation with respect to the accommodation of external influences 
and formulation of a clear idea of where the whole process should or could go. In this sense, it 
appears even logical for the “core” group in Sarajevo, to put an emphasis on the process itself, 
since they had no illusions about the optimal outcome. “My thoughts were constantly on what 
should come after the plenums”, the interviewee no. 18 said. From the perspective of the 
objectively “impossible” circumstances for a more “focused” and well directed social struggle, 
one could, in other words, only try to push the process from the dead point, without having 
illusions about a more tangible social change in the nearer future. The activists were mostly 
aware of these limitations:  
 “I remember a girl who told me after the second plenum: „If this fails, I'll never forgive 
you“. In that moment I thought we can’t even fail – because the whole thing doesn’t go 
anywhere. We couldn’t go further from where we had already gotten. I knew we won’t come to 
power, we won’t establish a dual power system because there was no one we could cooperate 
with.” (Interviewee no. 17) 
In order to initiate the process of creation of some sort of subjectivity, the social base had 
to be built along the way, since there had not been any inherited base from before. 
Discursively, this was achieved to an extent, whereas practically the whole endeavor proved to 
be more difficult. The external influences could indeed serve well for motivating the people by 
making them aware that what they were doing was a part of a bigger wave of uprisings in the 
region. Sarajevo was yet, not as ready for such endeavors as were Zagreb and Tuzla. And how 
ready was Belgrade?     
Belgrade stands half way between Sarajevo and Zagreb. Its municipal movement was also 
affected by the external influences which diffused both through space and time. On the one 
hand the origins of issues related to local communities, “right to the city” and “commons”, are 
clearly to be found in various municipal theories and social movements’ activities around the 
globe. In the past decade, these impulses were especially coming from Spain and this is why 
NDB has developed special ties with Barcelona en Comu, for instance. Another source, as 
previously mentioned, comes from Croatia, from the city of Pula. The influence of Barcelona en 
Comu and the “Pula Group” upon Belgrade’s activist scene was nonetheless, not supported by a 
well-organized, solid social base. This means that there was no “ready-made” social group 
which could have capitalized on the inflow of new ideas quickly. There was, furthermore, no 
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social group which could have claimed, either materially or ideationally, coherence and 
readiness to conduct or at least imagine radically different and more progressive and 
emancipated society. The activist network was in the phase of occurring, but the social base 
with its partial or full awareness about issues typical for municipal reasoning, was yet to be 
achieved. In a way, Belgrade shares Sarajevo’s condition, because the ground for a certain set 
of ideas had not been prepared before the ideas were conveyed into the local context. In 
Sarajevo, this tension was discursively resolved by using the most general conceptualizations 
such as “social justice” or “human dignity”. Belgrade yet, had a “backup plan” which could 
compensate the absence of a solid social base and “accommodate” concepts and experiences 
developed outside the given context. This plan was embodied in some concepts and 
experiences imported from the Yugoslav era. The additional “import product” from the past 
served as a replacement tool for contextualization of the imported theoretical and practical 
influences from the domain of municipalism. How was this possible? 
Simply, if one says “local community” or “popular participation” in former Yugoslavia, it 
sounds somewhat familiar because Yugoslav socialism, at least in theory, rested upon the 
concept of “self-management” which was all about people and workers’ councils, as well as 
about democracy at the level of neighborhoods and local communities, factories or enterprises. 
Certainly the new trends in both theory and practice of municipalism do represent an 
“updated” version of the “old” idea of self-management as imagined by its main founder 
Edvard Kardelj.150 The “old” nevertheless has not lost its value and could have been reinvented 
in the light of the newly arising municipally oriented movements in the region:  
“When Eleanor Ostrom got her Nobel Price, many people started thinking about an 
alternative way of governing as something possible. This is when self-governing local 
communities jump in as one among many possible solutions. When you read Kardelj and 
literature on self-management you see how similar these two conceptualizations are.” 
(Interviewee no. 27)        
And another interviewee adds:  
“The “old” concepts played an important role for us. We learned from them because 
past experiences represent knowledge that you can apply. All of the sudden people started 
talking about urban commons as if this fell down from the sky yesterday – we had already had 
this in Yugoslavia.” (Interviewee no. 29) 
                                                          
150
Edvard Kardelj was one of the closest collaborators of Josip Broz Tito and the founder of the concept of Yugoslav 
self-management. Most generally described, self-management was the attempt to keep radically democratic 
practice at lower levels of decision-making and somehow counter-balance temporal necessity of a stronger 
authoritarian role of the Communist party at the higher levels of decision-making. In Kardelj’s words, “the working 
masses which had once gained their right to decide for themselves through the national liberation struggle, were 
not ready to give up that right so easily and leave it to some new state bureaucracy”. Kardelj 1978, 17-19.  
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The socialist heritage was important for NDB, also because it should have oriented itself 
with respect to some other issues and lines of division which existed within the Serbian and 
former-Yugoslav context. For instance, the period when NDB was growing in terms of public 
support, Serbia was on the way to rehabilitate Nazi-fascist collaborators from the WWII and 
thereby fully breakup with the socialist heritage. On that occasion, the Initiative (NDB) 
organized a concert at the Republic square in Belgrade on October 20th, on the Day of liberation 
of Belgrade from fascism in 1944. Thereby the Initiative clearly stood on the partisan and hence 
anti-fascist side of history. The need for straightforward positioning was evident and this 
endeavor eventually led to a clearer articulation of this segment of NDB's collective identity.  
“October the 20th was good for ideological profiling, not as much externally, but rather 
internally. I remember when M. wrote that Belgrade has always been libertarian and I found 
that problematic because Belgrade hasn’t always been free. There were periods in its history 
when people were being killed, when neighbors were reporting neighbors due to their ethnicity 
or ideological orientation. It wasn’t libertarian then. M. said OK - you write the speech. A. and I 
then took over. We wanted to say who liberated Belgrade from the Nazis, and we wanted to 
say that there were concentration camps in Belgrade during the WWII. Every word had to be 
carefully weighed – should we also mention the Red Army or should we just say “the Partisans”. 
Hereby you are actually balancing between “the citizens” and “the people”. Yet, you have to 
say what is true in the end.” (Interviewee no. 36) 
Balancing between external influences and the capacity to channel them through, 
accommodate and indeed, filter them through a solid social base, took its place among crucial 
factors which could have empowered counter-hegemonic tendencies in the region. It should be 
emphasized finally, that social base is not the only factor that could have helped out in the 
process of accommodating diffused ideas in the three national contexts. To close the 
argumentation of this chapter we should wonder: What was the “nature” of deliberative 
processes that stood behind the formation of these activist collectives and what was the role of 
the concept of hegemony in these processes.   
  
6.4. Deliberation and Hegemony 
 
In the understanding of Dieter Rucht, deliberative democracy is not a decision-making 
process. This process is not institutional. It ends, as a matter of fact, before the decision-making 
starts. This is why deliberation is not assuming power relations, outvoting and alike. It is the 
process which is supposed to be led by reasonable discussion in which participants apply the 
“unforced force of the better argument” (Habermas 1971, 137). This should lead to the 
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increased likelihood of “preference (trans) formation during the discursive process, oriented to 
the definition of public good” (della Porta 2013, 61). Among the key postulates of deliberation 
is non-rigidity of the initial positions, whereby each participant leaves enough space for their 
eventual modification if faced with a stronger argument (Rucht 2008). This kind of democratic 
process is, of course, indisputably considered utopian. One can never exclude different 
interests, lobby groups and finally, power relations that usually lead to uniqueness which favors 
the one who happens to be more powerful, rather than the one who has “better arguments”. 
The one who succeeds in establishing hegemony is the one who gets to the position to overrule 
others and consequently, decides. This is to say, in this case, that the final versions of epistemic 
discourse analyzed above are the results of power games within the three movements in which 
one fraction or stream, overruled others. In such conceptual constellation, it seems like 
collective identity, discursive consolidation included, is usually either about deliberation or 
about hegemony. Since full deliberation is declared to be utopia, it must be hegemony that 
matters more in this process.   
Now, the central claim of this subchapter is that these two concepts do not exclude one 
another. What if hegemony may be (or if we want to be more normative we could say - should 
be) realized through real (utopian) deliberation? What if the conditions in which “better 
argument wins” (possible under certain circumstances which is what theoreticians of 
deliberation also argue) may (or should) seek to reach the final result, that is, hegemony? What 
if this is exactly what happened in Zagreb? 
The main decision-making body of the student movement was plenum. Like in the best 
deliberative imageries, every citizen could participate and vote, including people from other 
faculties, but also non-students. Direct democracy is demanding but may sometimes be a 
convincing method of decision-making. The specific social environment (University) within 
which plenums took place could have been hence, partially controlled. These preconditions 
inserted a new potential into the process of deliberation and direct democracy.  
“Ever since the blockade, I started believing in collective processes. Before, I was 
suspicious. But here was the following situation. I would say something, and five or six people 
would speak after me. Those interventions would make me agreeing with people who actually 
criticized my position. The thing is that other claims were not necessarily opposite to mine. 
They were rather contributing by widening what you had said and developing it further. These 
interventions would rapidly get integrated and get beyond the arguments preceding them. So, 
collective intelligence exists! You know the old Gramscian saying about the pessimism of 
intellect and the optimism of will… Before the blockade I had only the pessimism of intellect. 
The optimism of will came after I had gone through the whole process and witnessed its results. 
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The blockade hasn’t changed my views on capitalism, but it has provided me with trust in the 
possibility of collective democratic processes.” (Interviewee no. 12) 
In order to secure the “rule of better arguments”, to make people acknowledging and 
accepting their value, one had to have a specific social environment as well as a stable and clear 
social base. On the other hand, the quality of arguments of the core group (especially the ones 
coming from its “theoretical branch”) which sought to shape the movement’s discourse, had to 
be indeed valuable, well-articulated and convincing. The specificity of social habitus such as 
University, as well as a solid organization based on trust, has sped up internalization of certain 
theoretical positions and conceptual apparatuses by theoretically less equipped activists. In a 
short period of time, the circle of people capable of persuasively and argumentatively talking 
about social and political issues critically, grew larger - both within the “core” group and the 
wider group of activists. The process of diffusion of (primarily) theoretical knowledge from the 
theoretically equipped, towards more practice oriented activists, turned out to be crucial for 
collective identity creation and discourse articulation. 
“It was fascinating how people who had not been familiar with literature, theory or 
discourse, but who had been politically “on the line” – have become sovereign in their 
excellency of articulating our demand and the overall discourse - within a month or two, 
overnight almost. This type of articulation has introduced a new paradigm because such type of 
discursive organization had not been on the radar of the mainstream media before the 
blockade. The very word “socialism”, for instance, had been taboo for a long time and we 
started using it again (also) in the light of the world economic crisis.” (Interviewee no. 7)          
Here we may trace the effects of deliberation. Activists coming from the previously 
mentioned reading group and those who had stepped into the process of conceptual learning 
and equipping before and during the blockade could simply articulate arguments better than 
others. Certainly, no one's arguments overruled other sets of argumentation always. Especially 
at the beginning, even the moderators at the plenums151 were sabotaging the organizers and 
the ideas pushed forward by the “core” group. The first couple of meetings were quite difficult 
to comprehend, let alone control. As the process of collective identity formation was 
progressing, things were slowly coming to its place: 
“The feeling of togetherness and collectivism increases self-confidence and strengthens 
the sense of social belonging (…) You could of course find people who were against us, but 
simply the strength of arguments was making more and more people changing their opinions 
and support us.” (Interviewee no. 1) 
                                                          
151
 Everyone could be a moderator. All one had to do is to express this kind of wish.  
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The “Jacobin” [sic!] wing of the movement, and its rhetorical skillfulness nonetheless, had 
another internal / organizational advantage or an additional “tool” in its hands. On the one 
hand, they managed to equip other “core members” theoretically and thereby keep the high 
degree of influence upon the “core’s” projection of collective identity. On the other, some of 
them belonged to the “notorious” (sic!) “media section” of the student movement. This section 
actually shaped media reports and thus controlled the main channel of communication 
between the movement and the wider public. Thanks to the above indicated dynamics and 
presence of trust, strength of the established “core” group, as well as the rapidness of diffusion 
of critically intonated ideas and arguments, the media section succeeded to safeguard its 
privileged position with respect to its influence upon collective identity.    
“The fact that we were sitting in the media section made a huge difference. This 
position allowed us to communicate with the public and organize the whole discourse. I did it 
consciously, I politicized the whole thing. This is why we were perceived by some as the 
hardliners, and this is why we were called by some the „arrogant media section“. Moreover, we 
faced three initiatives for replacement, but each time the plenum supported us.” (Interviewee 
no. 12)  
The “hardliners” thus established hegemony through deliberative process. “Better 
arguments” moreover, did not affect only those who were politically “on the line”. Other 
activists, with conservative worldviews, also showed readiness to open up for different 
explications of social and political dynamics, different kind of mapping causes of social 
hierarchies and injustice and allow for the possibility of (progressive) cognitive transformation. 
“Already before the blockade I knew that extremely conservative attitudes, typical for 
Christianity, are not well perceived and received at the Faculty of Philosophy. Their language 
was different, values such as homophobia, sexism and alike were simply not welcomed there. 
Soon after I got involved with the movement, I realized the difference between myself and the 
environment. My worldview tough was not so rigid and well structured. You notice how some 
dimensions of their discourse are compatible with yours, whereas some are totally opposite. 
Then you start asking yourself where these differences come from and you discover a whole 
new universe, corpus of knowledge you had never gotten in touch with before. I happened to 
be quite open for new ideas and this corpus simply resonated with me. What they were saying 
made much more sense than the mainstream argumentation behind certain social and political 
phenomena.” (Interviewee no. 9)   
In democratic processes, or processes by which new democratic actors seek to re-
encourage participation in the “post-democratic” world, deliberation often appears as 
essential. At the same time, hegemony may enhance the power of deliberation and make it 
functional, contrary to Rucht’s abovementioned definition, also within a decision-making 
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process. If what Habermas calls “ideal speech situation” is indeed just a goal that can practically 
never be achieved, then every collective identity building includes (also) power relations. In 
order to secure the almost “ideal speech situation” and the “rule of better arguments”, actors 
who are in possession of “better arguments” should build their power both argumentatively 
and organizationally. The case of the student movement illustrates this. On the other side, the 
situation in Sarajevo was different and showed what happens to “better arguments” if no group 
builds or manages to secure at least minimal organizational advantage before the beginning of 
collective identity formation. 
From the very beginning, namely, the issue of persuasiveness of argumentation did not 
work within the Sarajevo’s “core” group or between the “core” and the wider popular 
movement, let alone the wider public. Firstly, homogeneity of the “core” was determined by 
the necessity to channel sudden outburst of anger and discontent on the streets of Sarajevo. 
There was no serious deliberation between them because they had to react to the escalation of 
street protests which preceded their formation. Even though the “core” group was compound 
of Marxists, Trotskyists, anarchists and others, there was simply no time for internal discussions 
and deliberation. The sudden outburst of anger and dissatisfaction on the streets of Tuzla and 
Sarajevo (as well as other cities, such as Mostar or Zenica) caught the (future) organizers of 
plenums unprepared. On one hand, their theoretical endeavor (mentioned above) made them 
deliberate at the theoretical level. Deliberation about eventual political agenda that could have 
come from theoretical discussions did not take place before the occurrence of protests. 
Considering the ad-hoc reaction by the “core” group during the protests, the space (and time) 
for political deliberation was limited, if not even non-existent. The absence of such deliberation 
within the “core” prior to the initiation of plenums (which were about to make the movement 
“popular”) did not, however, represent a serious disadvantage for that group alone (in terms of 
internal persuasions and/or power games). It is clear from the first document analyzed in the 
part on epistemic discourse, that the “core” was comprised of people who shared a radically 
critical vision of Bosnian society. The problem with the absence of political deliberation, as well 
as with hegemony, became more tangible after the plenum started functioning as the main 
decision-making body. 
Unlike the cases of Belgrade and Zagreb where the core group navigated or at least 
proposed a rough framework for collective identity formation and discursive consolidation, the 
popular movement in Sarajevo could not do more than channel through and somehow make 
sense of the dispersed ideational impulses, coming from the streets and discussions at the 
plenary sessions. Thereby, the group was prevented from playing a role of reservoir of ideas 
and the navigator of overall discursive performance. Space for conceptual redefinition and 
intervention into the very essence of the post-socialist paradigm (which was the intention of 
the “core”, as evident from the first document analyzed) was thus, very limited. Concepts, or 
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more abstract (theoretical) knowledge that proved to be highly important for the 
comprehensive/systemic critique, could not find an easy way through such complex set of 
social, political and economic relations. The idea was to encourage deliberation at plenary 
sessions and then hope for an optimal outcome.  
“The whole thing happened with very little or no theoretical reflection which could’ve 
helped us to handle the situation better. Regardless of how much some of us were well-read 
and educated, this didn’t play a real role. It couldn’t, because we had to deal with accumulated 
and abrupt boiling energy which appeared in form of a great discontent and not much else.” 
(Interviewee no. 17)    
The organic process of deliberative direct democracy is difficult to apply even in less 
complex contexts than the one in Sarajevo. Under given circumstances, one of the main front-
running master-frames appeared as a forced solution. Even though the main decision-making 
body (the plenum) was launched by the “core” group, no control was established over it, 
whatsoever. Their initial idea was not to impose hegemony, but the confusing part is that it 
seemed like they did not want to win it throughout the process of deliberation at plenums, 
either. This is evident from the above indicated testimony in which the activist explains that the 
organizers spoke very rarely at the plenary sessions. One cannot, however, put all the blame on 
the organizers. The situation was suitable neither for deliberation, nor for direct democracy. 
The first couple of plenums, actually, “stripped” Sarajevo’s social image. Everything started with 
“collective psychotherapy sessions”, where people would simply come together and talk. They 
would tell personal stories for hours and share among themselves their personal traumas. It 
seemed like this was the first time they were given a chance to speak up about their suffering 
and, more importantly, to be listened to. 
“People would approach us and say, thank you – just for giving us a chance to talk about 
the war. This wasn’t our idea, not in our craziest dreams. No one among us even mentioned the 
war, as if it never happened. Then, suddenly, a slogan emerged: “We’re hungry in all three 
languages”. People started saying that all of them lived through the same suffering, regardless 
of who was where and when. They suffered from a common pain, and their voice was silent for 
the last 20 years.” (ibid.)     
Listening and talking are indeed, components of deliberation, but what made a difference 
was that these two activities almost became their own purpose, without possibility of 
developing a realistic political imagery out of it. The “core” was just transmitting the sentiment 
from bellow. It could neither shape it nor provide directions for its political articulation.  
People were then invited to contribute and write down their demands. The plenum 
established working groups that were supposed to organize demands according to different 
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sections. In the end, there were some 2200 demands submitted. Based on them, the working 
groups formulated four general demands (the last document analyzed in the chapter on 
“mapping concepts”). Despite all challenges, the “core” tried to secure a minimum of common 
ground, a denominator which could have put all demands under the same conceptual 
“umbrella”. This is why they tried to emphasize social justice, which was not a matter of 
persuasiveness of arguments but, possibly, the only solution for the “multitude” to come 
together:   
“(…) the concept of social justice served as a reserve signifier which could cover 
everything we have been thinking and working on, all our theoretical inputs and worldviews. 
This concept became the alternative instrument with which we somehow managed to stay on 
the “revolutionary path”, under the circumstances.” (ibid.)  
In a society where political agendas usually have a tone of ethno-national determination, 
this was an attempt to come up with an, at least non-nationalist, if not clearly and openly anti-
nationalist discourse. Post-conflict societies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina are very difficult to 
be addressed in such way, let alone to be ruled over by such narratives. Here is another 
remarkable detail illustrating the overall social and political climate. 
At one point, the anti-nationalists among the protestors in Sarajevo (on the street) found 
themselves side by side with the people carrying the “lily” flags, symbol of the Army of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina used during the war.152 It seemed that no one could do anything about this 
group without direct (and undesired) confrontation. No one among the activists dared to 
approach them and ask to take the flags down because the whole thing was not about “lilies”, 
“double headed eagles”153 or “checkerboards”154, but about social and economic 
impoverishment of the people regardless of the flag they carry. Among the masses, several 
activists recognized the representatives of the so-called “minor fighters’ club”155 and assessed 
that these people might be the only ones who have credibility to take the “lily flags” down. This 
is precisely what happened, and most of them were removed and only a few remained after 
the intervention of the “minor fighters’”. This example shows that the only group which could 
have claimed the right and establish hegemony over meaning on the streets, was the group 
                                                          
152
 The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the three regular military formations during the war in Bosnia, 
apart from the Army of Republika Srpska and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO). Even though it was firstly 
multiethnic (to an extent), the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was soon made almost exclusively of ethnic 
Bosniaks. The other two regular armies in Bosnian conflict were mainly Serbian and Croat (along with some 
paramilitary formations present). The symbol of lily became associated with the Army of BiH and (mostly) one 
ethnic group – the Bosniaks. 
153
 Double headed eagle is a Serbian national symbol.  
154
 Checkerboard is a Croatian national symbol.   
155
 This is a group of people who fought the war on the side of the Army of BiH while still underaged (under 18 
years old) – Juvenile Defense and Liberation Volunteers in the Army of BiH. 
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that was somewhat linked to the war. This situation illustrates how difficult it became in Bosnia, 
since the war onwards, to push forward any sort of progressive social and economic political 
agenda and put identity politics aside. Every time someone says “we are all equally 
disadvantaged”, memories pop up, memories of the recent past when some were more 
disadvantaged than others only on account of their name and surname. This is why no other 
group of activists could have intervened in situations like the one here described. Under such 
circumstances, discursive framework could not go too far either: 
“The furthest I could go is to say that we managed to get some attention for our socio-
economic life in the public sphere. This wasn't anti-nationalism, as such. We didn't try to make 
any supranational bodies and we didn't want to talk about it because they have been keeping 
us imprisoned in that narrative for too long. That is why we didn’t want to set the agenda 
around it.” (Interviewee no. 25) 
A minimum of common ground was therefore achieved on the basis of a non-nationalist 
agenda. This was, however, more visible in documents issued by the ad-hoc gathered “core” 
during the first couple of days of protests. Later, when the same group tried to articulate 
impulses coming from the chaotic street protests (by organizing plenums), the problems arose 
again. Among the main “enemies” of deliberation and any sort of political imagery that could 
lead to a more solidly set collective identity, were war traumas that remained alive in both 
individual and collective memories. This obstacle took the wind out of sails of a more effective 
collective endeavor.  
“The first person to speak at the first plenum was an elderly gentleman who stood up, 
gave his name and said: “I come from Vogošda and I spent more than two years in the 
concentration camp. My wife was killed, and my daughter was a victim of something I’m 
embarrassed to say out loud, here, in front of all these people.” You immediately assume that 
his daughter was raped. Everything you imagined beforehand, whatever political agenda – at 
that moment goes into a completely different direction.” (Interviewee no. 23) 
Without a clear and stable social base, trust and solidly developed activist network, no 
space for fruitful deliberation and appreciation of “better argumentation” was left within the 
popular movement in Sarajevo. Democratic hegemony, as one could label the process of 
achieving hegemony through deliberation, was finally left out from the outcomes of the 
collective identity building.  
Regarding the issues of hegemony and deliberation, the case of Belgrade may be (again) 
placed somewhere in between Sarajevo and Zagreb. On one hand no plenary sessions 
(plenums) were ever held in Belgrade. This means that there was no “official” deliberation 
between the “core” and the rest of the movement. On the other hand, hegemony within the 
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“core” was established through deliberation. Deliberation thus existed, but was limited to a 
narrow circle of people. Those who managed to prevail within the “core” decisively shaped the 
discourse of the entire movement afterwards. It is symptomatic that those “core” members 
who prevailed were usually well theoretically equipped. They were people from the 
abovementioned “Ministry of Space”, on one side, and others who shared their vision of the 
activist and political directions, on the other. Hegemony was taking place gradually, from action 
to action, from one informal or formal meeting with other actors/activists, to another. This is 
how one stream of thought ruled over the others, from “Inex Film” to the occupation of 
“Zvezda” cinema and, finally, actions concerned with “Belgrade Waterfront”. People were 
joining and leaving, but there was always a constant in the process - the “core” group gathered 
around the “Ministry of Space”. Thanks to their dedication and persistency, this group managed 
to set out (in a rather subtle way) the essence of collective identity and epistemic discourse. 
Along the way, some activists left the movement because their understanding of what NDB 
should represent differed from the dominant conceptual stream. 
“My understanding of why the Initiative (Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own) was established 
had to do with defending the rule of law and legal state. This was my motif to join the 
movement. The biggest problem for me was the collapsing state and violations of the 
constitution – aside from my opinion about the constitution. People were coming from the 
confused left, as well as from the liberal-civic milieu. Initially, the accent was on the real 
actions, without much theoretical or ideological elaboration. Slowly, however, you could see 
conflicts popping up within the group, mainly over conceptual and ideological understanding of 
what we were doing. I remember when someone said that the rule of law shouldn’t be central 
at all because it’s nothing more but a shitty neoliberal concept. On the other hand, I was trying 
to explain that without it, you can’t even get a chance to say anything about this society – from 
the inside, but also from a distance.” (Interviewee no. 28)    
It was the municipal, left-leaning stream that managed to overrule both the (more) radical 
left and the liberal (central) left. Even though activists were coming from different social 
spheres (from the alternative cultural scene to NGOs and different subcultural milieus), but also 
with different theoretical and political affiliations, there was only one concept, or one 
perspective from which the sphere of politics was to be penetrated. When asked which concept 
in his view is central to NDB, one of the activists replied:       
“I would say that our central concept is “right to the city”. The inspiration clearly comes 
from Harvey. That concept is the core idea of a different way of governing. It’s still not 
completely clear what kind of governing it’s supposed to be, but it’s clear that people are 
excluded from decision-making process which has to be streamlined “down” to the people (…) 
The “Ministry of Space” was formed in the period when topics related to the commons and 
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public goods were becoming a conceptual umbrella in some (activist) circles.” (Interviewee no. 
27) 
The way in which this conceptual edifice was constructed within the “core” group 
represented a typical hegemonic maneuver followed by sporadically deliberative and non-
deliberative processes. Since there was no permanent body for deliberation and decision-
making (such as plenum), the “core” was building its predominance on basis of networking, 
(mostly) informal deliberations and persistency to push forward the type of discourse they 
found appropriate. The concept of the right to the city was not, finally, introduced as superior 
over other concepts (such as the rule of law), but was pushed forward as an “empty signifier” 
which was supposed to carry out all the “unfulfilled demands” coming from various social 
groups. Even though not everyone was satisfied with this maneuver, the movement “survived” 
after some individual members distanced themselves from the group.  
A similar strategy was applied as the movement grew bigger. Many people, who took to the 
streets after the demolition in Hercegovačka Street, participated due to the violation of the 
right to private property. The cognitive background of NDB, on the other hand, either 
individually or collectively, had nothing to do with this kind of framing. NDB’s previous 
endeavors, like the occupation of the (private) “Zvezda” cinema or “Inex Film” stood in direct 
contradiction to such conceptualizations because these were all violations of the principle of 
private property. Nevertheless, people from the liberal civil sector or libertarian organizations 
knew this well. Despite that, everyone managed to insert their meaning into the (common) 
empty signifier and find enough reasons to come out and protest. The “core” got a big “push” 
by massification of protests (after “Hercegovačka”), with a higher number of people who 
inscribed their meanings into the concept of the right to the city and municipal nature of the 
movement:         
“To a great extent, municipalism is inspiring us. It’s based on the reinvention of the way 
in which we're supposed to deal with our communities. This has nothing to do with Serbia's 
geopolitical orientation or similar things – only with our ability to fix roofs or bus stops in our 
city. The point is to start from the bottom, repairing a leaking roof and then moving step by 
step up the stairs. Politics became a matter of “professionals”. We want to conquer political 
sphere by emphasizing things that are within our scope of decision. You can’t decide about 
“Europe-Russia” issues or something similar. The only level where you can practice politics is 
local. The elites indeed annoy us, but we’re not calling for a lynch mob, but to reclaim space. 
For me, the concept of “commons” is practically quite unusable, but it could be good for 
slogans: “Our water pipe”, “our – this” or “our – that”. “Right to the city” is quite suitable for 
articulation of our narrative. Practically, this means that that the whole set of things – from the 
right to decide, to the conditions that make you well-informed before reaching a decision. 
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Municipalism helped us “translate” certain things and acquire a reference that helps us have a 
better perception of reality.” (Interviewee no. 33) 
Finally, NDB’s discourse showed vulnerability once the movement decided to enter the 
political arena. After the local elections held in 2018, the movement did not reach the electoral 
five percent threshold. After that, together with other local initiatives around Serbia, they 
established a new entity called the “Civic block”. Their desire to scale up their activities and 
make a national political entity turned out to be in contradiction with their municipal discourse. 
The logic behind their ambition was to join forces with various local initiatives and compete at 
the national level. Nonetheless, it turned out that without “big narratives” in a country that, for 
instance, still did not define its borders (the issue of Kosovo is still dominating public discourse) 
one cannot do much with “everyday” local themes at the national level. Even though this stage 
of movement’s development is not studied here, the insights from this work have given, I 
believe, a good basis for studying further developments and steps of Don’t Let Belgrade 



















 Considering that the process of collective identity formation is here understood in 
Melucci’s terms, as a cognitive process, one may conclude that (every) cognition, including 
discursive consolidation that is in focus here, takes place under influence of both external and 
internal factors. At the individual (micro) level of analysis, in a research such as this, one could 
address only external, meaning social factors influencing individual cognition. Addressing 
internal (psychological) factors in the process of acquisition of knowledge and “cognitive 
mapping” was not possible under given theoretical framework, because it would require tools 
from other scientific fields. At the collective level of analysis, both internal (meso) and external 
(macro) factors could be assessed (and addressed), because both were detectable in the sphere 
of social. In the chapter four, the “external” side of the three collective identities was covered. 
It was shown that the three case studies have both convergences and divergences with respect 
to their epistemic discursive performances. Convergences are embodied in the attempt of 
newly rising social movements to challenge the dominant transitional paradigm. Divergences, 
on the other hand, have to do with various structural factors, as well as with variances in the 
type of movement in question. In this, sixth chapter, the analysis is expended onto divergences 
concerning internal/organizational factors affecting the process of discursive consolidation. 
Throughout the analysis, I traced several internal factors which shaped this cognitive process. 
The following table shows what was elaborated in this chapter. 
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By recalling conceptual “backbone” of the three movements, meaning their front-running 
and supportive master-frames, I can start concluding this part case by case. Regarding internal 
factors, the case of Zagreb showed how significant were the high level of trust, previously 
established (dense) activist network and a solid social base. The stable social habitus where the 
moment arose is of no less importance. All these factors pushed forward the “free education 
for all” demand and concepts such as capital(ism) and neoliberalism as the (front-running) 
master-frames. “Free education for all” was specific enough, so people could identify with it in 
the context of critique of capital(ism) and neoliberalism, while the supportive set of master-
frames provided an additional context within which the central demand and the “frontrunners” 
were placed. All this would have not been possible without the ability of the theoretically 
equipped activists to formulate the central demand and the wider context where it was about 
to be addressed. Furthermore, such agenda would have never been settable, had there not 
been for partially controlled social habitus. A solid social base, on the other hand, allowed trust 
to be gained and the rule of “better argument” to become convenient and fruitful for the 
process of deliberation.  
On the opposite side from Zagreb, Sarajevo case showed all difficulties that a movement 
can face if some of the above indicated factors are absent. Certainly, this absence is, to an 
extent, predetermined by the unfavorable structural conditions. Yet, we could observe 
organizational and other variations within the Bosnian context as well. The social movement in 
Tuzla (which shares structural obstacles with Sarajevo), for instance, had a much clearer social 
base and could have relied on some sort of previously established (workers’) activist network. 
Structure, hence, may indeed affect internal processes of collective identity formation 
positively or negatively, but various non-structural factors may possibly compensate for, or 
enhance structural disadvantages.  
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In Sarajevo, the “core” of the popular movement was faced with an incredibly difficult 
endeavor: to channel through the dispersed anger and despair accumulated throughout these 
last two and a half decades. Without a clear social base and at least roughly defined margins of 
social habitus where the action takes place, as well as with a significant degree of external 
influence unsuitable for a given context, one of the crucial components of every functional 
collective, trust, could not be achieved either. That is why the employed set of master-frames, 
especially the “front-running duo” (social justice and human dignity), operated at such high 
level of abstraction. This was the only way to reach, or try to reach, the widest possible consent 
of the dispersed and unmitigated clamor of the multitude. Every attempt to concretize 
demands and put them into a wider context of (macro) conceptual critique of the status quo 
(like the student movement in Zagreb did), resulted in proliferation of narrow demands which, 
often, stood in contradiction with macro concepts (the “government of experts” vs. “social 
justice”, for instance). Clearly, no stream within this popular movement succeeded in 
establishing hegemony over meaning, under such unfavorable structural and organizational 
circumstances which prevented participation and conversation to gain shape of deliberation.  
In Belgrade, finally, the activist network had been, to a large extent, built before the 
municipal movement managed to gain public visibility and reach wider support. A certain level 
of trust, both within the “core” group and later, between the “core” and the wider scope of 
activists (and eventually the wider public) were established and achieved. However, the social 
base and the habitus where the movement occurred were not as clear and solid as in Zagreb. 
They were not, on the other hand, as fuzzy as in Sarajevo either. The movement was 
undoubtedly, under tremendous influence of municipalism from the “outside” and would have 
normally (under such conditions) had much more trouble with accommodating this conceptual 
apparatus into domestic context. Had this shortcoming not been compensated by 
reintroducing, in parallel, the conceptual apparatus from the (socialist) past, this would have 
probably been the case. This way, the front-running master-frames such as “right to the city” 
and the reinvented sense of the local community, were “translated” by using the main concept 
of the Yugoslav period (the concept of self-management) as a supportive master-frame. 
Thereby, the space for (further) contextualization of issues of “commons” and “local 
democratic governance” was opened as well. This space, then, could have been filled out with a 
sense of anti-neoliberal agenda. In this case, similarly to Zagreb, the specific issue (“Belgrade 
Waterfront project”) was spotlighted as a paradigm for a whole set of systemic fallacies and 




Chapter 7: General Concluding Remarks 
 
I started the thesis with a reference to the fall of the Berlin wall. This event undoubtedly 
announced, both symbolically and practically, the end of an era and the beginning of a new 
one. Since then, the often-repeated catchphrase related to the new world order became the 
phrase “the only game in town”. This means that the announced victory of neoliberal capitalism 
did not only become evident, but almost final and irreversible. Globally speaking, this alleged 
irreversibility was soon brought into question. During the late 1990s, protests started spreading 
from Seattle to Genoa and intensified throughout the following decade. By the end of the first 
decade of the 2000s, “the only game in town” was significantly discredited across the globe, 
arguably due to its numerous social and economic (but also political) misconceptions and side-
effects.  
The post-socialist space was, at first, lagging behind with respect to these trends of global 
resistance. Keeping in mind the context, it was difficult for “post-socialist” activists to come up 
with a convincing critique of the system to which their states were (still) trying to catch up with. 
Soon after the socialist systems disintegrated, the narrative about a “brighter” future was 
closely tied to the (nation) state building, market liberalization and privatization. In some parts 
of the post-socialist world such as former Yugoslavia, the “nation state building” brought about 
ethnic cleansing, mass killings and genocide. Ethnic nationalism became the most relevant 
political category. Liberalization and privatization, on the other hand, exposed the already 
devastated economy to much more powerful competitors and economic “tigers” (multinational 
companies included) that managed to suck even the last drops of “blood” from its fragile 
“veins”. While privatizations, left hundreds of thousands of workers jobless, ethnic nationalism 
kept their anger at bay. “National freedom” and “modernization” represented the key pillars of 
a narrative which secured hegemony of the post-socialist political and economic elites. Almost 
two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the resistance was born in this part of the world as 
well. The hegemonic paradigm proved to be contestable.   
The thesis was set to illuminate the conceptual “backstage” of this resistance and get as 
deep as possible into the very essence of the critique to which the peripheral version of 
neoliberal capitalism in former Yugoslavia was exposed to. Research questions and theoretical 
framework were set up in order to dig deep into the matrix of actors, social relations, 
structural, organizational and social factors that opened the space for (re)penetration of 
counter-hegemonic, critical knowledge into the post-Yugoslav region. In order to investigate 
which ideas influenced the activists and the three social movements in question I applied the 
“cognitive approach” to social movements. I looked at the way in which the so called “critical 
communities” and social movements cooperate, and sought to assess the way and conditions 
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under which this linkage is established. The three case studies on which this research relied, 
belong to the specific context of post – socialist and more specifically, post-Yugoslav space (and 
time), which implied two important notions. Firstly, it was the space (and time) where the 
paradigm (of “transitology”) indeed became dominant, so that very little or almost no space 
was left for counter-hegemonic tendencies. Secondly, the region of former Yugoslavia has 
specifically undertaken a path from a role model for democratic socialism (as proclaimed by 
Erich Fromm) to a fertile ground for peripheral and (hence) predatory neoliberal capitalism. The 
research on the occurrence of counter-hegemonic tendencies in this region was, therefore, the 
research about emergence of critical discourse in the time period of social, economic and 
indeed, political regression.  
Results of this research include both theoretical and empirical insights. Theoretically 
speaking, the most general conclusion covers the domain of sociology of knowledge. Thus far, 
the field was usually preoccupied with investigating how widely accepted commonsensical 
knowledge upon which societies rest gets established and institutionalized. My task was to 
show that the field of sociology of knowledge should pay more attention to the other side of 
the medal, as well. Instead of focusing solely on the acquisition of knowledge that builds and 
reproduces the status quo, I showed that the assessment of sources, channels of diffusion and 
(social, structural, etc.) conditions under which counter-hegemonic knowledge finds its way 
through and starts functioning as a “counter-narrative” through activism, might be equally 
important for the field.  
Second important theoretical insight covers the field of social movement studies – more 
specifically, social movements and knowledge. I showed above that the dispute over whether 
social movements produce knowledge or just use (and accommodate) ideas - is resolvable. By 
dividing discourses into micro, meso and macro levels of abstraction (chapter four), I argued 
that both “inherited” and originally produced knowledge by social movements are important 
for their discourses. The higher relevance of generic knowledge originating in critical 
communities over, for instance, commonsense knowledge at the micro level or knowledge 
produced by “organic intellectuals” at the meso level – or vice versa, is a matter researchers’ 
interest and the specific goal of a research. Thereby, the tension between social movements as 
active producers of knowledge and social movements as passive recipients of knowledge may 
be eliminated. Social movements are both producers and recipients of knowledge. The 
emphasis on one type of knowledge instead of the other would depend on the level of 
abstraction one is looking at. 
The empirical insights allowed for encompassing full matrix of cognitive and social (meaning 
individual and collective) processes which eventually led to “cognitive liberation” and counter-
hegemonic tendencies within a given historical context. Starting from the distinction I between 
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theoretical and non-theoretical knowledge, I sought to illuminate the way in which counter-
hegemonic ideas interacted with the activists and social movements in question. Even though 
my focus was on the side of theoretical counter-hegemonic knowledge and its effect on 
formation of critically intonated discourses in former Yugoslavia, the non-theoretical knowledge 
is likewise addressed and explored.  
The empirical research went along the trajectory posed by the three research questions. In 
chapter four, through discourse analysis, I gathered that the initial assumption of counter-
hegemonic tendencies in former Yugoslavia was justified. Furthermore, through “mapping 
concepts” I started showing that theory (still) matters with respect to activism. Apart from the 
shared anti-hegemonic “nature” assessed through “mapping concepts”, the three discourses 
illustrated three different types and, indeed, three different levels of the critique of the post-
socialist paradigm explicated in the chapter one. While the commonalities have to do with the 
shared post-socialist condition, variances are to be explained through differences in structural 
and organizational/social characteristics of the three national/social contexts. The conceptual 
apparatuses used by three social movements covered various fields of potential contestation: 
from higher education, to the “commons” and general notions such as social justice and human 
dignity. Each of the three critical discourses managed to resonate, at least partially and/or 
temporarily, with their national publics by challenging dominance of the post-socialist, 
transitional discourse. Alternative interpretations of the past, the present and the future made 
an alternative narrative of the post-socialist condition more visible, and, if nothing else, shed 
light on some of its most tangible misconceptions. 
Chapter five deals with the micro perspective and tackles the question of origins and 
channels of diffusion of critical knowledge from critical communities to individual activists. This 
part also sought to illuminate the most important social factors that contributed to the 
diffusion of critical knowledge, from its origins to its spreading to activists and social 
movements. The empirical material showed that the counter-hegemonic cognitive edifice in 
former Yugoslavia was compound of both theoretical and non-theoretical knowledge which 
diffused from various origins, through different channels. Starting from the non-theoretical 
corpus of knowledge, the empirical material showed that the dominance of the transitional 
discourse never remained totally uncontested. In the private sphere, as well as in some 
subcultural and other marginalized social circles, critical narratives survived, defying the 
dominant post-socialist narrative. Even if sidelined and pushed deeply below the surface and 
out of sight of the wider public, critical narratives survived in some milieus. My research singled 
out these milieus within progressive family or subcultural (including musical) habitus. Factors 
that increased the possibility of having inherited such anti-hegemonic value systems included, 
among others, coming from families with parents of different national origin, impulses from the 
punk scene, atheism or “depoliticized” religious sentiments. For this non-theoretical side of 
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knowledge acquisition, important was the persistence of anti-fascist Yugoslav heritage, as well 
as the heritage of coexistence between different ethnic, national and religious groups all over 
former Yugoslavia. Once the critical narrative spread, the “great refusal” of such categorization 
of individuals and groups signified an important precondition for any further counter-
hegemonic reasoning.  
Additionally, the inflow of critical theoretical knowledge turned out to be crucial for the 
development of counter-hegemonic “cognitive mapping”. In this respect, I looked at “critical 
communities” as “laboratories” and “suppliers” of critical theoretical knowledge. It turned out 
that the most influential authors of contemporary era, for the former Yugoslav region, 
stemmed from “classical” academic branches, especially philosophy, political theory, political 
philosophy, sociology and political economy. Disciplines such as psychoanalysis are also 
detected as influential (especially in Bosnia), whereas other more specialized branches such as 
social movement studies or alike did not affect, to great extent, the “cognitive mapping” of 
contemporary activists. On the other hand, philosophers belonging to the Frankfurt School 
(especially Marcuse and Fromm), or Foucault or, in contemporary era, Žižek (especially his 
“Sublime Object of Ideology”) seem to have a significant influence.  Abstract theoretical 
thought, as argued throughout this thesis, proved to be important for generating a 
comprehensive critical mindset that assesses an enviable level of analytical capability and 
(cognitive and practical) innovation, thereby avoiding conformity and passivity. Activists 
appreciated the combination of analytic complexity, vividness and polemical style of writing. 
Assuming that the so called “orthodox” critical theory is more rigid, in some cases, the 
combination between “orthodox” and “contemporary” critical theory could become an 
optimum the activists were looking for. The examples of David Harvey who managed to put 
complex theories into understandable terms without simplification, or Hannah Arendt whose 
style of writing tended to attract even those who disagreed with her in certain points, illustrate 
this claim. Having that in mind, the question about which stream, “orthodox” or 
“contemporary”, “talks” better to contemporary social dynamics and illuminates better the 
path for social struggle, got a simple answer: both. Instead of “competing” with one another, 
Harvey and Lenin or Rosa Luxemburg and Hannah Arendt, are seen by the activists as 
complementing each other – in spite of mutual (theoretical) differences.  
Insights extracted from the qualitative interviews with activists thus provided additional 
evidence that (critical) theory (still) matters for contemporary activism. Despite living in an era 
which is considered to be much “faster”, where “depth is replaced by surface” (Jameson 1991, 
12; in Billig 1995, 135), deeper theoretical considerations and more abstract ideas find their 
way from critical communities to activists. As mentioned, a significant amount of recognition 
for counter-hegemonic “cognitive mapping” in former Yugoslavia must be, undoubtedly, 
credited to the Yugoslav socialist heritage. Elements of socialism, personal memory of it, or 
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inherited affirmative narrative of the Yugoslav legacy are present in majority of the activists’ 
early political socializations. The theoretical upgrade of these inherited worldviews understood 
as “value systems”, on the other hand, gave an important “touch” to the counter-hegemonic, 
critical discursive expression. They opened the space to move forward, while simultaneously 
remembering the progressive elements of the socialist heritage. It was theory, in other words, 
that allowed the critique to go beyond simple “Yugo-nostalgia”.  
Equally important to the sources of critical knowledge are the channels of diffusion of 
critical knowledge, whether they are non-theoretical or theoretical. Within the time and space 
of post-socialism, many institutional channels of diffusion were cut off. It was hereof very 
important that non-institutional channels provide some sort of compensation. The empirical 
research showed that alternative social centers, informal and formal gatherings, left-wing 
festivals of activism and critical thought managed, to a certain extent, to make up for the lack of 
critical reflections on the dominant (transitional) paradigm within the mainstream public 
sphere. In some cases these channels reached (future) activists. In other, activists found the 
channels by being proactive. Who was going to reach who (channels activists or the other way 
around) depended mostly on the presence or absence of progressive narratives within one’s 
family. If present, progressive family narrative tended to encourage lighter or stronger 
commitment and search for the alternative channels and sources of critical knowledge. If 
absent, other factors such as subcultural environments or progressive social habitus, intervened 
and slightly illuminated channels through which critical knowledge was diffused. Among the 
strongest in that sense was the subcultural punk milieu or other types of progressive social 
habitus, such as university. As to the institutional channels of diffusion, the research showed 
that, in most cases, these had to be singled out abroad. Foreign universities, such as the 
Humboldt University in Berlin or CEU in Budapest were among the most successful institutional 
channels of diffusion when it came to critical (theoretical) knowledge. Internal institutional 
channel of diffusion of critical knowledge was detected in Zagreb where the Department of 
Comparative Literature at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences played a significant role 
in “cognitive mapping” with several activists.        
Finally, individual cognitive developments, as well as production, diffusion and acquisition 
of critical knowledge would have never surpassed individual cognitive maps or smaller 
intellectual groups, had there not been for social movements. These activist groups spread 
critical discourses. They were not, however, simple transmitters or summarizers of individual 
cognitive contributions. Dynamics and certain elements typical of collective identity formation 
within movements provided a final cognitive “touch” that was both autonomous and connected 
to the cognitive inputs provided by its activists. With addressing the way in which this collective 
dynamics affected epistemic discourses, the research circle was closed. In accordance with the 
literature on collective identity formation, this process is understood as the final part of the 
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cognitive process that brought concepts from the individual activists - to the stage of 
collectively constructed discourse. In the sixth chapter on consolidation of discourses, several 
factors were traced as influential. Among others, a decisive effect on the strength and 
coherence of collective (epistemic) discursive performance was ascribed to: the existence of 
previously established activist network, as well as its density; the degree of trust achieved; the 
issue of hegemony and its relationship to deliberation; the existence of a solid social base and 
external influences which could be, generally speaking, positive or negative depending on other 
factors involved. All these factors determined, consequentially, the way that conceptual 
content of discourses has been built. By making this last empirical step, I reached the final 
destination of the research endeavor where I sought to explain the “cognitive edifice of the 
counter-hegemonic tendencies” in three case studies in question.     
To recapitulate, first I mapped the presence of critical discourses and assessed the 
structural factors that had an impact on the them (macro perspective); then I dug deep into the 
origins and channels of diffusion of both theoretical and non-theoretical critical knowledge at 
the individual level of analysis (micro perspective); and finally, I moved to the collective level 
and wondered about social and organizational factors that intervened along the process of 
discursive consolidation and integration of various individual cognitive inputs (meso 
perspective). These research outcomes are, one should point out, certainly valid for the given 
context. The question of generalization of these results is a question that cannot fully be 
addressed here. The insights from this research could, on the one hand, serve for another 
similar research endeavor in a different context. The concrete patterns of counter-hegemonic 
reasoning at both worldview and theoretical level seems however relevant for certain political 
contests. This certainly holds for the countries of the so called “Global South”, which share with 
former Yugoslavia both peripheral economic position, and “transitional” hegemonic discourse. 
In some cases authoritarian tendencies overlap as well. Phenomena such as investor urbanism 
or general deindustrialization and privatization followed by mass layoffs, are also shared 
features of many countries, across the globe. In that respect, it seems like the critical literature 
addressing these issues could be shared among social movements internationally. Factors 
detected as influential in the acquisition of counter- hegemonic non-theoretical knowledge 
could, possibly, become generalizable in other multiethnic and/or post conflict societies, as 
well.                
A question not addressed in this thesis refers to the social and political consequences after 
the breakthrough of critical discourses. Evidently, the emergence of critical thinking was not 
sufficient to counter-weigh the dominant discourse in its totality. This is why one can talk of a 
breaking through of critical thought, rather than of a counter-balance or a “victory” over the 
transitional paradigm. The three societies, including Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia, remained on a similar track as before. In some cases, the most powerful actors 
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installed before the breakthrough of critical ideas became, in the meanwhile, even more 
powerful. During the last few years in Serbia, its ruling Serbian Progressive Party reached the 
support of over fifty percent vote. Other two case studies showed similar trend of power-
strengthening by the ruling political elites. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the system of “ethno-
nationalism” continued to reproduce itself, on daily basis and all sides, from domestic political 
elites to the “international community”. In Croatia, despite its European Union membership, 
political and social climate clearly regressed during the last ten years. As a matter of fact, 
joining the EU contributed to less feigned decency in the political and social sphere, whereby 
chauvinism, hate speech and open re-fascisization of public discourse come from the highest 
state officials and politicians.156      
It seems, therefore, that radically critical voices from below have not seriously threatened 
the reproduction of status quo in the region. The system was discursively contested, but not 
(yet) significantly shaken. It might be that other actors or other types of political engagement 
will continue the struggle that could possibly shake the edifice of the post-socialist condition 
more seriously. Have the social movements I analyzed exhausted their potential by 
reintroducing critical tones to their national and regional public? If they have, who can continue 
from the point where social movements stopped? By making a critical breakthrough in such 
highly layered, complex and, sometimes unfortunate region, those social movements took 










                                                          
156
 For instance, the slogan “Za dom spremni” (“Ready for the homeland”), is forbidden by law because it was the 
official slogan of the rule of “Ustaše” during the fascist Independent State of Croatia, during WWII. In spite of that 
prohibition, the former president Grabar Kitarovid, or Miroslav Škoro (who won around 25 per cent of votes 
running third on the elections for the president), several times “defended” this slogan publically, claiming that it is 
“the historical Croatian slogan).   
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Appendix 1: Historical Relevance of the Research 
 
This work should not be finished before drawing attention to the historically rooted 
relevance of this research. Firstly, the insights dealing with the historical relevance of the 
research show that my interest in exploring the link between social movements and (critical) 
ideas come from what had become evident long before I decided to tackle it systematically. The 
greatest historical events, revolutions, big uprisings and social and political movements namely, 
have been followed by different corpuses of knowledge. In order to illustrate this, a couple of 
centuries’ long tradition of “cooperation” between critical knowledge and social and political 
action, it is good to provide an overview of the most tangible examples of this tight connection 
between thought and action. This appendix serves for showing that the idea of studding the link 
between critical knowledge and social and political action is not an ahistorical “research 
adventure”. To the contrary, it aimed at digging deep into the nature of the relationship that is 
widely known, though not so much widely studied. 
A detectable or more clearly traceable history of the correlation between ideas and 
social and political action starts with the French Revolution. Since then, the link has been 
gradually straightening, as the level of literacy, education and development of public spheres 
was increasing. Already in the early period of Enlightenment, in the “Reflections on the 
Revolution in France”, Edmund Burke addressed the French revolutionaries by referring to 
“contradictory principles reluctantly and irreconcilably brought and held together by their 
philosophers” (Furniss 2000, 137; in: Whale 2000). The first set of ideas with a significant 
influence upon the content of social demands after the French revolution hence, was the one of 
“utopian socialism”. This stream of thought played a very important role in the 1848 
revolutions as well, especially in France. The 1848 European revolutions pretty much reflected 
in their demands what had been going on both materially and cognitively before they occurred, 
as they represented a turning point between pre-modern and modern times, i.e. pre-modern 
and modern politics. The ideas behind the revolutions, nonetheless, remained pre-modern in 
their essence.157 No wonder that probably the most influential modern thinker in history, Karl 
Marx, could only have observed and learned from the events of 1848 and 1871, rather than 
attempting to shape them, whereas pre-modern thinkers did influence these events. “There is 
evidence in the slogans of 1848 – “The right to work”, the state as the “banker of the poor”, 
“the organization of labor” – that during the 1840s Blanqui’s basic ideas had become familiar to 
a wide section of the Paris working class” (Calhon 1952, 36). Even though Blanqui himself 
                                                          
157
 “One of the central messages of Eighteenth Brumaire is that the radicals of 1848 looked back too much, 
borrowed too much language from the past, and failed to act on a clear understanding of the class struggle 
characteristic for capitalist society, and hence wound up replaying 1789 as farce instead of waging proletarian 
revolution as such.” See more in: Calhon 1952, 234. 
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wanted to breakup with “utopians” such as Saint-Simon and Fourier, he did, however, build 
upon some of their theoretical and conceptual insights. By the same token, the heritage of 
radical democracy taken as the agenda of many social movements (even today) starts with the 
mixture of Jacobin tradition and radical democracy upon which Luis Blanqui constructed his 
thought and political strategy. As Blanqui himself argued, “before men could be organized for a 
revolution, they had to be drawn out of their lethargy and activated by ‘an electric current of 
ideas” (1980, 29).     
Historical examples of the linkage between political thought and direct actions have, from 
then on, multiplied. Many movements for national liberation and/or unification have built their 
cognitive edifices out of theoretical blocks of Fichte’s primordialism, Mazzini’s voluntarism, and 
other prominent figures of theoretical (and practical) nationalism. Similarly to socialism, 
nationalism by the time of 1848 had only been in the stage of infancy, with its fully modern 
shape to come only in the future. A combination between nationalist and anarchist theories in 
movements for national liberation, for instance, may be found in the early 20th century 
Yugoslavia158. The political movement “Young Bosnia” whose member Gavrilo Princip 
assassinated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, was politically inspired 
mostly by movements such as Young Italy and figures like Giuseppe Mazzini. Theoretically 
however, “Young Bosnia” was mostly inspired by authors from the Russian anarchist tradition, 
such as Kropotkin, Herzen, Bakunin, Stepniak, Gorky, Chernishevsky, and Plekhanov (Stavrianos 
1958, 465). 
The year 1968 is also a turning point that launched a process of post-modernization of both 
thought as well as social and political action. The rise of student movements comes as a 
response to globally relevant issues of the time such as the war in Vietnam and the Cold War. 
Furthermore, it is also grounded in the formation and rise of new ideas underpinning new 
interpretations of global politics, social and cultural norms as well as subjectivity. Situationalism 
has established itself as one of the most influential streams of thought of that time. Guy 
Debord, as its most prominent representative introduced a new discourse into the rigid left-
wing politics and started talking about issues such as the environment, technology and art, 
among other things. The Situationists focused on “everyday life”, personal alienation in 
consumerist society, as well as the big “come back” of passions159 in the public sphere, opening 
                                                          
158
 At the time, the state still had not been unified since most of its territory was under occupation of the Austrian 
– Hungarian empire.  
159 The replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality is the great traumatic event in the development of man 
(…) but the unconscious retains the objectives of the defeated pleasure principle. Turned back by external reality 
(…) the pleasure principle not only survives in the unconscious but also affects in manifold ways the very reality 
which has superseded the pleasure principle. The return of the repressed makes up the tabooed and subterranean 
history of civilization (…) this recherche dutemps perdu becomes the vehicle of future liberation. See: Marcuse 
1966. 15-16 and 19.  
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up a new horizon for “return of political romanticism”, typical for the European revolutions of 
1848.  
The activists from the United States of America, Germany, France, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia all experienced 1968 in different ways due to various contexts, i.e. ideas and 
knowledge of social action. Situationalism rooted its influence in the USA, Praxis philosophy 
(and critical theory) in Yugoslavia, existentialism in France, the Frankfurt School in Germany and 
the USA, as Marcuse had been among the most influential thinkers within the anti – war 
movement, together with Noam Chomsky and the “spiritual father” of the student movement 
against the war in Vietnam, Bertrand Russell. As argued by Angela Davis, “Marcuse was an 
indispensable theorist for all those around the world who sought liberation but confronted 
domination of one – dimensional society in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s” (Davis 2017, viii). 
Hence “he influenced (and was influenced by) a generation of organizers and activists who 
were involved in a diversity of radical political projects” (Funke and Lamas 2017, 3). One of the 
leaders of the radical left German movement, the RAF, Rudi Dutschke, adopted Marcuse’s 
analysis in his criticism of the allegedly repressive “formed society” that managed Cold War 
politics. Dutschke drew on Marcuse in order to justify “external pressures” on established 
institutional authority (Suri 2005, 127)     
Apart from Marcuse’s great intellectual influence in Germany and the USA, among the rare 
theorists who were fully endorsed (as an individual) by the student activists, was Sartre, not for 
his Marxism, but rather for his existentialism. He was seen as a (theoretical) contributor to the 
projection of a new “liberated subject” by a new generation of French students. By many, the 
“French May” was considered a cultural rebellion, whereas others prescribed “proletarian” 
revolutionary spirit to it. In the specific case of France’s 1968, Sartre emphasized the need for 
continuation of the movement’s activities (despite the proximity of summer holidays) 
underlining the necessity of collaborating with the workers (Appignanes 2005, 153). Evidently 
many people thought about these protests in terms of their historical uniqueness and its 
strength in overcoming all previous models of rebellion. Among them was Georges Pompidou, 
the French prime minister who, “in the midst of the crisis”, remarked the following: “The only 
historical precedent (of the May events) is the fifteenth century when the structures of the 
Middle Ages were collapsing and when students were revolting at the Sorbonne. Right now, it is 
not the government which is being attacked, nor institutions nor even France. It is our own 
civilization” (Seidman 2004, 2).  
As already pointed out, 1968 may be seen as the turning point between modern and post-
modern times, same as 1848 represented the turning point between pre-modern and modern 
times. Nonetheless, both series of events belonged to what was about to become replaced. In 
the same sense, both came as a consequence of particular material and ideational 
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conditions/shifts. The so called “post-material” values and the shift towards “lifestyle activism” 
(Sotirakopoulos 2016), on one hand owed much to the relative economic stability of the “30 
glorious years”.160 On the other, they also are indebted to the authors and literature that had 
been attempting to disrupt the edifice of the Cold War status quo before 1968. The new 
theoretical tendencies led to the establishment of the “New Left”.   
Old Left New Left 
Dominance of ‘orthodox’ Marxism Influence of Frankfurt School, and of minoritian 
voices in the radical milieu (anarchism, 
autonomism, council communism, etc.) 
Political parties and trade unions Self-organization through loose networks 
Change through established institutions, like 
parties, trade unions and parliament  
Change through direct action; development of 
‘parallel institutions’ 
Working class as the revolutionary agent Young people, progressive middle class and 
‘outsiders’ as the radical avant-garde  
Improvement of material conditions  Counter-culture, alternative values, new issues 
(environment, peace, etc.) and solidarity with the 
oppressed/marginalized  
 
Table: The “New Left”, Source: Sotirakopoulos 2016, 19. 
Theoretical “backup” to the “New Left”, had evidently been produced in “critical 
communities” such as the Frankfurt School in Germany, or Praxis in Yugoslavia. Critical 
knowledge certainly had different variations and focuses. Some were preoccupied with 
“socialist humanism”, some with “libidinal politics” and others with social and cultural 
backwardness in spite of economic progress etc. All these were relevant topics of the 1960’s. 
The New Left (thought) had also different impact in different contexts. In Germany, the 
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory had a very strong influence on the student movement of 
1968. In a correspondence between Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse from February to 
August 1969, they discussed the student movement in Frankfurt and whether or not students 
perverted their theory in practice. The decisive moment happened when Adorno was forced to 
call the police after his lecture was interrupted by the students who, according to Adorno, 
“crossed the line of decency”. While Horkheimer and Adorno advocated for “philosophical 
purity” Marcuse “always saw his ideas as best understood in the context of social change” 
(Fominaya and Cox 2013, 14). In this correspondence, Adorno argued that discussion with 
students was not possible anymore. Marcuse’s reply was: 
“You know that we are united in the rejection of any unmediated politicization 
of theory (…).The student movement today is desperately seeking a theory and a practice. It is 
                                                          
160
 This was a generation (…) perhaps the first in history—for which the imperatives of material necessity ceased to 
dominate everyday life (…) Wolin 2010, 73.  
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searching for forms of organization that can correspond to and contradict late capitalist society 
(...) I believe that it is precisely in a situation such as this that it is our task to help the 
movement theoretically, as well as defending it against repression and denunciation. (…) The 
students know all too well the objective limits of their protest—they do not need us to point it 
out to them, but perhaps they need us to help them get beyond these limits (…) We cannot 
abolish from the world the fact that these students are influenced by us (and certainly not least 
by you)-I am proud of that and am willing to come to terms with patricide, even though it hurts 
sometimes.”161 
The influence of the Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School and its authors, as well as the 
influence of the “existentialists” led by Sartre - are certainly the most conspicuous examples of 
the tight link between theoretical inputs and activist endeavors of the 1968.  In countries like 
Yugoslavia, this trend is also detectable, in the same period. The Communist party 
nomenclature was seen as the “red bourgeoisie” in power and was criticized for its 
“embourgeoisement” (Michels 1911, 161). Among other factors, the role of the philosophical 
group gathered around the so called “Yugoslav Praxis School” was very important. The group 
had already existed for four years by the time when the 1968 student protests had begun. The 
aim of this group that launched the philosophical magazine “Praxis” was to deal not only with 
“narrowly philosophical problems but also with problems of Yugoslav socialism and with more 
universal problems of the modern world” (McBride 2001, 21). The school of thought was 
therefore highly critical of the socialist elites which got bureaucratized so that the ideals such as 
egalitarianism, brotherhood and unity and alike – appeared as ideals betrayed in practice. The 
wave of “socialist humanism” coming from authors like Erich Fromm also influenced the 
Yugoslav youth at the time.  Of course, new theoretical influences worldwide were neither clear 
and coherent, nor immune to the intervention of more rigid sets of ideas embodied in (still 
valid) traditional left.  
By the time of the late 1960s, the social democratic and communist parties in both West 
and East had already lost connection with the theoretical apparatus from which they initially 
arose. As argued by Christopher Henning, “politics lost the corrective of theory, and retained 
only the function of pragmatically solving day-to-day problems. This social - democratic politics 
has lost the reflexive moment of Marxian theory (…)” (Henning 2014, 37). No wonder that 
France was the only country in which the trade unions joined the students, when close to 
eleven million workers went on strike.162 French intellectuals (and also Italian) were at the time, 
                                                          
161 Adorno, Theodor and Marcuse, Herbert. 1969. SHOULD BEin text  (Adorno and Marcuse 1969) 
162
 The “hard core” wing of the Communist party was still very strong and influential at the time. What had begun 
as a student uprising in the Paris suburbs had metamorphosed into a mammoth anti-Gaullist student-worker 
alliance. The worker-student coalition was an unprecedented development. At no other point during 1968 - not in 
the United States, not in Latin America, nor elsewhere in Europe—did an analogous front materialize. See: ibid., 92 
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still affected by Maoism, so the late 1960s can be perceived as the period when the last sparks 
of traditional left could be detected, but have started losing influence precisely due to reasons 
indicated by Henning above.163 The more traditional left was giving in to ideas such as German 
philosopher Rudolf Bahro’s early thought on “de-growth”. The anti-modernist branch of the 
German Greens was under direct influence of this author, who claimed that the goal of the 
Greens should be “rolling back of the industrial system, rather than its advancement.” 
(Sotirakopoulos 2016, 81) 
“Considering that the function of philosophy is to corrupt the youth, to alienate (…) them 
from the predominant ideologico-political order, to sow radical doubts and enable them to 
think autonomously” (Žižek 2018, Introduction), the relationship between critical 
ideas/knowledge and political/social action, between rebellious practice and critical thought 
has remained intertwined until today. In the past three decades, we have been witnessing 
many theoretical attempts to provide conceptual frameworks within which one may critically 
observe and potentially launch a more substantial social change. Here we come to the 
contemporary era. 
As every system has its characteristics and means of reproduction, every social/systemic 
change starts from conceptual delegitimization of the status quo, before it develops conceptual 
and political/economic strategy for the future. If feudalism was challenged by the 
Enlightenment and “its philosophers”; early industrial capitalism by utopian and scientific 
socialism; late capitalism and “consumerist culture” by the Critical theory - one inevitably 
wonders about contemporary neoliberalism and its substantial critique. If the brief historical 
overview of the relationship between ideas and social/political action tells us something, then it 
is that no major change comes before conceptual tools for deconstruction of the ruling 
paradigm had been developed. 
Firstly, it took a long time for neoliberalism to become the main object of criticism, as it has 
been analyzed so thoroughly in order to be criticized aptly. The American theorist, David Harvey 
(2005) contributed greatly in this respect. Not only economic, but also its political and 
conceptual logic should be understood and explained. After that, many tried to reinvent the 
(new) radical subjectivity and point the finger at a social actor which could contest the new 
ruling paradigm. Thinkers have been trying to reset political thought and start building new 
                                                          
163
: “As with other French intellectuals, Sartre’s Maoist episode was a way station and rite of passage that allowed 
him to escape the political strictures of orthodox Marxism. But even more important, his association with the 
Maoists allowed him to think through problems concerning the role of the intellectual that had preoccupied him 
for years. Although Sartre was the consummate twentieth-century French intellectual, he always felt extremely ill 
at ease in this role. On the one hand, the intellectual claimed to be the exponent of universal values. On the other 
hand, he or she remained powerless to realize these values in real life. This chasm or breach afflicted the core of 
the intellectual’s being. It accounted for her endemic “bad faith” (mauvaise foi). Sartre’s Maoist commitment 
impelled him to view the intellectual’s role in an entirely new light.” See: Wolin 2010, 179. 
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concepts on the ashes of 20th century ideologies and their conceptual backgrounds. Recently, 
there were two concepts which have managed to “speak” to activists and political struggles for 
(social and political) change. The first is “populism” developed primarily by Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe. Spanish “Indignados” and later “Podemos” have clearly followed the post-
Marxian conceptual apparatus of Laclau/Mouffe. The whole logic of “radical democracy” 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985) and the “populist reason” (Laclau 2005) have been implemented in 
practice. Thereby “Podemos” abandoned classical Marxian “essentialism”.  What does this 
mean in conceptual terms? In a nutshell, the working class has lost its “privileged” position of 
the main carrier of radical (emancipatory) social change. The field of contestation has been 
shifted away from materially determined class struggle, and pointed towards discursive field of 
articulation. The idea of “left populism” introduced social demand as its central category and, 
among many unfulfilled social demands, Laclau argues, there should be one which may be 
capable of articulating all other demands. This demand Laclau calls “empty signifier”. 
Considering that each unfulfilled demand is carried by an actor, gathering social demands into 
one which is “emptied from meaning”, signified, by the same token, a convergence of different 
actors as well. What appears as crucial in Laclau is that all these demands and actors are 
pointed against a “common enemy”.  
Now, the link between Indignados and (especially) Podemos on the one hand, and Lacalau 
(and Mouffe) on the other, has become evident from numerous studies (Erejon and Mouffe 
2016; Valdivielso 2017; Agustin and Briziarelli 2018; Eklundh 2019). Had there not been a 
theoretically developed new “left populism”, Indignados or Podemos would have never 
occurred – at least not in the current shape (and possibly historical moment). Left populism 
however, has become the leitmotiv of Spanish “Podemos” and to a certain extent, Greek 
“Syriza” (and the mass popular movements behind them). The very idea of populism, apart 
from specific authors such as Laclau and Mouffe, is also often associated to the “Essex” scholars 
who still copiously work on academic production based on Laclau. The “Essex School” thus, 
might be considered, at least to an extent, a reaction to the previous victory by the (neoliberal) 
“Chicago school”.   
The second concept which has resonated with activists is David Harvey’s “the right to the 
city” (Harvey 2008) as the key conceptual pillar of municipalism, fueling the idea of “rebel 
cities” (Harvey 2012). These “rebel cities”, or “critical cities” as called by some authors (Naik 
and Oldfield 2012), have become the platform for plausible critique under circumstances of 
globalized world which make subversion on national or international levels, way more difficult 
than ever before. All these attempts sought to “re-politicize critical theory” (Kellner 1989, 225), 
make it applicable or, at least inspiring (again). Interestingly enough, by claiming that 
municipalist movements have been inspired by authors such as David Harvey, we go against the 
claim of no one else but Harvey himself. In his book on the “rebel cities” (2012), he argues that 
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“(…) the idea of the right to the city does not arise primarily out of various intellectual 
fascinations and fads (…)” It primarily, Harvey argues, “rises up from the streets, out from the 
neighborhoods, as a cry for help and sustenance by oppressed peoples in desperate times” 
(Harvey 2012, xiii). But at the same time, he emphasizes something that brings the story, again, 
back “on the side” of importance of ideas. The right to the city, Harvey argues, “can never be an 
end in itself, even if it increasingly looks to be one of the most propitious paths to take” (ibid., 
xviii). It might be true, in other words, that the very beginnings of municipal struggles were not 
inspired by any generic knowledge, but rather by deprivation and/or discontent based on a 
direct, every day experience. However, in order to perceive this experience as a part of a wider 
social and economic logic and politicize it, one needs generic knowledge. It definitely makes 
more sense, as Harvey argues, to claim that theoreticians actually learned from “ordinary” 
people and their local struggles. The “next step” however necessitates for conceptual 
knowledge to be essential, as it should prevent local municipal struggles from remaining “an 
end in itself” and connect them with other local, national or international struggles.  
The link between ideas and social and political action is indeed clear. But the research on 
the very ways in which this link is established has been lacking. By revealing the type of 
knowledge which matters with respect to activism today (in a given context of former 
Yugoslavia), and the specific role of generic (theoretical/conceptual) knowledge in the 
construction of a counter-hegemonic perception of reality, mechanisms of interaction between 
ideas and activists – this research precisely sought to provide a deeper understanding of the 
historically rooted ties between ideas and action. My aim, hereof, was to show that this linkage 
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